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Ranked among the world’s most competitive financial centres, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai have established themselves as Asia’s leading 
International Financial Centres (IFC’s). However, the existing literature on 
financial policy and IFC development remains focused on economic structural 
variables, overemphasizing a convergence in IFC development that is based 
on a set of common success factors. These typically include structural factors 
such as strategic location and time-zone, clustering and agglomeration of 
economic and financial activity, and the presence of transparent and robust 
regulatory and legal infrastructures.  
However, IFC’s are in reality vastly differentiated from each other. 
Differences exist across the three cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai in terms of their political systems, models of financial governance, 
the types of financial markets that each IFC is comparatively advantaged in, 
and the financial policies used by their respective governments in IFC 
development. Expectations of IFC convergence in the existing literature 
provide an inadequate basis for understanding IFC development.  
This thesis will show that there are more differences across IFC’s than 
is currently recognized by seeking to answer two research questions. First, 
how have Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai achieved their current levels 
of success as IFC’s?  Second, how have these three IFC’s managed to attain 
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their comparable levels of success despite differences in political-economic 
conditions? 
Given the prevalence of different policies leading to similar outcomes, 
there is a need for an analytical framework that explains both similarities and 
differences. Such a framework is provided in the form of the ‘nested 
instrumental approach’, which combines the policy instruments and policy 
subsystems approaches and allows for a more integrated understanding of both 
political context and policy considerations in the financial policymaking 
process. Importantly, causal linkages between context and policy are explored 
and their impacts on IFC success studied. 
Based on data collected over the course of fieldwork, the ‘nested 
instrumental approach’ is applied to the three cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Shanghai. Data collected includes in-depth specialist interviews with 
senior financial policymakers, private sector industry actors and other non-
state actors such as independent experts and academics as well as other 
qualitative data such as official government documents, publications and 
speeches. The use of qualitative data and a comparative case study approach 
provides a nuanced and contextually-rich understanding of IFC development 
and success, which stands in contrast to existing and predominantly 
quantitative studies of IFC development. 
The findings of my research allow me to argue that differences in 
policy subsystem configurations across the three cases have resulted in the 
xi 
 
formulation of different policy mixes comprising stabilizing, developmental, 
and enabling policies in varying weightage. The presence of a unique policy 
subsystem configuration in each IFC leads to the formulation and 
implementation of policy mixes tailored to the imperatives of the IFC’s 
subsystem configuration. In view of existing gaps in the literature, this thesis 
provides both empirical and theoretical contributions to the study of IFC’s by 
providing a clearer and more in-depth understanding of IFC development and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The rapid decline of Western developed economies such as the United 
States (US) and European Union (EU) in the wake of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) has been accompanied by an equally precipitous rise of 
emerging Asian economies such as China and Singapore. While post-GFC US 
and EU have been experiencing low or no growth, China and Singapore 
continue to enjoy strong GDP growth, with both countries boasting double 
digit growth in 2010.1  
This change in fortunes is particularly pronounced in the financial 
markets, which is both the cause of the current economic malaise in the US 
and EU and key driver of growth in China and Singapore. Although London 
and New York have both retained their positions as leading international 
financial centres (IFC’s), Asian IFC’s are fast catching up with them and 
displacing other hitherto dominant Western IFC’s.  
According to 2011’s Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI) 9, eight 
Asian financial centres were ranked among the twenty most competitive 
financial centres in the world, with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai 
ranked third, fourth and fifth place respectively. 2 While Shanghai has since 
                                                          
1 The World Bank, “GDP Growth (annual %),” The World Bank Database, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
2 Mark Yeandle, Jeremy Horne, and Nick Danev, The Global Financial Centres Index 9 
(London: Long Finance, March 2011), 2–4. 
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slipped to 16th place in September 2013’s GFCI 14,3 the Chinese government 
has unveiled a slew of policy initiatives to turn Shanghai into a full-fledged 
IFC by 2020. With Hong Kong and Singapore expected to retain their leading 
positions and Shanghai tipped to ascend IFC rankings on the back of 
continued support from the Chinese government, Asian IFC’s are poised to 
play an increasingly important role in global financial markets.  
While financial centre rankings such as the GFCI provide useful 
barometers for measuring the rise and dominance of Asian IFC’s, these 
rankings remain simplistic and overly reliant on quantifiable measures of 
competitiveness and connectivity that overstate the homogeneity of factors 
contributing to IFC success and development. This over-simplification stems 
from the existing literature on IFC’s and their development, which is discussed 
in the next chapter. This literature is derived from the works of economists and 
financial sector experts who had sought to document and understand the 
various factors that have led to the success of major IFC’s.  
These factors typically include strategic location and time-zone, 
clustering and agglomeration of economic and financial activity, and the 
presence of transparent and robust regulatory and legal infrastructures. 
Hierarchies of IFCs have been built based on the prevalence of these factors as 
well as the size of the financial sector in different IFC’s, implying a 
convergence among financial centres based on the development of these 
                                                          
3 Mark Yeandle and Nick Dranev, The Global Financial Centres Index 14 (London: Long 
Finance, September 2013). 
3 
 
common success factors. These hierarchies continue to inform the IFC 
rankings that currently hold sway over policymakers and public opinion on 
IFC development and success.  
In reality, IFC’s are vastly differentiated from each other. Each IFC is 
involved in a unique set of financial activities and follows variegated paths of 
historical and policy developments. Expectations of regulatory and IFC 
convergence in the existing literature provide an inadequate basis for 
understanding IFC development and result in an insufficiently comprehensive 
understanding of the types of policies required for IFC success. A particular 
weakness of the existing literature on IFC’s is its relatively underdeveloped 
understanding of the political economic context and set within this context, the 
policy preferences of policymakers underpinning each IFC’s development.  
As a result, the existing literature paints an overly-homogenous picture 
of IFC development, without adequately addressing the political economic and 
policy differences across different IFC’s. This is an important point to note, 
given that differences exist across the three cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Shanghai in terms of their political systems and context, models of 
financial governance, the types of financial markets that each IFC is 
comparatively advantaged in, and the financial policies used by their 
respective governments in IFC development. 
Singapore’s rise as a leading IFC has been driven by its strategic 
geographic location, political and economic stability, efficient and reliable 
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infrastructure, high regulatory standards, and robust legal system. While 
offering a broad range of financial services, Singapore’s financial centre is 
characterized by its formative role in the Asian Dollar Market, its deep and 
liquid capital markets, and its emerging role as a leading hub for wealth 
management and insurance4.  
Although Singapore’s development as an IFC was initially state-
driven, with the financial sector recognized by the government as a priority 
sector contributing to overall economic development, subsequent involvement 
of the private sector in financial policy through extensive consultation and 
dialogues has resulted in state-industry ‘co-creation’ of financial policies. 
Singapore’s development as an IFC thus relies on the co-dominant roles of 
both the state and industry as financial policymakers.  
Similarly, Hong Kong’s success as an IFC is based on its low taxes, 
sound legal system, and efficient infrastructure. Furthermore, it benefits from 
its economic and political proximity to rising China. This availability of a 
Chinese “economic hinterland” has allowed Hong Kong to become China’s 
main offshore financial centre and constitutes the Special Administrative 
Region’s (SAR) main advantage5. Hong Kong has since capitalized on this 
                                                          
4 “Singapore Financial Centre,” Monetary Authority of Singapore Website, June 23, 2012, 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-Financial-Centre.aspx. 




‘China advantage’ by leveraging on the ongoing liberalization of the RMB and 
positioning itself as the leading offshore RMB centre6.  
In contrast to the Singapore government’s more proactive financial 
policy role, Hong Kong largely operates according to free market principles, 
with state intervention at a minimum. However, this means that state-industry 
linkages are less dense, since the government’s non-interventionist stance does 
not require as much feedback from the industry. While industry consultation 
does take place, it does not contribute significantly to financial policymaking. 
Nonetheless, the Hong Kong government has recently played a more active 
role in developing a market for trade in RMB and RMB-denominated 
investment products, vigorously promoting itself as the leading offshore RMB 
centre. 
Despite being a relative late-comer, Shanghai’s rapid rise over the past 
decade has made it the “domestic financial hub of mainland China” and a 
centre for a diverse variety of Chinese financial activities7. It is also slated to 
become a full IFC by 20208 and aims to become a global centre for RMB 
                                                          
6 George Ng, “Hong Kong Banks on Yuan for the Future,” China Daily, July 1, 2012, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/HK15th/2012-07/01/content_15539890.htm. 
7 James Laurenceson and Kam Ki Tang, “Shanghai’s Development as an International 
Financial Center,” Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP) 08, no. 
01 (2005): 148. 
8 Kristine Lim, “China’s Regulators Urge for Reform of Financial Sector - Channel 




trading by 20159 . All this is intricately linked to China’s overall national 
development, with the state “determining the timing, pace and economic and 
spatial configuration of Shanghai’s development” 10 . Shanghai’s economic 
reforms are thus linked to national goals of economic development and 
financialization.  
Financial sector development in Shanghai is heavily state-driven, with 
both central and municipal government agencies actively involved in financial 
policymaking. Like Hong Kong, financial policymaking lies within the control 
of the state. However, Shanghai exhibits a much larger extent of state 
intervention in financial markets than Hong Kong. Given that a majority of the 
financial institutions operating in Shanghai are state-owned or joint ventures 
with state-owned enterprises, financial market participation in Shanghai is also 
state-dominated. Unlike the case of Singapore, there is very little space for 
private sector industry actors to influence financial policymaking in Shanghai. 
In short, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai are each driven by their 
unique political economic circumstances, which further feeds into each IFC’s 
unique financial policy practices and preferences. Observers have noted that 
“Asia’s multiple and varied financial centres reflect not only the region’s vast 
                                                          
9 “Shanghai Aims to Become Global Yuan Trading Center by 2015,” Bloomberg News, 
January 31, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-31/shanghai-aims-to-become-
global-yuan-trading-center-by-2015.html. 
10 Karen Lai, “Developing Shanghai as an International Financial Centre: Progress and 
Prospects,” China Policy Institute Discussion Paper 4 (2006): 2. 
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geography but also its different economic realities”11. Despite such distinct 
differences in political economic circumstances, all three cities have rapidly 
risen up the ranks to become the fastest growing IFC’s in Asia. This thesis 
argues that such success was achieved through the respective governments’ 
roles in formulating and implementing financial policies that are tailored to 
each IFC’s political economic circumstances.  
This means that each IFC’s success is underpinned by a unique set or 
mix of financial policies. Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai have thus 
attained comparable levels of success as the fastest growing IFC’s in Asia 
based on the implementation of different mixes of financial policies that 
reflect their unique individual political economic contexts. This goes against 
the conventional wisdom of IFC convergence as espoused by the existing 
literature, which does not adequately take into account such differences in 
political economic context and the types of financial policies implemented 
within each IFC but instead over-emphasizes commonality in economic 
structural variables.  
This thesis seeks to provide a clearer understanding of how Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai have each risen to their positions as leading 
Asian IFC’s, focusing in particular on the interactions between the political 
exigencies of policy subsystems and policy considerations in the form of 
policy instruments and mixes. Given that the existing literature does not 
                                                          
11 “All Shapes and Sizes: Asia’s Financial Centres Reflect Its Vast Geography and Divergent 
Economies,” The Economist, September 13, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/9753204. 
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provide the analytical tools that allow for such an undertaking, this thesis 
develops an analytical framework termed the “nested instrumental approach”, 
which combines the policy subsystem and policy instruments approaches for a 
more integrated and nuanced analysis of IFC development.  This approach is 
briefly described in the next section and further discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The Nested Instrumental Approach 
In combining the policy subsystem and policy instruments approaches, 
the nested instrumental approach provides an integrated framework for 
analysis that melds both political context and policy considerations in 
understanding IFC development and success. While Chapter 3 provides a 
deeper discussion of the approach by delineating its component parts and 
describing its inherent logic of ‘nested instrumentality’, this section briefly 
introduces the nested instrumental approach. Figure 1.1 below provides a 
general illustration of the nested instrumental approach.  







Policy Output Policy Mix 
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As Figure 1.1 shows, the nested instrumental approach takes the policy 
subsystem as its basic unit of analysis. A policy subsystem is essentially a set 
of “actors with sufficient knowledge of a problem area, or a resource at stake, 
to allow them to participate in the process of developing possible alternative 
courses of action to address the issues raised at the agenda-setting stage”.12 
While policy subsystem configuration has been related to the openness of a 
subsystem to new actors and ideas, 13  this thesis defines policy subsystem 
configuration around relations of dominance and dependence among 
subsystem actors. This means that subsystems are configured around a 
dominant actor or set of actors. This concept of subsystem actor dominance 
draws from Sabatier’s work on advocacy coalitions, which posits the presence 
of dominant coalitions within a subsystem.14   
Policy subsystem configurations subsequently define policy mix 
design, which in turn determines the attainment of desired policy outputs. In 
other words, a policy mix is ‘nested’ within its policy subsystem, with the 
design of the policy mix and its component instruments defined by the 
interests, preferences, and beliefs of dominant actors. This use of policy 
instruments as a means for achieving policy outputs within the political 
                                                          
12 Michael Howlett, M. Ramesh, and Anthony Perl, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and 
Policy Subsystems, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12. 
13 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, “Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: 
Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the Politics of the Policy Process,” Policy 
Studies Journal 26, no. 3 (1998): 473–474. 
14 Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of 
Policy-Oriented Learning Therein,” Policy Sciences 21, no. 2–3 (1988): 129–68. 
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economic context of the policy subsystem connotes a logic of ‘nested 
instrumentality’.  
While the role of dominant actors in instrument choice has received 
some attention in work on “instrumental constituencies”,15 this thesis expands 
on this existing work by studying the various ways in which dominant actors 
exert their influence over policy mix design. Dominant actors influence policy 
mix design through two channels: an instrumental channel that involves 
instrumental constituencies and an ideational channel involving advocacy 
coalitions. This will be further discussed in Chapter 3.  
This thesis argues that such a logic of nested instrumentality underpins 
IFC development in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai. In all three cases, 
individual subsystem configurations have led to the design of unique policy 
mixes that both reflect and cater to the interests, preferences, and beliefs of 
dominant subsystem actors and which are implemented for the attainment of 
desired policy outputs such as financial system stability or IFC development.  
While the nested instrumental approach is discussed at greater length 
in Chapter 3, it is suffice to say that this approach provides the necessary 
depth and nuance to provide a clearer understanding of the determinants and 
pathways of IFC development and success. This is as yet inadequately 
                                                          
15 Jan-Peter Voss and Arno Simons, Instrument Constituencies and the Supply-Side of Policy 
Innovation, Paper presented at International Workshop: Designing Optimal Policy Mixes: 
Principles and Methods. (Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National 
University of Singapore, March 29, 2013). 
11 
 
achieved in the existing literature. The nested instrumental approach is 
subsequently applied to the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai in 
Chapter 7. The next section discusses the rationale and motivations behind this 
thesis’s choice of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai as case studies.  
 
Justification for Choice of Cases  
Consistently ranked among the top five most competitive IFC’s 
globally, Hong Kong and Singapore are the most successful IFC’s to have 
emerged from Asia. While Shanghai’s position in global rankings has 
fluctuated, it remains ranked among the top IFC’s in Asia. Furthermore, the 
Chinese central government has made clear its intentions to establish Shanghai 
as a leading IFC by 2020. Taken together, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Shanghai are the fastest growing IFC’s in Asia.  
Aside from their strong showing on global IFC rankings such as the 
GFCI, the financial sector contributes significantly to the GDP of the three 
cities. This reflects the presence of highly developed financial markets and 
hence is testament to the success of financial policy in all three cases. In Hong 
Kong, financial and insurance services made up close to 16% of the SAR’s 
GDP in 2012,16 while financial and insurance services contributed 10.6% to 
                                                          




Singapore’s GDP in the same year.17 While similar figures for Shanghai are 
not available, reports have shown that Shanghai’s services industry 
contributed to 62.2% of the municipality’s GDP in 2013, with financial 
services being among the top three largest services industries.18 In short, the 
financial services sector make up an important component of the economy in 
the three cities.  
Based on extant similarities, the three IFC’s are highly comparable for 
various reasons. First, all three IFC’s have emerged from similar historical 
roles as trading entrepot. While Hong Kong and Singapore first started off as 
trading ports for their British colonial masters, Shanghai has a long history of 
being a key port for Chinese trade with the rest of the world. In all three cases, 
the emergence and development of early financial institutions was predicated 
upon the presence of substantial trade activity. As a consequence of their 
positions as global trade and finance hubs, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai are all considered major or “Alpha+” Global Cities.19 
Other similar historical precedents include historical backgrounds of 
colonial rule and time-frame of financial sector development. Both Hong 
Kong and Singapore started off as British colonies, while Shanghai 
                                                          
17 Singapore Department of Statistics, “Gross Domestic Product by Industry,” 2014. 
18 Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Shanghai: Market Profile (Hong Kong: HKTDC, 
March 17, 2014), http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Fast-
Facts/Shanghai-Market-Profile/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X06BVOR.htm. 
19 Saskia Sassen, Global Networks,Linked Cities (New York, NY, 10001: Routledge, 2001); 
GaWC Research Network, The World According to GaWC 2010 (Loughborough University, 
September 14, 2011), http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2010t.html. 
13 
 
experienced occupation by Britain, France, the United States, and Japan 
between the Opium War and the Second World War. The presence of foreign 
powers in all three cases had stimulated increased cross-border trading 
activities and the emergence of financial services related to foreign trade.  
Furthermore, all three cities had emerged as IFC’s during the 1970s. 
Although there was some trade-related financial activity in post-War Hong 
Kong,20 it was only with the rapid internationalization of its financial services 
during the 1970s that Hong Kong truly emerged as an IFC.21 Similarly, the 
post-independence Singapore state actively planned and developed its 
financial sector in the late 1960s to early 1970s22. Although it was only in the 
1980s that Shanghai received more explicit support from the central 
government for its development as an IFC, Shanghai’s emergence as an IFC 
can be traced back to China’s 1979 economic reforms.  
Most importantly, all three IFC’s are run by highly capable and 
autonomous governments. 23  Since its independence in 1965, Singapore’s 
                                                          
20 Catherine R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre: Emergence and 
Development 1945-1960 (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
21 Reed, “The Ascent of Tokyo as an International Financial Center,” 45; Y.C. Jao, “Hong 
Kong as a Regional Financial Centre: Evolution and Prospects,” in Dilemmas of Growth, ed. 
Chi-Keung Leung, J.W. Cushman, and Gungwu Wang (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1980), 163. 
22 Swee Liang Tan, “The Development of Singapore’s Financial Sector: A Review and Some 
Thoughts on Its Future Prospects,” in The Economic Prospects of Singapore, ed. Winston T. 
H Koh and Roberto S. Mariano (Singapore: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2006), 248. 
23 Hong Kong and Singapore are both ranked highly on government effectiveness by the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports; For the effectiveness and 
autonomy of the Shanghai government, see Fulong Wu, “The Global and Local Dimensions of 




People’s Action Party (PAP) has retained one-party rule. Given continued 
popular support for the PAP, the Singapore government possesses an 
extraordinary amount of policy autonomy and capacity. Although Hong Kong 
was returned to Chinese rule in 1997, its status as a Special Autonomous 
Region (SAR) has allowed the Hong Kong government to retain a high level 
of autonomy in economic policymaking. While Shanghai is neither an 
independent state nor an autonomous region but a municipality under Chinese 
central government rule, the Shanghai municipal government enjoys 
significant autonomy from the centre,24 bolstered by the presence of a pro-
growth coalition led by the local government.25 
However, the three cases are also different in two important ways. 
Firstly, political and policy arrangements differ across the three IFC’s. The 
Hong Kong government operates within a highly liberal political environment 
and plays a minimal role in financial sector development due to its belief in 
the free markets. In contrast, the Singapore government is much more hands-
on in its approach to financial sector development, although industry actors are 
also heavily involved and influential in the formulation of financial policies. 
While Shanghai is similarly state-driven in its financial sector development, it 
does not feature private sector actors in financial policymaking due to the 
                                                          
24 Ibid.; Hongyi Lai, Reform and the Non- State Economy in China: The Political Economy of 
Liberalization Strategies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
25 Tingwei Zhang, “Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai,” 
Urban Affairs Review 37, no. 4 (March 1, 2002): 475–99. 
15 
 
dominance of state-owned banks and financial institutions in its financial 
markets.  
As such, financial policymaking in Shanghai is almost completely 
state-dominated, while that in Singapore is state-led with strong private sector 
participation and Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach features minimal 
government intervention that allows private sector actors to drive financial 
sector development within the boundaries of the legal and regulatory 
infrastructure. These differences in political economic context flow into 
differences in the types of policies enacted to develop the respective financial 
sectors. Given that this linkage between political context and the policy 
process is  relatively under-studied in the existing literature, this thesis will 
address this shortcoming through the ‘nested instrumental approach’ discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 7.  
Secondly, the three IFC’s feature distinctly different types of financial 
markets and activities. This has resulted in the formation of different 
comparative advantages across the three IFC’s. Hong Kong’s deep and liquid 
securities market and proximity to China have allowed it to establish itself as a 
loan syndication and offshore RMB centre. Based on its first mover advantage 
in establishing the Asian Development Market and the government’s 
successful efforts at attracting private banking and fund management 
activities, Singapore is well-established as a Foreign Exchange (Forex) and 
Wealth Management Centre. Owing to the Chinese government’s fiscal 
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policies and the size of Shanghai’s primary and secondary sectors, Shanghai 
has relatively large and active markets for debt and commodities futures.26  
While the existing literature alludes to such differences in financial 
sector activities across the three financial centres, few attempts have been 
made to understand why these differences exist and more specifically how the 
different political contexts and policy preferences of the three IFC’s influence 
or result in the formation of these different financial sector specializations.  
  In sum, distinct similarities across the three cases have allowed this 
thesis to take Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai as comparable case 
studies. In fact, the three cases make up a natural experiment on how IFC’s 
can be developed upon emergence. Similarities in historical beginnings of 
trade and colonialism serve to equalize initial conditions. Furthermore, 
similarities in time-frame mean that all three centres faced similar global 
economic conditions, neutralizing potential exogenous factors arising from the 
external global economic environment.  
Being ranked at similar levels in global city and IFC rankings also 
suggests that the three IFC’s have reached similar levels of success and 
development, rendering them suitable for direct comparison. Lastly, the 
presence of strong and autonomous governments in all three IFC’s allows this 
thesis to compare them as cities and policymaking units in their own rights. In 
                                                          
26 Y. C. Jao, “Shanghai and Hong Kong as International Financial Centres: Historical 
Perspective and Contemporary Analysis,” Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business 
Strategy Working Paper, no. 1071 (September 2003): 19–20. 
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sum, all three IFC’s are highly comparable. They are also historically, 
spatially, and temporally well-placed to be considered parts of a natural 
experiment.  
These similarities are related to the typical structural economic factors 
which contribute to an IFC’s success, as identified by the existing IFC 
literature. These factors typically include favourable geographic locations and 
time-zones, robust legal and regulatory infrastructures, and factors related to 
clustering and agglomeration of financial activities. However, in light of the 
differences identified above, a focus on these economic structural factors 
neglects the impact of politically-driven and policy-related differences on 
financial policymaking and IFC development. This suggests the need for a 
more nuanced approach to understanding IFC development and success, 
taking into account the impacts of political economic context and financial 
policy practices within each IFC.   
Such differences in political context and financial policy practices are 
important for illustrating how different financial policy regimes can lead to 
comparable levels of IFC development and success. Drawing on the example 
of Hong Kong and Singapore, Tan and Lim note that similar levels of IFC 
success may be driven by “different philosophies” and different extents of 
government intervention. 27  Importantly, differences in the financial sector 
specializations of the three IFC’s refute the existing literature’s expectations of 
                                                          
27 Chwee Huat Tan and Joseph Young Sain Lim, Singapore and Hong Kong as Competing 
Financial Centres (Singapore: Saw Centre Financial Studies, 2007), 73. 
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IFC convergence and suggest the need for a deeper study of how unique 
comparative advantages are developed as a consequence of different policy 
instruments and mixes used in IFC development. 
It is also important to note that all three IFC’s represent cases of 
success in financial sector development. It is not in the scope of this thesis to 
study instances of IFC failure. As it is, the success of Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and Singapore as IFC’s has not been adequately studied, neither do the few 
existing studies of their success possess sufficient analytical depth. 
Furthermore, the differences in political context and financial policy practices 
highlighted above suggest that introducing instances of IFC failure would limit 
the potential for comparison.  
By delving into the subsystem configurations and policy mixes of each 
IFC and how these have driven their individual successes, this thesis plugs 
existing gaps in current understandings of IFC development and success. The 
findings and results of this thesis will in turn facilitate further studies of why 
IFC’s in other contexts have not been able to attain the success enjoyed by 
these three cases.  
In particular, this thesis’s development and application of the ‘nested 
instrumental approach’ as a framework for analysis paves the way for a similar 
application of this approach to failed IFC’s in future research. Studying the 
success of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai is thus a first step towards 
the eventual development of an integrative analytical framework that studies 
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both the success and failure of IFC’s, assessing both policy subsystem 
configurations and policy instrument mixes in different IFC’s and their 
impacts on IFC success and failure.  
 
Summary of Argument 
This thesis is driven by two research questions. First, how have Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai achieved their current levels of success as 
IFC’s?  Second, how have these three IFC’s managed to attain their 
comparable levels of success despite differences in political-economic 
conditions? I argue that IFC success in all three cases is related to the way in 
which policy mix design is embedded within each IFC’s unique policy 
subsystem configuration.  
As discussed in later chapters, financial policy mixes typically 
comprise stabilizing, developmental, and enabling policies in varying 
weightage, reflecting the interests and preferences of dominant subsystem 
actors. Specifically, dominant subsystem actors are able to influence policy 
mix design, in terms of the weightage of these three types of financial policies 
within a financial policy mix, through two channels: an instrumental channel 
involving participation in instruments constituencies and an ideational channel 
involving the formation of advocacy coalitions. These two channels and the 
subsystem configurations involved are discussed in Chapter 3.  
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However, the interests and preferences of financial policy actors and 
the overall political economic context within which these are embedded are 
largely ignored in the existing IFC literature. Instead, this literature over-
emphasizes structural economic factors and overstates the convergence of IFC 
development models, glossing over actual differences in political economic 
context and financial policies implemented. The IFC literature and its 
limitations are discussed in the next chapter.  
As this thesis will show, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai have all 
attained success as IFC’s by nesting policy mix design within the political 
economic context of prevailing policy subsystem configurations. The presence 
of a unique policy subsystem configuration in each IFC has led to the adaptive 
formulation and implementation of policy mixes tailored to the IFC’s 
subsystem configuration. This is largely achieved through the influence of 
dominant subsystem actors working through instrumental and ideational 
channels to exercise and enforce their instrument preferences and policy 
beliefs in policy mix design. 
However, this causal linkage between subsystem configuration and 
policy mix design remains under-explored and hence insufficiently explicated 
by the existing policy subsystems and policy instruments literatures, which 
have instead developed separately from each other. This has resulted in a lack 
of the analytical tools necessary for understanding policy design within policy 
subsystem configurations. As Chapters 3 and 7 will show, this limitation is 
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overcome through a combination of the policy instruments and policy 
subsystems approaches in a more integrated analytical framework termed the 
“nested instrumental approach”. This allows for a deeper understanding and 
appreciation of the causal linkage between subsystem configurations and 
policy mix design, focusing in particular on the abovementioned instrumental 
and ideational channels through which dominant subsystem actors are able to 
influence policy mix design.  
At the operational level, IFC development and success in all three 
cases involve the formulation and implementation of stabilizing, 
developmental, and enabling financial policies by the respective regulatory 
agencies. This means that aside from their traditionally prescribed roles in 
regulating and supervising financial markets, regulatory agencies are in effect 
policymaking units directly involved in the formulation, implementation and 
enforcement of policies that directly contribute to IFC development and 
promotion. As such, this thesis focuses on the role of regulatory agencies as 
key financial policymakers, with field research largely geared towards 
collecting information from regulatory sources.  
By combining the policy subsystems and policy instruments 
approaches through the nested instrument approach, this thesis also contributes 
to public policy theory. Given that existing studies of policy instruments 
underemphasize context and that the policy subsystem approach does not 
sufficiently address the actual policy instruments being implemented, the 
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combination of both approaches in the ‘nested instrumental approach’ 
overcomes the limitations of both theoretical approaches. Specifically, the 
nested instrumental approach delineates and studies the financial policy 
instruments used in IFC development within the political economic context of 
the policy subsystem rather than studying instruments and subsystems 
separately.    
This merging of tools and context yields a more nuanced and 
integrative approach to studying public policy, which not only takes into 
account both political context and policy considerations, but the interactions 
between these two sets of variables as well. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, 
the nested instrumental approach has allowed this thesis to make both 
empirical and theoretical contributions to the field.  
 
Summary of Thesis  
Having provided an introduction to the rationale for this thesis as well 
as a brief overlay of my argument, Chapters 2 and 3 delve into the theoretical 
and methodological basis of this thesis, while Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with the 
specific case studies. With Chapters 4, 5 and 6 providing a descriptive 
backdrop, Chapter 7 provides comparative analyses and applies the nested 
instrumental approach to the three cases. Chapter 8 provides conclusions, 
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rounding up the findings and arguments of this thesis. The following 
paragraphs provide a more detailed summary of the thesis chapters.    
A review of the relevant literature is provided in Chapter 2. In this 
chapter, I first review the literature on financial policy and financial sector 
regulation in general, followed by the more specialized IFC literature. 
However, these literatures do not adequately explain the exact means through 
which governments of IFC’s attain success nor do they address the impact of 
the political-economic context on IFC development. Hence, there is a need for 
a new theoretical framework based on an amalgamation of the existing work 
on policy subsystems and policy instruments.  
This is provided in Chapter 3, which delves into the theoretical 
framework and research methodology underlying this thesis. Based on a 
combination of the policy instruments and policy subsystems approaches, I 
develop and describe the ‘nested instrument approach’. A brief overview of 
the existing literatures on policy instruments and policy subsystems is 
provided, providing the theoretical background necessary for the proceeding 
section’s detailed discussion of the nested instrumental approach. 
This discussion of the nested instrumental approach is followed by an 
overview of the research methods employed in this thesis, mainly comparative 
case study and qualitative research methods. I end this chapter with a 
description of the field work which underpins the research for this thesis. In 
particular, I discuss the in-depth expert interviews which I had carried out as 
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well as the process of collecting other primary data such as official documents 
and speeches. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 delve into the actual case material, with Chapter 4 
focusing on Hong Kong, Chapter 5 on Singapore, and Chapter 6 on Shanghai. 
Each chapter comprises an overview of the historical development of the IFC, 
descriptions of each IFC’s comparative advantages, models of financial 
governance, regulatory regimes, policy mixes used by the respective 
governments, and policy subsystem configurations. All case material is based 
on primary data collected during field work as well as existing scholarly work. 
Taken together, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide in-depth descriptions of the cases, 
delineating and describing the historical development and political-economic 
context of each IFC as well as the policies enacted to build and develop these 
IFC’s.  
Description is naturally followed by analysis. Chapter 7 provides a 
comparative analysis of the three cases, explaining similarities and differences 
across the cases in terms of their comparative advantages, financial 
governance models, regulatory agencies, financial policy mixes, and financial 
policy subsystems. I then apply the ‘nested instrumental approach’ to the 
cases. This entails combining insights on the subsystem configurations and 




Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of the findings of this 
thesis and the issues which this thesis has addressed. I also suggest other 
potential avenues of further research in the study of IFC’s and discuss the 
















Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
At the heart of financial sector development is financial policy. Any 
study of IFC development necessarily requires a good understanding of the 
financial policies that underpin an IFC’s success. To this end, a well-
established literature on financial sector policy and development provides the 
analytical tools required for understanding how government policies facilitate 
or affect IFC development. Yet this literature does not adequately take into 
account contextual and spatial variables, focusing instead on financial policy 
only at a general level and within the domestic economy.    
The recognition of these flaws prompted the development of a more 
specific literature on IFC’s that sought to document and understand the rise 
and success of leading IFC’s such as London and New York. Predominantly 
driven by the work of economists and geographers, these studies contributed 
to the formation of a specific literature on IFC’s that accounts for spatiality 
and temporality in financial policy, as manifested in IFC’s that act as nodes or 
conduits in global flows of capital. In doing so, the IFC literature took a more 
international perspective of financial sector development that is more 
reflective of the increasingly globalized financial markets, situating the IFC 
and financial policy process within the international context.  
Taken together, the literatures on financial policy and IFC’s provide 
the background information and conceptual knowledge necessary for studying 
the success of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai as IFC’s. However, the 
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existing literatures on financial policy and IFC’s do not sufficiently address 
the development of IFC’s in the context of emerging Asia. Furthermore, the 
financial policy literature does not provide an adequate understanding of 
financial policies as policy instruments and the different ways in which 
different financial policies are used in financial sector development.  
Most importantly, the political economic context within which IFC’s 
exist is insufficiently explored by proponents of both literatures, with the 
implication being a less than satisfactory understanding of how inter-actor 
relations and politics within an IFC determine the financial policymaking 
process. This means that the financial policy and IFC literatures are limited by 
analytical shortcomings that hamper their ability to provide a complete 
understanding of IFC development in Asia.  
While the next chapter provides the theoretical and methodological 
foundations which allow this thesis to overcome these existing shortcomings 
and limitations, there is first a need to understand the existing work of scholars 
on financial policy and IFC’s. In the following sections, I first review the 
literature on financial sector policy and development, followed by the more 




Financial Sector Policy and Development  
Given the financial sector’s role in generating revenues and supporting 
real economic growth, research and scholarly work on financial policy have 
long been related to the impact of the financial sector on the real economy. 
Financial sector development has been shown to be an important driving force 
for economic growth through what is known as a “finance-growth nexus”,28 
with financial depth identified as a significant contributing variable to real 
economic growth.29 Financial sector development also stimulates growth less 
directly by boosting manufacturing activities and stimulating trade. 30 
Conversely, real economic growth may also stimulate financial sector 
expansion via increased savings, suggesting a “reciprocal externality” between 
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the financial and real sectors within an overall process of endogenous 
growth.31  
Given this important contribution of financial sector development to 
economic growth, scholarly work and theoretical advancements in the fields of 
economics and IPE have sought to understand and conceptualize how states 
promote economic growth and competitiveness through financial sector 
development. However, economists have tended to view financial sector 
development as a market-driven consequence of burgeoning supply and 
demand for financial services while IPE scholars have focused on the active, 
targeted and often strategic government interventions that drive financial 
sector development.32  
In the aftermath of the GFC in 2008, economists have taken a greater 
interest in government intervention in financial markets and how such 
interventions can be used to prevent future crises. While the study of financial 
crises pre-date the GFC,33 this recent surge in attention on financial crises has 
brought a renewed focus on financial policies as both the cause of and 
potential solution to financial crises.34 However, these studies have framed 
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financial policy narrowly within the context of financial crises, resulting in an 
overarching focus on crisis management measures rather than measures geared 
towards building up and developing new financial markets or sectors. Given 
the relative youth of Asian IFC’s and ongoing efforts at financial sector 
development by their respective governments, there is a need to refocus on the 
policies that are being used to build up emerging financial markets.  
In contrast, the works of IPE scholars in the 1990s have focused on the 
significant role of the state in promulgating policies aimed at financial sector 
development. This state-centric approach has yield key theoretical innovations 
such as the developmental state and competition state models.35 Other IPE 
scholars have sought to understand financial sector development in the context 
of the international system. Based on Waltz’s three images of international 
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relations, Cohen provides four models for understanding the rise of global 
finance: the liberal, realist, pluralist and cognitive models. 36  Dombrowski 
takes a structural realist view by suggesting that financial globalization has 
resulted in intense competition among states, with states undercutting each 
other in order to attract financial capital and gain competitive advantage.37  
While such studies have yielded important insights into the role of the 
state in driving financial sector development and how states compete with 
each other in global financial markets, they remain at an overly-broad level of 
conception and do not sufficiently explicate the actual policies or means used 
by the state to facilitate financial sector development, aside from neo-classical 
prescriptions of “laissez faire” non-intervention. 38  These existing concepts, 
such as the developmental state model, will thus not feature in this thesis’s 
conceptual and analytical framing. Nonetheless, more recent scholarly work 
has attempted to conceptualize and categorize financial sector management 
policies. 
At the heart of financial sector development is financial policy. 
According to Polak, financial policies relate both to the domestic financial 
structure of the economy as well as the external financial structure, with the 
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latter including exchange rates, and the rules and institutions that guide capital 
flows.39 Polak reaffirms the ‘finance-growth nexus’ by noting that economic 
development is the “yardstick by which financial flows and financial policies 
can be made commensurate”.40 This necessitates a strong regulatory role of the 
state, with government interventions focused on reducing market failure.41  
More broadly speaking, financial policy involves seeking the “right 
balance among policy instruments”, with financial regulation being part of a 
set of ‘complementary financial policy instruments’. 42  Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine have emphasized the importance of financial policies in shaping the 
“structure and functioning of financial systems” by ensuring political and 
macroeconomic stability, establishing the legal and information infrastructure 
necessary for financial transactions to take place as well as a regulatory and 
supervisory infrastructure that ‘enables’ and empowers markets by 
encouraging financial market competition, liberalization and access.43  
Similarly, the World Bank’s recent GFDR report emphasizes the role 
of the state in better aligning private incentives to private interests, 
establishing sound regulatory and supervisory frameworks, encouraging 
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financial market contestability and competition, promoting transparency of 
information and strengthening the governance of state-owned banks. 44  In 
short, the GFDR report posits that financial sector policies should be geared 
towards “providing supervision, ensuring healthy competition, and 
strengthening financial infrastructure”45. 
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz have also suggested that a set of 
“financial restraint” policies form the core of government efforts at financial 
deepening and financial sector development.46 Financial restraint policies aim 
to create rents in the financial sector through selective government 
interventions such as deposit rate controls, regulations on entry, and 
restrictions on competition, in the process reducing opportunistic behaviour 
and inducing efficiency among private market actors. 47  Financial restraint 
policies also contribute towards the build-up of ‘reputational capital among 
private agents and the development of strong governance mechanisms in 
financial institutions.48  
However, these fledgling attempts to conceptualize the financial policy 
process remain overly focused on its regulatory aspects. In reality, financial 
                                                          
44 The World Bank, Rethinking the  Role of the State in Finance, Global Financial 
Development Report (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2013). 
45 Ibid., 2. 
46 Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz, “Financial Restraint: Towards a New Paradigm,” 2. 
47 Thomas Hellman and Kelvin Murdock, “Financial Sector Development Policy: The 
Importance of Reputational Capital and Governacne,” in Development Strategy and 
Management of the Market Economy, ed. Istvan P. Szekely and Richard Sabot, vol. 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 273; Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz, “Financial Restraint: 
Towards a New Paradigm,” 2–3. 
48 Hellman and Murdock, “Financial Sector Development Policy: The Importance of 
Reputational Capital and Governacne.” 
34 
 
policy involves a wide array of government interventions, with financial 
regulation representing merely one aspect or type of financial policy. This is 
particularly the case in East Asia, where the state’s role in financial markets 
has involved creating, regulating, and even directing credit to financial 
institutions, with financial policies serving to both ensure market stability and 
encourage financial sector growth. 49  Similarly, Carmichael notes that the 
public sector participates in the financial sector through its various roles as 
regulator of financial institutions, owner of financial institutions, market 
participant, fiduciary agent, and through direct intervention in market 
operations.50 
In more recent attempts to develop a comprehensive understanding and 
typology of financial policies, Barajas et al state that financial policy involves 
the formulation of an “adequate policy mix to achieve the optimum, or long-
term sustainable level of financial sector development” that is represented by a 
“financial possibility frontier” (FPF).51 In particular, three sets of financial 
sector policies have been identified. These are: (i) market-developing policies 
that push the FPF outwards through the long-term building of institutions and 
infrastructure; (ii) market-enabling policies that shift a financial system 
towards the FPF via regulatory reforms and encouraging greater competition; 
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(iii) market-stabilizing policies that prevent a financial system from moving 
beyond the FPF through regulatory oversight and macro-prudential 
management.52  
While this typology by Barajas et al represents an important step 
forward in understanding financial policies, the three types of financial 
policies identified have in reality received varying levels of attention in the 
existing literature, with much of the literature focusing on market-stabilizing 
policies and new emerging work beginning to explicitly recognize market-
developing and market-enabling policies. As such, the remainder of this 
section uses this categorization of financial policies as a heuristic to 
understand the existing literature on financial policy.  
According to mainstream conceptions of financial policy, the raison 
d’être of financial policy is essentially the maintenance of market stability. 
This stabilizing aspect and its inherent objectives of market stability and 
investor protection remains the most-commonly held view of financial policy. 
Under this view, the “core goals” of financial policy are basically the 
maintenance of financial system stability and integrity, protection of 
depositors and investors, as well as ensuring that financial intermediaries 
perform their fiduciary duties to their clients and shareholders.53 Examples of 
stabilizing policies include deposit insurance, provisions for information 
disclosure and minimum capital requirements. 
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As an important stabilizing financial policy instrument, financial 
regulation is commonly understood as “laws and rules that govern what 
financial institutions such as banks, brokers and investment companies can 
do”, with an aim to “protect investors, maintain orderly markets and promote 
financial stability”.54 In his oft-cited 1988 article, Stigler defines regulation as 
"any policy that alters market outcomes by the exercise of some coercive 
government power".55 The range of regulatory activities can include setting 
minimum standards for capital and conduct, making regular inspections, and 
investigating and prosecuting misconduct”.56  
Financial regulation is thus based on an “essential faith in capitalism” 
that precludes government intervention in markets 57 . Vittas notes that the 
rationale for financial regulation lies in the “existence of market failure in 
financial systems arising from externalities, market power, and informational 
problems”. 58  Hence as a stabilizing financial policy instrument, financial 
regulation allows for the efficient allocation of capital resources by ensuring 
that financial markets are free from both market distortions and state 
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intervention. In a sense, this means that stabilizing instruments are an 
important part of the free market mechanism.  
However, this commonly-accepted stabilizing view of financial policy 
does not take into account the more active and direct roles of financial 
policymakers in financial sector development. Due to distributional concerns 
inherent in the political process, financial regulation has often been used by 
governments to achieve objectives that may not be related to market stability 
and consumer protection, such as protecting domestic financial institutions or 
“supporting specific industrial or regional policies by channelling funds to 
particular sectors”.59  
Cerny has also identified two “competing models of capitalism” that 
feed into two different models of financial policy: (i) market-driven ‘arms-
length’ financial systems, and (ii) “developmental” or “strategic” financial 
systems that promote the integration of industrial and financial policy-making 
by a conglomerate of state and corporate actors. 60  While market-driven 
financial systems require stabilizing financial policies, strategic financial 
systems involve financial policies that are more development-oriented. This 
suggests that financial policies may be designed for the purpose of developing 
specific financial markets or even the overall financial sector of an IFC. Such 
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development-oriented financial policies can further be separated into enabling 
and developmental policies.  
First, financial policies can be used to build markets through 
“enablement – the creation not merely of incentives but of those conditions 
that allow activities to take place”.61 This is part of a global shift from a 
Fordist to a “finance-led” growth regime, where the role of regulatory policy 
is to “guide the development of the financial markets in the best possible 
way”.62 Enabling financial polices thus allow for the “allocation of financial 
resources” to “targeted sectors”, through a “broad array of regulations that 
affect entry and the scope of bank business”.63  
Importantly, enabling financial regulations allow for the establishment 
and subsequent maintenance of “national comparative advantages”, by 
constructing “man-made conditions and resources favourable or necessary to 
efficient performance of financial services”.64 This concern with establishing 
the market conditions favourable to the operations of financial institutions and 
the overall expansion of an IFC’s financial services sector makes financial 
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regulation “an instrument to reach economic and social policy objectives”65 
through stimulating growth and productivity as well as enhancing 
competitiveness through “sectoral liberalization”.66  
Furthermore, financial policy also plays a developmental role in 
ensuring that the financial system and infrastructure is geared towards the 
attainment of developmental goals. Murinde and Mlambo have argued that 
such “development-oriented financial regulation” can allow the “allocation of 
financial resources towards developmental goals”. 67 Chang and Grabel 
similarly note that the goal of domestic financial regulation should be “finance 
in the service of development”, where “sustainable, stable and equitable 
economic development” is achieved by providing “finance in adequate 
quantities and at appropriate prices for those investment projects that are 
central to this kind of development”.68  
Strategies and policy instruments for doing so include influencing bank 
lending to key sectors, long-term financing by development banks and 
managing financial firms’ asset holdings through “variable asset-based reserve 
requirements”. 69  Thus, regulation is used by states in “developmentalist 
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fashion”70 to “favour certain market outcomes”.71 According to Stiglitz and 
Uy, financial regulation as a form of development-oriented government 
intervention contributed to the rapid growth of emerging Asian nations during 
the “East Asian Miracle”. 72  Gordon and Li further note that the Chinese 
government tends to choose regulations that “maximize a standard type of 
social welfare function” and help in “collecting revenue from both foreign and 
domestic investors”,73 using regulation in place of taxes to extract rents.74 
In short, financial policy comprises three types of policy instruments, 
namely stabilizing, enabling and developmental instruments. Stabilizing 
instruments largely include financial regulations and are geared towards 
ensuring financial sector stability and investor protection. Enabling 
instruments are typically used to establish or develop the market conditions 
necessary for financial institutions to operate and thrive. Lastly, 
developmental instruments refer to financial policies that allow policymakers 
to directly channel resources towards financial sectors or markets which in 
turn contribute to the overall economic development of the IFC. 
As later sections will show, stabilizing, enabling and developmental 
instruments are used in varying extents by financial policymakers in Hong 
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Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai, based on the socio-political contexts within 
which these policymakers are enmeshed. Chapter 7 provides a ‘nested 
instrumental approach’ to understanding policy instrument choice within the 
context of the policy subsystem in the three IFC’s.  
However, the existing scholarly work on financial sector policy is 
limited by its assumption of a unitary monolithic state. Almost all the studies 
reviewed in this section take the ‘state’ or ‘government’ as the basic unit of 
analysis and agency. In reality, the formulation and implementation of 
financial policies are carried out by a wide variety of state and non-state 
actors. These typically include the governing elite and the various 
administrative agencies tasked with the various aspects of financial sector 
policy formulation and implementation.  
Furthermore, many of the recommendations of these studies deal with 
improvements to financial regulatory policy, infrastructure and process 
without mentioning the role of financial regulatory agencies in financial 
policy. This thesis focuses on the regulatory agency as the key formulator and 
implementer of financial policy instruments within a financial policy 
subsystem that also includes industry actors and other non-state actors. As 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will show, the financial regulatory agencies in the three 
cases are policymaking units in their own rights.   
Litan et al take a broader approach by recasting financial policy as 
“financial sector governance”, which involves the “range of institutions and 
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practices by which authority is exercised”.75 Under this conception, financial 
sector governance has both public and private dimensions, with the public 
aspect involving the regulation of financial institutions and markets while the 
private aspect refers to the institutions and practices through which financial 
institutions, borrowers, and even regulators are governed or controlled.76  
This thesis builds on the views of Litan et al by studying how 
dominant subsystem actors, both public and private, exercise their influence 
and authority over financial policymaking. However, this thesis goes beyond 
this existing view of financial sector governance. Rather, it seeks to 
understand the instrumental and ideational channels through which dominant 
subsystem actors influence policy mix design, establishing a deeper 
understanding of how policy mix design is ‘nested’ within the political 
economic context of the subsystem. This ‘nesting’ or tailoring of policy to 
political economic context had previously received attention in the work of 
Porter, who relates such tailoring of regulatory policy to the attainment of 
national competitive advantage.77 
While the work of Porter and Litan et al has provided a broader 
understanding of financial policy that includes both state and non-state actors, 
it lacks the theoretical sophistication and empirical validation necessary for a 
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clearer understanding of how exactly state and non-state actors in the financial 
sector influence and/or are affected by financial policies. In other words, the 
linkage between subsystem configuration and policy mix design remains 
insufficiently explored and documented. This thesis addresses these 
shortcomings through the introduction and application of the ‘nested 
instrumental approach’ in Chapters 3 and 7 respectively.   
The largest shortcoming of the literature on financial policy is its 
neglect of spatiality. Existing understandings of financial policymaking has 
largely been studied in the national context, with few attempts to situate this 
understanding at the level of the city or IFC. This is a weakness that permeates 
both the work of Economists and IPE scholars alike. While studies of financial 
policy by economists have tended to focus on the national government, IPE 
scholars have tended to focus on the international financial system, similarly 
taking the state as the basic unit of analysis.  
In reality, financial policymaking takes place at the level of the IFC, 
with city or local governments playing a particularly important role. 
Furthermore, the IFC is itself an intersection between domestic policymaking 
and international systemic pressures. Nonetheless, a small but significant 
literature on IFC’s, driven by scholars of economics and geography, has 
sought to understand financial policymaking in the context of the IFC. This 




International Financial Centres 
The origins of the IFC literature can be traced back to early studies by 
economists on financial centres, which were largely based on a desire to 
understand the emergence of financial centres as centralized locations of 
financial and economic activity. These studies allowed scholars to establish 
clear definitions of what an IFC is and understand the factors which have 
contributed to the emergence of major successful IFC’s. It is important to note 
that while such early work preceded the coining and widespread use of the 
term “international financial centre”, the financial centres studied by these 
scholars were effectively international, given the already globalized state of 
financial markets.  
Kindleberger defines a financial centre as “a single worldwide center 
with the highly specialized functions of lending abroad and serving as a 
clearinghouse for payments among countries”. 78  This means that financial 
centres typically perform “medium-of-exchange” and “interspatial store-of-
value” functions.79 A similarly broad definition is provided by Tschoegl, who 
describes a financial centre as a “central market place” for a wide variety of 
financial services.80 
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According to Reed, a “financial center is an urban area which contains 
a concentration of specialized institutions that possess, at least marginally, the 
international skills and capabilities necessary to facilitate the flow of goods, 
services, information, and capital between its own national economy and the 
other national economies of the world”. 81  Park provides a more nuanced 
approach by differentiating between ‘primary, booking, funding, and 
collecting’ financial centres, with each type of centre based on the range and 
type of international financial transactions that take place within it.82  
Aside from providing broad general definitions of financial centres, 
scholars at that time also sought to delve deeper into the exact characteristics 
which make a particular location a financial centre. An important 
characteristic is the size, liquidity and complexity of financial markets as 
measured by the number of financial institutions and mobility of capital or 
funds. 83  Reflecting the international nature of financial centres, a related 
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characteristic is the presence of foreign financial institutions and non-resident 
market participants.84   
Early scholars also noted the importance of favourable policies that 
characterize a location’s role as an IFC, with such policies including the 
maintenance of currency convertibility,85 favourable regulations and taxes86 
and active efforts by the government to attract foreign financial institutions.87 
Another less direct role of policy is human capital development, with IFC’s 
typically characterized by the presence of skilled financial sector specialists.88 
These laid the foundation for subsequent efforts to empirically test the validity 
of such policy and socio-economic factors in contributing to IFC development 
through the use of quantitative models.89  
Another important aspect of such early scholarly work on IFC’s 
involved identifying and studying the various factors which contribute to the 
formation of IFC’s. According to Kindleberger’s “staple theory”, the 
development of banking from its initial roles in serving “sovereigns and 
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nobles” to subsequently serving commerce and government and finally acting 
as financial intermediaries resulted in the formation of national financial 
centres which eventually become IFC’s. 90  The concentration of financial 
activities within IFC’s is also explained by the need for face-to-face 
interaction among market participants, the ability of localization to overcome 
costs of information, and the dislocation of cross-boundary trades due to time-
zone differences.91  
Goldberg et al attribute the development of IFC’s to international 
trade, international financial intermediation and industrial organisation 
factors.92 These are factors which contribute to growth in the international 
financial services industry, which is crucial in the actual development of an 
IFC. Specific factors positively associated with the growth in size of the 
financial sector include imports, economic development, number and size of 
multinational companies present, the significance of the city within the 
country and time zone; while exports and financial regulation are negatively 
associated with financial sector development.93 The importance of trade in IFC 
development is underscored by the role that IFC’s play in balancing out the 
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surplus and deficits of countries that trade with each other, resulting in the 
development of an assortment of financial instruments for this very purpose.94 
Davis’s successful application of the ‘theory of location of firms’ to 
financial firms also posits that achieving external economies of scale and 
economies of agglomeration allows financial centres to attain a form of self-
perpetuating’ growth, even if the initial motivations that had led to the 
development of the IFC no longer apply.95 In other words, a greater number of 
firms locating to a IFC can result in financial sector growth due to the 
enlargement of markets, availability of contacts, skilled labour and auxiliary 
services (such as accountants, lawyers, actuaries, etc).96 This further leads to 
the view that once IFC’s are formed, they show “remarkable powers of 
survival” in a cumulative process that “concentrate financial markets in a 
small number of centres”.97 
While such early studies have provided definitions of IFC’s, delineated 
the characteristics which qualify a location as an IFC and yielded important 
insights into the factors which have facilitated the emergence of an IFC, they 
were nonetheless limited by their over-reliance on economics. In particular, 
the focus on quantifiable IFC development variables such as financial market 
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size or number of financial institutions does not reveal much about relations 
between regulators, financial institutions, and other financial sector actors. As 
this thesis will show, such relations are crucial in ensuring effective financial 
policy design and successful IFC development.  
As such, issues of financial policy actor agency, the socio-political 
context and the precise ways in which governments develop or promote an 
IFC were largely under-explored.  Rather, early IFC studies tended to take a 
passive view of the state in IFC’s. IFC development is understood to be a 
consequence of increasingly globalized flows of financial capital that have 
resulted in an almost-automatic agglomeration of economic activity in the 
IFC. While subsequent IFC studies by economic geographers have sought to 
incorporate spatiality into the study of IFC’s, these studies are still unable to 
provide a clear account of socio-political context in IFC development.  
These began with efforts at developing more geographically-informed 
definitions of IFC’s, such as Jones’ typology of IFC’s as sub-regional 
(involving bilateral trade between the IFC’s host country and other 
economies), regional (providing financial services to a specified geographical 
location), or global centres (providing an extensive range of financial services 
to the whole world).98 Gehrig’s definition similarly addresses the geographical 
aspects of IFC location by stating that IFC’s are “geographical locations with 
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agglomerations of branches or subsidiaries of banks and other financial 
intermediaries in narrowly defined regions”.99 
An important theoretical development is the global cities movement, 
which studies how a select group of cities tend to dominate the global 
economy due to their “higher order functions of control and coordination of 
economic flows”.100 According to these scholars, global cities are “used by 
global capital as ‘basing points’ in the spatial organization and articulation of 
production and markets”. 101  While globalization and advances in 
communications technology have resulted in a “spatial dispersal of economic 
activities at the metropolitan, national and global level”, there is also a 
“territorial centralization” of management and control over these dispersed 
economic activities.102  
This centralization means that ‘global cities’ serve as sites for the 
facilitation of global economic transactions, thereby becoming “command 
centers in a global economy”.103 Territorial centralization is related to what 
Sassen has identified as the two most important factors contributing to IFC 
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formation: national consolidation and market liberalization.104 Thus, cities that 
contain higher concentrations of “major institutional equity holdings” such as 
banks and investment houses are most likely to become successful IFC’s.105 
The global cities literature has thus identified a paradoxical centralization of 
financial activities in IFC’s amid a technologically-driven dispersal of 
economic activities globally.  
According to Gehrig, this paradox of simultaneous dispersal and 
centralization of financial activities can be explained by assessing the 
informational content of financial activities. In particular, IFC’s facilitate trade 
in securities that are ‘informationally sensitive’ and require geographical 
concentration for communication while securities that are more standardized 
flow more freely across borders in response to regulatory differences. 106 
Information, or access to it, has also been seen as an important factor 
determining the functional distribution of roles and services among IFC’s.107 
Such concentration of communication based on the need for information 
sharing results in the formation of an IFC’s “social infrastructure” through the 
presence of major market actors.108 
                                                          
104 Saskia Sassen, “Global Financial Centers,” Foreign Affairs 78 (1999): 76. 
105 Ibid., 76–77. 
106 Gehrig, “Cities and the Geography of Financial Centers,” 417–418. 
107 David J Porteous, The Geography of Finance: Spatial Dimensions of Intermediary 
Behaviour (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995); Simon X. B. Zhao, “Information Exchange, 
Headquarters Economy and Financial Centers Development: Shanghai, Beijing and Hong 
Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 84 (2013): 1006–27. 
108 Sassen, “Global Financial Centers,” 80. 
52 
 
Such studies of global cities have also prompted the formation of a 
network of global cities scholars who often take a qualitative and comparative 
approach to studying IFC’s, focusing in particular on reputational factors and 
perceptions of IFC’s among various financial market participants.109 However, 
these and other more geographically-motivated studies of IFC’s still do not 
adequately study the role of government and agency in IFC development. 
Rather, IFC’s are seen as passive repositories of global financial flows that are 
constantly seeking out existing structural and environmental advantages. Yet 
as this thesis will show, government interventions can often be integral in the 
formation and development of an IFC as well as the building up of advantages 
that attract financial institutions and capital to an IFC, particularly in the cases 
of Singapore and Shanghai.  
A more agentic view of IFC’s is presented in the work of IFC scholars 
who have sought to study inter-IFC competition. Such efforts have largely 
been focused on the study of a “hierarchy of international financial centres”110 
and how IFC’s compete to reach the upper echelons of this hierarchy. Poon’s 
longitudinal study further shows how the hierarchy of IFC’s have become 
more differentiated and grown from three to seven tiers or ‘vertical layers’ 
over time,111 with IFC’s often making use of their comparative advantages to 
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“support the trend of increasing spatial hierarchical tendencies and 
differentiation”, even going so far as to try and prevent the migration of 
financial activities to other IFC’s.112  
Gaining from their central position in international trade and 
commerce, newer regional IFC’s (such as Hong Kong and Singapore) were 
thus able to exploit increased trade volumes to challenge other top-tiered 
IFC’s. 113  Such hierarchical relations among IFC’s also point towards 
“persistent competition as the most basic condition of their (IFC’s) 
existence”,114 prompting efforts to exploit and enhance existing comparative 
advantages, especially through regulatory policy. 115  Scholars have 
subsequently sought to study the impacts of history, policy, institutions, and 
geography in determining inter-IFC competition, particularly among emerging 
Asian IFC’s.116 
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Competitive pressures may also prompt IFC’s to cooperate, based on a 
collective desire to avoid costly disadvantageous situations such as bank 
failures.117 Mid-level international relations concepts such as the hegemonic 
stability theory, regime theory, epistemic communities, and capital mobility 
hypothesis have been found to be useful in explaining cooperation among 
states in global financial markets.118 Such complex relations of competition 
and cooperation have contributed to increased interdependency and a tendency 
towards “functional specialization” or “differentiation”, particularly among 
Chinese financial centres such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing.119 
Inter-IFC cooperation has also been studied in terms of regulatory or 
policy convergence. Based on case studies of Britain, Germany and the US, 
Lutz shows how countries tend to converge on “patterns of standardization 
and instruments of regulation” as a multilateral response to financial crises.120 
Thus, regulatory reform represents a politically-mediated and crisis-driven 
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form of cooperation among states that wish to reduce the competitive 
disadvantages arising from financial globalization.121  
As such, financial policymakers may converge in terms of policy 
instruments used or modes of policy-making. 122  This means that IFC 
convergence can be related to an existing literature on policy convergence,123 
although this thesis argues focusing on convergence tends to overstate 
similarities among IFC’s and as a consequence, gloss over differences in the 
policy and political processes of different IFC’s.  IFC’s may also converge in 
terms of belief systems and as a consequence, policy beliefs. The policy 
diffusion literature deals with this by accounting for the spread of economic 
and political liberalism among states.124  
Subsequent scholarly work has sought to develop a deeper 
understanding of such competitive or cooperative dynamics among IFC’s, 
putting particular attention on socio-political relations or linkages. These 
include studying how IFC’s act as “public-private coalitions” that strategize 
against other IFC’s by relying on locational advantages in financial 
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production 125  as well as the “strategic alliances” formed among IFC’s to 
improve individual comparative advantages. 126  Inter-IFC relations and 
competition are also influenced and constituted by “socio-geographical 
practices” arising from the interaction of financial actors.127 
Aside from these studies of major financial centres, studies focused on 
tax havens have also sought to delve into the international and domestic socio-
political aspects of financial sector development and policy. Specifically, 
studies on tax havens have attempted to understand the strategic nature of state 
financial policy in establishing tax-friendly jurisdictions that contribute to 
offshore financial sector growth. 128  Such studies have pointed out how 
‘offshoreness’ and strategic financial policymaking impact concepts of state 
sovereignty, specifically imbuing it with commercial interests.129  
At the international level, studies of tax havens are more focused on 
regulatory cooperation and the establishment of an international tax regime 
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that mitigates unhealthy tax competition,130 although others have emphasized 
the positive contributions of tax havens to the global economy, particularly in 
terms of enhancing efficiency and reducing tax competition. 131  More 
importantly, such studies of tax havens provide a more qualitative and 
contextualized understanding of financial sector development, even as they 
remain largely focused on small island economies. As a result of this over-
specification, tax haven studies do not connect easily with existing IFC studies 
that are focused on economic structural variables and hence largely 
quantitative in nature.  
Despite emerging attempts to provide more qualitative accounts of IFC 
development such as the global cities approach and studies on tax havens, 
such attempts remain at a relatively nascent stage. Relations among financial 
sector actors, both state and non-state, within IFC’s and the impact of such 
relations on financial policymaking remain under-studied. Rather, there is a 
tendency to take the ‘state’ as a singular unit of analysis. This reflects an 
overall lack of conceptualization in existing comparative IFC studies.132  
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By neglecting inter-actor relations within IFC’s and the impacts of 
such relations on financial policy, the existing IFC literature underemphasizes 
the political economic context within which IFC’s exist, as defined by socio-
political ties between state and non-state actors. Instead, there is an over-
emphasis on an assumed convergence of IFC development models, as 
reflected in IFC rankings or hierarchies that measure and explain IFC success 
based largely on structural economic variables such as financial market size 
and competitiveness.  
Nonetheless, scholars from the fields of finance, economics and IPE 
have made fledgling attempts to address this shortcoming by studying inter-
actor relations in economic and financial policy, showing a deeper 
appreciation of political processes and relations in financial policy. Such 
emerging efforts are discussed in the next section.  
 
The Politics of Finance 
Political and social structures as well as relations between the 
government, industry, and society have been deemed important in financial 
regulation, with these relations influencing and being influenced by 
regulation. 133  In particular, financial globalization has made private actors 
more powerful in their ability to shape and set rules, with the result being an 
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alignment of financial governance with private sector preferences.134 This has 
led scholars to take a more “politically sensitive approach” to understanding 
financial crisis, 135  with one such study focusing on the varying influence 
which property sector wielded on the Hong Kong and Singapore governments’ 
response to the AFC.136 
Rajan and Zingales also show in their “interest group theory of 
financial development” that private sector influence may hinder financial 
sector development, especially when powerful industry actors are focused on 
their narrow self-interests.137 This focus on private sector authority in financial 
and economic policy had also previously received attention in the work of key 
IPE scholars, with a focus on state-industry relations and the policy role of 
industry actors.138   
The political system is another important channel through which inter-
actor relations impact financial policy. Carney has studied how financial 
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institutions and arrangements are often defined by a priori political 
contestations between labour, owners of capital, and landed interests.139 More 
accountable political systems are also positively related to better investor 
protection and lower costs of entry, thereby stimulating financial sector 
development.140 Politics also affects corporate ownership in East Asia, with the 
state becoming a more significant owner of companies over the past few 
decades and changes in company ownership becoming increasingly dependent 
upon political change at the national level.141  
Scholars have further sought to understand complex inter-actor 
relations in financial policy through the lens of the policy subsystems 
approach. While this approach is discussed at greater length in the next 
chapter, it is necessary to discuss the contributions of subsystem scholars in 
their studies of socio-political relations among financial sector actors. Within 
the context of US commercial bank regulation, Krause has found that strategic 
behaviour is prevalent among financial sector actors, who typically engage in 
a complex mix of cooperative and competitive behaviour in reaction to the 
behaviour of other actors.142 As Worsham has noted, variations in political 
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arrangements have a significant impact on financial policy subsystems and the 
policy roles of these subsystems.143 
Inter-actor relations within a financial policy subsystem have also been 
related to how these financial sector actors respond to change. Williams has 
found that subsystems facilitate endogenous change or policy adjustments in 
response to exogenous shock, dependent upon the goals and strategies of key 
actors within the subsystem.144 However, the dominance of a coalition deeply 
imbued with a set of strong policy beliefs is also likely to expose a financial 
system to risk and contagion through ‘groupthink’ and a lack of effective 
policy coordination.145  
Studies that seek to understand inter-actor relations in the financial 
sector have also taken on an international approach, focusing on relations 
between financial sector actors across national boundaries. For instance 
scholars have found that regulators and other state actors are increasingly 
connected to their foreign counterparts, often operating within transnational 
networks of regulators and central bankers.146 A concrete example of cross-
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national policy coordination is the creation of the Basle accord on the back of 
British and American regulatory cooperation.147 
This increasing recognition of inter-actor relations in global financial 
markets has resulted in the emergence of a network approach to studying 
global financial markets. Specifically, Oatley et al argue from an IPE 
standpoint that the international financial system has become a system of 
economic and political relationships between public and private actors. 148 
Similar efforts can be found in Knoke’s work on “economic networks”, which 
takes a more sociological approach to understanding social relations and social 
capital in the global economic system.149  
 However, such fledgling attempts to incorporate the political economic 
context into the study of financial policymaking remain limited by several 
shortcomings. First, a vast majority of these studies are based on the context of 
developed Western economies. Given differences in political systems and 
state-industry relations between these developed Western economies and 
emerging Asian economies, there is a need for more extensive research into 
the political economic context within which Asian financial policymakers and 
regulators operate.  
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 More importantly, attempts to understand the precise means or 
mechanisms through which different combinations of financial policy actors, 
state or non-state, are involved in financial policymaking remain at an 
analytically rudimentary stage. While IPE scholars have attempted to 
conceptualize the policy roles of state and non-state actors, these studies 
remain at an overly-general level and require a better delineation of the exact 
means and channels through which non-state actors exercise this policy role.  
In sum, there is a need to provide a clearer and more detailed 
classification of the various actors involved in financial policymaking within a 
given IFC, the socio-political relations which define their positions and inter-
relations within the IFC’s policy subsystem, as well as the precise means and 
channels through which they influence financial policymaking. Existing IFC 
studies by scholars of economics, IPE and economic geographer do not 
adequately study the various financial policy actors or their inter-relations, 
despite more recent attempts to take a network approach. These studies also do 
not focus on IFC development at the policy instruments level, focusing instead 
on broad policy categories or types.  
 This thesis attempts to build upon these existing studies and address 
their limitations by situating the analysis of financial policy instruments within 
the political economic context of the policy subsystem in the form of the 
nested instrumental approach, which is discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. 
Importantly, the instruments and subsystems approaches provide a 
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standardized ‘language’ through which the socio-political and policy aspects 
of IFC development can be understood. This will help consolidate existing 
understandings of IFC development, given that much of the existing literature 
represents the study of IFC’s through the use of different approaches and 
different analytical ‘languages’.      
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the literatures on 
financial policy and IFC’s. Both literatures have made significant 
contributions to the study of financial sector development. In particular, the 
financial policy literature has provided a systematic description of the means 
and mechanisms through which governments are able to develop and regulate 
financial markets. The IFC literature has further built on this by studying 
financial policy through a more international systemic lens. This has allowed 
IFC scholars to identify the factors and processes which have contributed to 
IFC success. More importantly, these scholars have shifted the study of 
financial policy to the city or local level of government. 
However, these two bodies of work remain insufficient in addressing 
several key questions that this thesis seeks to address. First, while the financial 
policy literature describes ways in which governments have managed to 
achieve financial sector development, it does not sufficiently address issues of 
context and spatiality. Rather, financial policymaking is assumed to take place 
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at the national level, with the state taken as a unitary monolithic financial 
policymaking unit. In reality, the bulk of financial policymaking is carried out 
by local or city governments who actually run the IFC’s.  
While the IFC literature addresses some of these shortcomings by 
situating financial policy processes spatially and temporally within the 
globally-connected IFC, it does not sufficiently account for the political 
economic context within which IFC’s exist or the socio-political relations 
which connect policymakers and other significant financial sector actors. 
Instead, much of the IFC literature focuses on structural and locational factors 
contributing to IFC success and overemphasizes a convergence of IFC 
development models based on these factors. While qualitative IFC studies on 
tax havens and global cities have sought to overcome the limitations of such 
quantitative approaches, these studies have yet to adequately delineate and 
provide a clearer understanding of the socio-political relations which underpin 
IFC development.   
While scholars have begun to address these shortcomings by taking a 
network or subsystems approach to studying financial policy and focusing on 
the ‘politics of finance’, these studies remain at a rudimentary stage and are 
unable to provide a sufficiently clear or in-depth understanding of how such 
inter-actor relations affect financial policymaking and contribute to IFC 
success. Furthermore, the Western-centric nature of these studies raises 
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questions over their applicability to the study of Asian IFC’s, which operate 
within markedly different political systems.  
These shortcomings in the financial policy and IFC literatures point 
towards a need to reconceptualise existing understandings of IFC 
development. In particular, two clear issues need to be addressed. First, there 
is a need to develop a comprehensive understanding of the exact means or 
policies through which governments drive or stimulate IFC development. 
Second, there is a need to situate these policies within the milieu of the 
political economic context. Governments of IFC’s typically operate within a 
complex network of private sector financial institutions and firms as well as 
other non-state actors such as industry associations, independent research 
organizations and experts, and other members of the interested public.  
This thesis addresses these two issues through the introduction and 
application of the nested instrumental approach in Chapters 3 and 7 
respectively. Specifically, the nested instrumental approach situates the policy 
design process within the context of the subsystem configuration by drawing 
on and combining the policy instruments and policy subsystems approaches, 
in the process addressing the causal linkages between subsystem configuration 





Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
Given the empirical and theoretical limitations in the existing financial 
policy and IFC literatures identified in chapter 2, this thesis seeks to establish 
and apply a new analytical framework termed the ‘nested instrumental 
approach’ to the study of IFC’s. Specifically, this approach addresses two 
significant shortcomings in the IFC literature, as identified in Chapter 2, by 
drawing upon the insights of two public policy theoretical literatures, namely 
the policy instruments and policy subsystems approaches.   
First, there is a need to provide a clearer understanding of the types of 
financial policies implemented and the mechanisms through which they 
operate, in the attainment of IFC development. The policy instruments 
approach is particularly useful for addressing this shortcoming, by taking a 
tools approach to understanding policies as instruments designed and 
implemented for achieving specified policy outputs. Secondly, the IFC 
literature does sufficiently account for the political economic context of each 
IFC and the impact of such contextual variables on financial policymaking. 
This shortcoming can be addressed by drawing upon the policy subsystems 
approach, which deals with the roles of and linkages between policy actors 
involved within a particular issue area.   
By drawing on and combining the policy instruments and policy 
subsystems approaches, the nested instrumental approach addresses both the 
policy and politics of IFC development, in the process embedding policy mix 
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design within the political economic context of the policy subsystem 
configuration.  This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological 
foundations of this thesis. First, I discuss the policy instruments and policy 
subsystems approaches that underpin the nested instrumental approach. This is 
followed by an in-depth discussion of the approach itself. I then discuss the 
research techniques and methods employed in the course of field research.   
 
Policy Instruments and the Design Process  
The concept of policy instruments can be traced back to 1936, when 
Harold Lasswell first distinguished between policy means and policy goals150 
and categorized policy means as symbols, violence, goods, or practice. 151 
Importantly, Lasswell’s approach emphasized the importance of context and 
established a focus on the availability and use of policy instruments 
throughout the entire policy process.152 While the study of such policy means 
has since evolved in comprehensiveness and sophistication, Lasswell’s means-
ends differentiation continues to permeate the policy instruments literature.  
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This is exemplified in other early attempts to study and categorize 
policy instruments, such as Dahl and Lindblom’s analysis of “politico-
economic techniques” in economic and social policy.153 These techniques were 
categorized according to whether they involve government ownership or 
private enterprise, compulsion or information as techniques of control, the 
exercise of direct or indirect control, use of voluntary or compulsory 
organizations, and their application through autonomous private-styled 
organization or prescriptive government organizations, with each set of dyads 
forming a continuum upon which techniques are classified.154 Kirschen et al 
also provide a comprehensive list of policy instruments used in economic 
policy. 155  However, such early attempts at studying policy instruments by 
economists tended to over-simplify instrument use and selection, providing 
little more than comprehensive lists of instruments with insufficient analytical 
depth.156   
A deluge of scholarly work subsequently attempted to address this 
shortcoming,157 with Hood’s NATO model being one of the most influential 
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typologies of policy instruments. 158  In his typology of policy instruments, 
Lowi differentiates between “regulatory”, “distributive”, “redistributive”, and 
“constituent” policies, based on whether the instrument is strongly or weakly 
sanctioned and whether it targets individuals or the collective.159  
Hood’s “NATO” model provides more nuance and depth, categorizing 
instruments according to the type of “governing resource” used by the 
government, namely “nodality” (information), “authority”, “treasure”, and 
“organization” policy instruments.160  Elmore categorizes policy instruments 
into the four instrument types of mandates, inducements, capacity-building 
and system-changing.161 In their attempt to consolidate the existing typologies 
of policy instruments, Linder and Peters have classified policy instruments 
into the seven classes of direct provision, subsidy, tax, contract, authority, 
regulation, and exhortation.162  
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Types of policy instruments have also been classified by Salamon and 
Lund according to four main “tool dimensions” that include the nature of 
government activity, structure of delivery system, degree of centralization, and 
degree of automaticity.163 This allows them to categorize tools into four broad 
categories that include money payment, provision of goods or services, legal 
protection or guarantees, and prohibition or restriction; delivered through 
direct or indirect systems, involving varying levels of centralization and 
automatic versus administered delivery processes.164  
Vedung provides a more parsimonious typology, classifying policy 
instruments into economic means (carrots), regulations (sticks) and 
information (sermons). 165  This typology is based on the amount of 
“authoritative force” that the government is prepared to use, with regulations 
being the most constraining, economic means less constraining and 
information tools the least constraining.166 
Other early studies of policy instruments can also be found in the 
literature on “statecraft”, which refers to the “science of government”167 or “art 
of conducting state affairs”168. However, statecraft has since been appropriated 
by international relations (IR) scholars, with the term losing traction in studies 
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of domestic public policy. 169  Nonetheless, the IR formulation of statecraft 
retains an instruments orientation, with statecraft defined as the “selection of 
means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals”. 170  Based on Lasswell’s 
“fourfold division of policy instruments”, 171  Baldwin has also devised a 
taxonomy of policy instruments used in statecraft; this includes propaganda, 
diplomacy, economic statecraft and military statecraft.172  
The policy instruments literature has further benefited from the 
contributions of a group of Canadian public policy scholars,173 with much of 
their work focusing on how policy instrument choice and governments’ 
capacity for policy instrument implementation affect policy goal attainment 
and influence the policy-making process. 174  This literature yielded the key 
insight that policy instrument choice is influenced by the degree of 
government coercion, given the technical substitutability of most policy 
instruments.175 This has allowed for the classification of policy instruments on 
a continuum, based on the level of governmental coercion involved in the use 
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of each instrument, 176  in contrast to other typologies that rely on rigid 
categories that imply mutual exclusion between categories.  
However, such classifications of policy instruments by degree of 
coercion have been shown to be analytically limited, given that “each policy 
instrument can be used in a wide range of ways that involve differing degrees 
of coercion”. 177  This difficulty in operationalizing ‘coercion’ is avoided in 
Howlett and Ramesh’s taxonomy of policy instruments, which is based on the 
level of state involvement required in the use of each instrument. 178  This 
typology identifies ten major types of policy instruments categorized into three 
major groups: Voluntary Instruments (low state involvement) comprising 
family and community, voluntary organizations, and private markets; 
Compulsory Instruments (high state involvement) that include regulation, 
public enterprises and direct provision; and Mixed Instruments (varying levels 
of state involvement) that comprise information and exhortation, subsidies, 
auction of property rights, and tax and user charges.179  
While providing significant insight into the policy instruments that 
governments have at their disposal and the sorts of resources or levels of 
intervention required in the use of these instruments, such ‘first generation’ 
studies of policy instruments were analytically limited in several ways. 
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Specifically, they did not differentiate between substantive and procedural 
policy instruments or the different levels at which policy instruments exist, 
were overly focused on single instruments without addressing policy mixes, 
and did not deal with the “micro-level” aspects of specific instrument selection 
within a general policy instrument category.180 These limitations have since 
been addressed by advances in the policy instruments literature, sparking off 
“second generation” theories of policy instrument choice181 that have since 
evolved into a “new policy design orientation”.182 
In recognition of the use of multiple instruments in real world policy-
making, there was a shift in focus from single instrument studies to studies of 
policy mixes.183 Early work by Elmore had classified combinations of policy 
instruments aimed at a broad set of policy goals as “strategies”.184 Doelen has 
also advocated the combination of stimulative and repressive instruments in 
‘policy packages’ comprising instruments that work in opposite directions but 
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nonetheless complement each other.185 In their seminal study on environmental 
regulatory policy, Gunningham et al note how policy-making involves the 
“use of multiple rather than single policy instruments” through the “design of 
efficient and effective ‘optimal’ policy mixes”186 that allow the deficiencies of 
each individual instrument to be compensated for with the strengths of 
another.187  
This recognition that policy instruments are utilized by governments as 
part of a larger policy mix or ‘package’ adds a significant dose of nuance and 
realism to the study of policy instruments. Scholars of policy design have 
subsequently sought to understand the internal workings of the policy mix, 
studying complementarities and interactions between policy instruments 
within a mix, and emphasizing how processes of policy patching or layering 
can result in greater consistency, coherence, and congruence in a policy mix.188  
Addressing another major analytical deficit in the existing policy 
instruments literature, Howlett distinguishes between substantive and 
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procedural policy instruments.189 While substantive policy instruments directly 
affect society’s production, distribution and consumption of goods and 
services, procedural policy instruments alter “political or policy behaviour in 
the process of the articulation of implementation goals and means”.190 It is 
however important to note that the idea of procedural instruments had already 
received prior attention in the works of various scholars.  
For instance, Baldwin has noted that free trade can be used as a policy 
instrument to reshape the international political and economic order. 191 
Bressers and Klok have taken a process approach in understanding how policy 
instruments affect the policy process, circumstances, and subjective rationality 
of the actors in achieving a policy outcome. 192  This broadens the 
understanding of policy instruments to include means that allow “the 
implementation of policy-targeted changes in the behaviour of other people or 
bodies”.193  
Scholars have also attempted to account for the behavioural and 
contextual aspects of instruments, including how instruments affect and are 
themselves influenced by individual perceptions. 194   However, such early 
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attempts at understanding how policy instruments can affect circumstance, 
process and behaviour did not yield a clear definition or taxonomy of 
procedural policy instruments.  
It was only in the early 2000’s that a clearer understanding of 
procedural policy instruments emerged.195 Based on Hood’s NATO model, 
Howlett has developed a taxonomy of procedural policy instruments based on 
the type of ‘governing resource’ they rely on as well as a spectrum of 
procedural policy instruments based on the level of state manipulation 
involved. 196  An extensive catalogue of substantive and procedural policy 
instruments could then be drawn based on the type of governing resources 
associated with the use of each instrument.197  
Howlett further posits that procedural policy instrument choice is 
based on the levels of systemic and sectoral de-legitimation, suggesting that 
the existing level of procedural credibility or legitimacy (in the eyes of policy 
actors) has a significant influence on the government’s willingness or desire to 
alter a policy process through a particular procedural policy instrument.198 
Procedural policy instruments have come to permeate ‘second-generation’ 
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policy instrument theorizing, driving the study of policy mixes comprising 
procedural and substantive instruments.199  
Furthermore, policy instruments do not exist in a vacuum. Policy 
instrument choice is often influenced by contextual elements such as political 
or organizational culture and social relations.200 As Salamon has noted, “each 
instrument has its own distinctive procedures, its own network of 
organizational relationships, its own skill requirements – in short, its own 
“political economy””. 201  Policy instruments also exist at various levels of 
abstraction within the policy process. According to Hall, policy change occurs 
at three levels, with “first order” change referring to changes to policy 
instrument calibrations, “second order” change referring to changes in type of 
policy instrument chosen, and “third order” change denoting a paradigmatic 
change in the policy goal pursued.202  
Based on Hall’s taxonomy of policy change, Howlett and Cashore 
have identified three levels of policy means or tools: instrument logic, 
mechanisms and calibrations.203 Therefore, policy instruments exist at various 
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levels, “ranging from the most general level of a relatively abstract governance 
mode, to the level of a policy regime and finally to the level of specific 
programme settings”. 204  This macro, meso and micro aspect of policy 
instruments suggest a “multi-level, nested, nature of policy tool choices”.205  
Subsequent studies of policy instruments have sought to incorporate 
these later advances in policy instruments theorizing. For instance, Howlett, 
Ramesh and Perl have consolidated a comprehensive typology of substantive 
and procedural instruments and placed both types of instruments on 
continuums based on the extent to which the use of these instruments involve 
the manipulation of the market and network actors. 206  Howlett et al have 
further developed a “model of basic instrument preferences”, with policy-
makers’ preferences for directive, authoritative, subsidy or information 
instruments dependent upon government capacity (or the level of constraints 
on the state) and subsystem complexity (number and complexity of subsystem 
actors).207  
John’s typology of policy instruments also includes (1) law and 
regulation, (2) public spending and taxation, (3) bureaucracy and public 
management, (4) institutions, (5) information, persuasion and deliberation, and 
(6) networks and governance, with each type of instrument representing 
different types of “resources that governments have available ... to influence 
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public-policy outcomes”.208 John has also noted that policy instruments are in 
“infinite regress: tools needing to implement tools, meta tools to introduce 
these guiding tools, meta-meta tools and so on”.209  
Developing in tandem with this systematic study of policy instruments 
is the notion of a policy design process or orientation,210 which has provided a 
meta-level framework that is heavily reliant on instrumental reasoning and 
within which policy instrument formulation and choice are situated. 211 
Although the recognition of a design orientation in the development of policy 
instruments was recognized only in retrospect by scholars who came to 
appreciate the design processes that underpinned the formulation and 
implementation of policy instruments, it has since become a significant aspect 
of the policy instruments literature.  
However, scholarly work on policy design went into decline in the 
1990s and 2000s with the dominance of the globalisation and governance 
literatures. 212  The globalisation literature’s focus on the meta-level and its 
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downplaying of the government’s role in policy design213 nonetheless led to 
renewed efforts at re-establishing the central role of government and the 
importance of policy design, resulting in a revival of the policy design 
orientation in the process.214  This ‘new’ policy design orientation dealt with 
complexity in the design of multi-instrument policy mixes over time and 
space.215 
In sum, the policy instruments literature has provided a clear 
understanding of how policy instruments work, allowing for the development 
of comprehensive instrument typologies that match different instruments to 
specific goals and objectives. Furthermore, the reinvigorated policy design 
orientation has addressed the various shortcomings of the policy instruments 
approach by addressing issues of complexity, multiple instruments, time and 
spatiality in design processes. However, attempts by policy instruments and 
design scholars to incorporate context into the policy design process remain 
insufficient to capture the complexity and contextual layers of financial 
policymaking in modern IFC’s.  
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In particular, the design orientation places the policy designer, i.e. 
government policymakers, centre-stage in public policymaking. In reality, 
financial policymaking involves a plethora of state and powerful non-state 
actors operating within the political-economic milieu of each IFC. This is 
especially so in the context of Asia, where state authority tends to diffuse into 
the private sector through state ownership and/or informal influence and 
conversely, powerful non-state actors often also wield an inordinate amount of 
influence over the government. The design orientations’s limited attention to 
policy actor interactions and dynamics in the design orientation, can be 
overcome by considering insights drawn from the policy subsystems approach. 




Policy subsystems are an integral aspect of the policy process. 
Identifying policy subsystems with the policy formulation and implementation 
processes, Howlett, Ramesh and Perl have defined a policy subsystem as 
comprising of “actors with sufficient knowledge of a problem area, or a 
resource at stake, to allow them to participate in the process of developing 
possible alternative courses of action to address the issues raised at the 
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agenda-setting stage”.216 Importantly, policy subsystems represent the arena 
within which actors, institutions, and ideas come together in the public policy-
making process within an issue area.217 
Various attempts have been made to identify and characterize the 
various types of policy subsystems in existence. The earliest such attempt was 
Cater’s identification and conceptualization of “iron triangles” that are made 
up of government agencies, congressional committees, and interest groups.218 
This was followed by Heclo’s criticism in 1978 that the concept of iron 
triangles is “not so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete”.219 Instead, 
Heclo suggests that policy-making involves “issue networks” made up of a 
large number of constantly-changing participants.220  
Heclo and Widlavsky subsequently introduced the idea of “policy 
communities” to describe policy subsystems formed around a set of shared 
understandings.221 The concept of policy communities would come to gain 
traction with later scholars. 222  An important development in the study of 
subsystems is the introduction of “policy networks” through the work of 
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scholars such as Rhodes, Wilks and Wright.223 The policy network concept 
allowed for the identification of a large variety of subsystem types according 
to their level of “integration”, insulation from external influence, membership 
stability and restrictiveness, and control over resources.224 It also underpinned 
the emergence of the “governance” movement.225 However, these early studies 
on policy networks did not adequately account for the interests and beliefs of 
subsystem actors.  
Reflecting the emergence of constructivist approaches in political 
science in the 1980s and early 1990s, the advocacy coalition framework first 
developed by Sabatier in 1988 represents a major attempt to address this 
deficit.226 Sabatier’s approach identifies subsets of policy subsystems formed 
around the shared beliefs of its members as ‘advocacy coalitions’, with 
coalition members coming from all levels of government.227 The central role of 
ideas in defining and driving policy subsystems would be further explored in 
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the literature on “epistemic communities”.228 Advocacy coalitions can further 
be categorized into dominant coalitions, transitory coalitions, and competing 
coalitions.229 Baumgartner and Jones have also found that the entrenchment of 
particular ideas results in the formation of stable “policy monopolies”, 
whereby powerful subsystem actors dominate interpretations of policy issues 
to form enduring “policy images”.230  
While advocacy coalitions, epistemic communities and policy 
monopolies are driven by the prevalence of a set of beliefs or ideas and earlier 
concepts such as iron triangles and issue networks are focused on interests and 
issues, more recent research has found that policy subsystems may also be 
defined around a set of preferred policies. Voss and Simons have shown that 
networks may be formed around a preferred policy instrument, with such 
networks known as ‘instrument constituencies’.231 An instrument constituency 
is basically formed around the preference and advocacy of particular policy 
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instruments by a group of subsystem actors who may form a subset of the 
subsystem or even dominate the entire subsystem.  
Furthermore, this means that an instrument constituency may become a 
policy monopoly through its dominance of a subsystem, or an advocacy 
coalition through its belief in the efficacy of a particular instrument type and 
its inherent normative beliefs. However, this also means potential overlaps in 
these various subsystem concepts, with boundaries between instruments 
constituencies, advocacy coalitions, and policy monopolies often fuzzy and 
difficult to define in practice.  
Nonetheless, as later chapters will show, cases such as Hong Kong 
exhibit a clear preference for a particular type of policy instruments by 
policymakers, suggesting the existence of an instrument constituency. In 
contrast, instrument constituencies are much harder to discern in cases such as 
Singapore, where a wide array of instruments are used by policymakers to 
attain their objectives. As later chapters will show, the presence of an 
instrument constituency may well be reflected in policymakers’ preference for 
a particular set of policy instruments.  
Having provided characterizations and typologies of policy 
subsystems, policy scholars next sought to understand the dynamics through 
which subsystems evolve or change, whether through endogenous processes or 
in response to exogenous stimuli. Howlett and Ramesh have proposed that 
policy subsystems adjust to the exogenous forces of globalisation through 
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policy learning, venue change, systemic perturbations, and subsystem spill-
over’s.232 While policy learning and venue change are endogenously driven by 
subsystem actors, systemic perturbations and subsystem spill-over’s represent 
the response of subsystem actors to exogenous shocks and stimuli.233  
Endogenous policy learning remains heavily informed by the key work 
of Hall on social learning234 along with other scholarly works.235 Heclo has 
also noted the role of exogenous factors in prompting learning.236  Attempts to 
analytically distinguish between the differing impacts of exogenous shocks on 
a subsystem have yielded the insight that subsystem spill-over’s tend to alter 
the policy subsystem through the entrance of new actors and ideas while 
systemic perturbations tend to reinforce the position of currently dominant 
subsystem actors without any changes to subsystem boundaries.237  
Subsystem formation and dynamics have also received attention in the 
IPE and comparative politics literatures. Bryson has noted that strategy 
formulation and adoption often require establishing a “winning coalition”, 
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with strategy formulation involving intense dialogue and deliberation and 
strategy adoption rife with politics and bargaining.238 According to Gilpin, the 
objectives of states are determined by the “interests of the dominant members 
of the ruling coalitions”.239 Palan et al further argue that competitive strategies 
are shaped by a “constellation of interests within the state, and by the struggle 
or accommodation between them”.240  
The East Asian development state model has also alluded towards a 
commingling of state and non-state actors in the attainment of public goals, 
whereby the state achieves its goals and increases its autonomy though the 
“blurring of public and private”.241 Aside from industry actors, other non-state 
actors such as academics and think tank researchers may also play an 
important role in informing and even influencing public policies through their 
participation in transnational “knowledge networks” or epistemic 
communities.242  
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Yet, the policy subsystems approach is also beset with flaws, the most 
significant being the neglect of the exact policy means which are used by 
policymakers operating within a subsystem. By focusing on the socio-political 
context of policymaking, scholarly work on policy subsystems are at an 
overly-general level of abstraction. Neither do the more recent efforts at 
understanding policy change and learning in subsystems properly address the 
ways in which policies are formulated, chosen, and implemented. Rather, the 
focuses remains squarely on subsystem membership and configuration, 
without sufficient attention on the impacts of subsystem configuration on the 
policy process. As such, there remains a need to address the impact of 
subsystem configurations and dynamics on policymaking, especially in terms 
of policy instrument preferences and implementation processes.  
 
Analytical Framework: The Nested Instrumental Approach 
Given the limitations of the policy subsystems and policy instruments 
approaches discussed above, there is a need to develop an analytical 
framework that draws upon the insights of both the policy instruments and 
policy subsystems approaches. While the policy instruments approach 
provides a rigorous understanding of the design and implementation of 
policies as tools for the attainment of desired policy outputs, the policy 
subsystems approach brings with it an in-depth understanding of the political 
economic context within which policymaking takes place.  
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Importantly, merging the two approaches will allow for a better and 
more integrated understanding of both policy choices and political context in 
IFC development. This is accomplished in this thesis through the “nested 
instrumental approach”, which combines the policy subsystem and policy 
instruments approaches and in the process provides a clear and contextually-
embedded understanding of financial policy mix design in the context of the 
financial policy subsystem.  
While existing institutional approaches such as the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VOC) approach or the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) 
framework have made attempts to situate the policy process within the socio-
political context and postulated the ways in which such embedded 
policymaking could affect economic structures and processes, 243  these 
approaches are still at an overly-general level of abstraction and are thus not 
suitable for the in-depth delineation of inter-actor relations and understanding 
of specific policy mechanisms or channels which can be achieved through the 
policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches respectively.  
By combining both approaches, the Nested Instrumental Approach 
allows for greater specification of individual policy instruments, even as it 
situates the policy design process within the socio-political context of the 
subsystem. More importantly, the Approach takes a public policy approach 
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that accounts for the interests and policy preferences of policymakers, which is 
suitable for the purpose this thesis. In contrast, the VOC and IAD approaches 
are based on studies in Political Economy, which do not address the policy 
process directly and hence may be less suitable for providing specific policy 
analyses and recommendations.  
This section provides an in-depth discussion of the nested instrumental 
approach, discussing the logic of ‘nested instrumentality’ that drives the 
approach and delineating its constituent components. This in-depth 
understanding of the nested instrumental approach and its inner workings will 
facilitate and considerably simplify the application of the approach to the 
study of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai in Chapter 7. A diagrammatic 
representation of the nested instrumental approach is illustrated in Figure 3.1 
below.  





A key aspect of policy-making is the formulation and implementation 
of policy instruments. It is through these instruments that policy-makers are 
Subsystem 
Configuration 




able to effect change and influence the behaviour of citizens and other market 
participants. Furthermore, each government has at its disposal a combination 
or mix of policy instruments that can be used to develop the financial sector 
and hence influence the development of its city as an IFC. These instruments 
directly determine the attainment of a government’s desired policy output, in 
this case IFC development. This represents the instrumental aspect of policy-
making.  
However, policy instruments do not exist in a vacuum. They are 
‘nested’ within a political-economic milieu that is made up of the interactions 
between a variety of state and non-state policy actors. ‘Nestedness’ is no doubt 
a concept that carries considerable baggage in the public policy literature. In 
particular, Ostrom’s work on common pool resources is based on “multiple 
levels of analysis” that involves the study of rules nested within other higher 
orders of rules, 244  with policy problems and the various attributes of a 
particular resource system embedded within the larger socioeconomic, 
political, and ecological context.245  
Notions of the embeddedness of policy within the social context 
further pre-date Ostrom, particularly in the work of Granovetter. 246  More 
recently and in the public policy literature, Howlett has studied the multi-level 
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‘nesting’ of policy instruments within the context of established governance 
modes and regime logics.247 While these studies have contributed significantly 
to conceptualizing and theorizing nestedness, there remains a need to apply 
these concepts empirically and in the process establish a deeper understanding 
of nestedness. Conversely, studies in which scholars have tried to develop a 
deeper and more empirical conception of nestedness remain overly steeped 
within a particular research agenda or issue, such as common pool resources.  
While Hollingsworth has attempted to study the different institutional 
mechanisms that coordinate inter-actor relationships and which result in 
different governance and institutional arrangements within which actors and 
economies are nested,248 he does not discuss how these different arrangements 
influence or affect the form and substance of policies. As such, there is a need 
to provide a clearer understanding of the political relations that define context 
and how these relations affect the policy process. The policy subsystems 
literature provides a clear starting point in achieving such an understanding, by 
framing contextual variations as different policy subsystem configurations.  
While the government is the official policy-maker in most instances, 
other policy actors are also often able to influence the policy process. The 
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combination or configuration of state and non-state actors within a policy 
issue area is known as a policy subsystem. Configurations of state and non-
state actors within any given policy subsystem differ across jurisdictions. 
While policy subsystem configurations have been related to the openness of a 
subsystem to new actors and ideas,249 this thesis further explores how policy 
subsystem configurations are defined by relations of dominance and 
dependence among subsystem actors, taking into account both the interests 
and ideological underpinnings of dominant subsystem actors. 
As scholars of the advocacy coalition framework have shown, the 
dominance of a political actor or set of political actors tends to result in the 
formation of specific policy-making arrangements or coalitions.250 Yet there is 
also a need to understand the dominance of particular actors within a dominant 
coalition, an aspect which the advocacy coalition framework has not 
sufficiently addressed. This requires studying the dominance of individual 
actors within the overall context of the subsystem, and how such dominant 
individual actors or organizations determine policy subsystem configuration 
and influence policy mix design. This causal link between subsystem 
configuration and policy mix design is discussed at greater length below.  
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Combining the policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches, 
the nested instrumental approach provides a useful tool for studying how 
relations of dominance and dependence manifest in subsystem configurations 
and affect policy design. As with the concept of ‘nestedness’, prior attempts 
have been made by public policy scholars to understand the causal linkages 
between policy context and instrument choice. In particular, scholars of policy 
learning have noted that policy instrument choice is made by subsystem 
actors, based on lessons learned by these actors and influenced by the 
membership and norms of a subsystem.251 Policy instrument choice has also 
been related to national policy styles252 and policy networks,253 with the latter 
focusing on the relationship between policy network attributes and instrument 
choice. Studies have also focused on the how policy subsystem configurations 
are related to instrument choice254 and policy change.255  
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While these studies have provided an important theoretical basis for 
the study of nested policy design processes by pointing out the presence of 
linkages between policy subsystem and instrument choice, this thesis further 
develops upon this understanding by studying the financial policy subsystems 
of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai and how situating the policy design 
process within the context of policy subsystem configuration has allowed all 
three IFC’s to attain comparable levels of success.  
Importantly, this requires a dual focus on the subsystem and individual 
subsystem actors. Focusing on dominant coalitions underemphasizes the inter-
actor dynamics within the coalition itself while emphasizing national policy 
styles proves particularly problematic given the globalized nature of financial 
markets and the role of cities and IFC’s as autonomous policy units. This 
means a need to take the broader policy subsystem as the unit of analysis 
while at the same time focusing on political relations and dynamics among 
individual subsystem actors.  
Existing conceptions of subsystem configurations as a subsystem’s 
openness to new actors and ideas 256  tend to understate the socio-political 
relations between existing subsystem actors, focusing instead on issues of 
boundary and acceptability. This is particularly problematic when applied to 
the East Asian context, where government actors and selected industry or non-
                                                          
256 Howlett and Ramesh, “Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change”; ibid. 
97 
 
state elites enjoy both longevity and authority in the subsystem, and state-
industry relations are entrenched through state corporate ownership.257  
The existing subsystems literature also presupposes equality among 
actors and the presence of a democratic political process, stemming from the 
focus of these existing studies on Western developed contexts. However, 
policy subsystems in emerging Asia differ widely from their Western 
counterparts by virtue of differences in political systems and even belief 
systems. This problem can be overcome by conceptualizing policy subsystem 
configurations around power relations between the state and powerful 
financial industry actors, focusing on inter-actor power relations rather than 
presupposing an artificial equality among them. This allows for a more 
generalizable approach to studying subsystems across national contexts. 
Given this need to refocus the attention on subsystems configuration 
and inter-subsystem actor dynamics, the nested instrumental approach takes 
the policy subsystem as its analytical starting point and studies the impact of 
policy subsystem configuration on policy mix design. This ‘nesting’ of the 
policy mix within the political economic context of the policy subsystem 
means that the policy process is driven by a logic of ‘nested instrumentality’. 
While understanding policies as instruments used for the attainment of policy 
outputs provides an instrumental approach to understanding policy, studying 
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policy instruments within the context of the subsystem ‘nests’ instrumentality 
within the context of the political economic drivers of policy.  
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, a logic of ‘nested instrumentality’ is 
exhibited when subsystem configurations inform and influence the 
formulation and implementation of policy mixes and instruments used by 
policymakers in the pursuit of specified policy outputs. ‘Nested 
instrumentality’ also defines the causal linkage between subsystem 
configuration and policy mix. In particular, dominant subsystem actors are 
able to influence and define policy mix design through ideational and/or 
instrumental channels, by forming or participating in advocacy coalitions and 
instruments constituencies respectively. These two channels are further 
discussed below.  
Having described the theoretical foundations of the nested instrumental 
approach, there is a further need to delineate the individual components that 
make up the approach. Figure 3.2 below provides a more detailed overview of 
















In general, the three main components of the nested instrumental 
approach are defined by parameters which define the dynamics operating 
within each component. First, policy subsystem configuration is defined by 
positions of dominance versus dependence held by subsystem actors. 
Dominance in this context is defined as the ability of an actor to affect or 
influence the policymaking process, with other subsystem actors dependent 








































work on advocacy coalitions, whereby policies in a subsystem are made by a 
dominant coalition.258   
Dominant subsystem actors invariably include state actors such as 
government agencies and departments, although non-state actors such as large 
firms and industry associations can also influence policy by operating as 
dominant or co-dominant actors. A second parameter that defines policy 
subsystem configuration is complexity. Subsystem complexity has been 
related to the “existing range of policy actors present in the policy 
subsystem”,259 with scholars of policy networks further defining subsystem 
complexity by the size, type and stability of subsystem membership as well as 
the varied roles of state and non-state actors within a subsystem.260  
This thesis defines policy complexity by the number and homogeneity 
of subsystem membership. Specifically, a complex policy subsystem features 
a large number of actors and low homogeneity in the types of actors involved. 
In the context of this thesis, low homogeneity is associated with a high degree 
of diversity in subsystem actors, with subsystem membership fluid and 
frequently changing. Conversely, subsystems which are homogenous typically 
comprise a relatively uniform and unchanging set of actors. As discussed in 
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later chapters, Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem exhibits homogeneity 
due to the dominance of a stable set of state actors.  
Importantly, policy subsystem configurations subsequently influence 
and define policy mix design through the actions of dominant subsystem 
actors. This causal linkage between subsystems configuration and policy mix 
design has not been adequately explored or understood in the IFC literature. 
Furthermore, the policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches have 
largely developed separately from each other, with the result being an under-
emphasis on this causal linkage between subsystems and policy mixes. The 
nested instrumental approach represents an attempt to bridge this gap between 
the two approaches and provide a more integrative approach to studying 
financial policy.  
Specifically, dominant subsystem actors are able to influence policy 
mix design by exercising their authority over instrument choice and 
influencing other the instruments preferences of other subsystem actors. Direct 
influence over instruments choice represents an overt expression of the 
instrument preferences of dominant actors, while less direct attempts to 
influence the instruments preferences of other subsystem actors entails the 
advocacy or promotion of dominant actors’ policy beliefs. These two channels 
through which dominant subsystem actors are able to influence policy mix 
design are further discussed below.  
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Within a given subsystem configuration, policy mixes typically 
comprise a set of policy instruments, with combinations of the various types of 
instruments within each mix varying across cases. A policy mix is defined by 
the complementary versus conflicting relations among policy instruments. 
Instruments within each policy mix may complement each other and result in a 
more integrated policy mix; they may also be in conflict with each other, with 
instruments working at cross-purposes or worse, negating each other’s impacts 
on the policy output. Complementary relations between instruments contribute 
to a policy mix’s consistency, coherence, and congruence.261 
Furthermore, the choice of policy instruments which make up a mix is 
also affected by the instrument preferences of policy actors, in particular 
dominant subsystem actors. Such preferences are dependent upon whether 
instruments allow dominant actors to pursue their interests and in the process 
perpetuate their dominance as well as the ideological predispositions of actors 
towards particular instruments. These are further discussed below in the 
segment on channels of policy mix nesting. Policy mixes in turn affect the 
attainment of policy outputs, which are typically defined in terms of policy 
success versus policy failure. 
In short, policy subsystem configurations affect and define policy mix 
design through the influence of dominant subsystem actors. Based on their 
positions within the policy subsystem, dominant subsystem actors are able to 
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shape policy mix design through their participation in “instrument 
constituencies” which favour and advocate particular instruments 262  or by 
shaping the beliefs and norms of other subsystem actors through advocacy 
coalitions. These two means or channels through which subsystem 
configuration affects policy mix design are nested are illustrated in Figure 3.3 
below. 






First, dominant actors determine the types of instruments that make up 
a policy mix based on their dominance over instrument choice through an 
instrumental channel. Voss and Simons have defined the subset of a policy 
subsystem that determines policy instrument choice through the articulation of 
a preferred instrument as an “instruments constituency”. 263  Given that 
instruments constituencies are formed around a shared preference among its 
members for a particular set or type of instruments, dominant actors who 
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belong to an instrument constituency are likely to promote an instrument 
choice that is favourable to the interests and preferences of the constituency.  
However, policy instrument choice may not necessarily be driven by 
instrument preferences. As shown in later chapters, policy instruments choice 
in Singapore and Shanghai tend to be driven by concerns over policy output 
achievement. This reflects a goal-oriented approach to policy instrument 
design and choice in the two IFC’s, based on assumptions over the efficacy 
and reliability of favoured instruments in achieving desired policy outputs. 
This is related to a second ideational channel through which dominant actors 
influence policy mix design.  
This channel involves advocating dominant norms and beliefs through 
the actions of dominant actors. At a fundamental level, this involves 
promoting the achievement of particular policy outputs and favouring the 
instruments which allow these outputs to be achieved, in the process 
influencing the belief structure and normative instruments preferences of other 
subsystem actors. According to Sabatier, dominant subsystem actors or 
coalitions are defined by their adherence to a set of shared beliefs.264 This 
means that the choice of policy instruments by these dominant actors tend to 
reflect their beliefs and preferences.  
                                                          
264 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein.” 
105 
 
As such, dominant actors are able to define policy subsystem 
configurations by shaping the subsystem around their interests, preferences, 
and beliefs. They do not simply represent or reflect these norms and beliefs; 
they actively propagate them as well. Given that norms and beliefs provide the 
normative basis for instrument choice and increase the acceptability of 
particular instruments, dominant actors exercise an indirect influence over 
policy mix design through this ideational channel.  
To sum it up, dominant actors within a given policy subsystem 
configuration define and determine policy mix design and instrument choice 
through two channels: (i) an instrumental channel that articulates the 
instrument preferences of instrument constituencies, and (ii) an ideational 
channel that involves the shaping of a subsystem’s belief structure by an 
advocacy coalition. However, it should also be noted that in reality, these two 
channels tend to overlap and are often hard to distinguish from each other. In 
other words, dominant actors may influence policy mix design through both 
instrumental and ideational channels, with the relative importance of either 
channel often unclear.  
In other words, these two channels are not always clear-cut and 
mutually distinguishable. In reality, dominant actors are likely to belong to 
both instrument constituencies and advocacy coalitions, with policy mix 
design often goal-driven and instruments designed or chosen based on their 
efficacy in achieving desired policy outputs. This suggests that while 
106 
 
instrument constituencies may exert an influence over instrument choice, the 
implementation of instruments by goal-oriented policymakers may instead be 
geared towards policy output achievement rather than instrument constituency 
preferences. Hence while Figure 3.3 separates between the instrumental and 
ideational channels, this is purely for heuristic purposes. The reality is that 
both channels tend to overlap in practice.   
Nonetheless, both instruments constituencies and advocacy coalitions 
are accounted for in the nested instrumental approach. This addresses the 
myriad ways in which subsystem actors interact with each other, and the 
impacts of such inter-actor relations on policy mix design. Existing policy 
instruments studies that ignore the political-economic milieu of the subsystem 
may perpetuate analytical sterility and a lack of relevance to real world 
policymaking. Conversely, studies of policy subsystem configurations that do 
not address specific policy instruments and mixes are too general and abstract 
to be of practical use to policymakers and scholars alike.  
In short, there is a need to combine the policy subsystems and policy 
instruments approaches within an integrated framework for analysis which 
addresses both political context and policy considerations. This will allow for 
a deeper understanding of how policy mixes are designed and used within the 
political-economic context of the policy subsystem. This is achieved in this 
thesis through the nested instrumental approach. 
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The nested instrumental approach will be applied to the three cases of 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai in Chapter 7. While the development of 
the nested instrumental approach allows this thesis to contribute to public 
policy theory by combining two key theoretical approaches within one 
analytical framework, its application to the three cases paves the way for a 
more systematic and empirically-driven understanding of IFC development. 
Further development and application of the nested instrumental approach may 
also potentially yield a useful analytical tool that incorporates both policy 
considerations and political context. This potential application of the nested 
instrumental approach as a tool for policy analysis is discussed at greater 
length in Chapter 7.   
 
Research Methodology 
This section describes the research and data analysis methods used in 
this thesis. Specifically, this thesis relies on the case study method to establish 
a comparative analysis of the three IFC’s. Given that existing quantitative 
studies of financial centres fail to provide a complete picture of IFC 
development and instead overstate IFC convergence through their focus on 
common economic structural variables and the development of IFC 
hierarchies and rankings based on these variables, this thesis takes a 
qualitative approach in order to provide a contextually nuanced and in-depth 
understanding of the impact of political economic contextual variables on the 
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policy design process and how these less tangible variables contribute to IFC 
success.  
Qualitative data collected in the course of fieldwork include interview 
data and archival records. In-depth interviews were conducted with senior 
policymakers, industry actors, and experts in the financial sector while official 
speeches, documents and reports published by governments, banks, financial 
institutions and research institutions were collected and analysed. The next 
section describes the case study method used in this thesis in greater detail.  
 
Case Study Method 
A comparative case study approach was taken to describe and analyse 
the development of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai as successful IFC’s. 
Case studies provide detailed and in-depth data that also account for context.265 
According to Yin, a case study “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and in its real world context”.266 This is especially important when the 
“boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”, 267 
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since case studies allow the micro level of the individual to be linked to the 
macro level of structure and process.268  
By incorporating depth and context, the case study it allows for a 
clearer specification and delineation of subsystem actors and interests within 
each IFC, which in turn facilitates a deeper understanding of the ways in 
which financial policy decisions are embedded within the political-economic 
context of the policy subsystem. This enmeshment of policy within politics 
suggests that phenomena (policy instruments used) and context (policy 
subsystem configuration) are highly intertwined and difficult to separate, 
precluding the applicability of quantitative methodologies.   
Given that the case study method allows a researcher to address both 
descriptive (“what”) and explanatory (“how” and “why”) questions,269 case 
studies are particularly useful for answering explanatory questions that 
typically involve the tracing of “operational links over time”.270 Following 
Yin’s typology of case study designs,271 this thesis relies on an embedded 
multiple-case design to analyse data collected from different groups of 
financial sector actors and from different sources across the three cases.  
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This helps increase the level of confidence and replicability of my 
research findings. Importantly, case studies are also guided and defined by 
underlying theoretical propositions, serving to “build, extend, or challenge” an 
existing theoretical perspective.272 In the case of this thesis, taking the three 
IFC’s as case studies provides the empirical foundations upon which the 
Nested Instrumental Approach can be developed as an analytical framework.  
Scholars have also noted the strengths of case study research. In 
particular, case study research provides conceptual validity by identifying and 
conceptualizing core variables, captures complex events succinctly, permits 
process tracing over time and space, allows for the calibration of abstract 
concepts to concrete real-life experiences, incorporates multiple perspectives 
in a holistic manner, and most importantly, permits the identification of causal 
mechanisms.273  
Issues of causal mechanism and process tracing have received much 
attention in recent scholarly work on case study and qualitative research 
methods.274 Importantly, case studies yield valid causal inferences, with thick 
descriptive data layered around a causal question or explanation. 275  This 
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combination of description and explanation is important for gaining a deeper 
understanding of the political and policy processes which underpin IFC 
success. Such an understanding is largely missing in the existing IFC 
literature, given this literature’s focus on measurable outputs at the expense of 
less quantifiable processes.   
An important aspect of any case study research is case selection. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai were 
chosen based on their positions as Asia’s leading IFC’s. As described in 
Chapter 1, similarities across the three IFC’s coupled with the unique political 
economic characteristics of each IFC allows the three cities to be taken as 
comparable cases. The selection of these three cases was also based on a 
general dearth of studies on Asian IFC’s and the existing IFC literature’s 
neglect of political economic contextual variables and the impact of these 
variables on IFC success.  
While the case study method has often been criticized for its small-n 
nature that could contribute to selection bias, qualitative methodologists have 
argued that these selection bias critiques do not apply to causal inferences 
drawn from within-case process tracing, given that process tracing is different 
from methods that rely on covariation. 276  Given the limits of existing 
quantitatively-driven IFC studies, taking a small-n case study approach allows 
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for an in-depth understanding IFC development, particularly through the use 
of qualitative data. This use of qualitative data is discussed next.    
 
Qualitative Data  
This thesis relies mainly on qualitative data collected in the course of 
fieldwork. As Chapter 2 has shown, existing studies of IFC’s based on 
quantitative methods over-emphasize the economic and structural aspects of 
financial sector development, with a consequent development of IFC 
hierarchies and rankings that assume and predict the eventual convergence of 
IFC development and financial policy models around such economic structural 
variables. Such studies give short shrift to differences in political economic 
context and policy preferences across IFC’s. 
In particular, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai exhibit clear 
differences in their political systems and contexts, the financial activities and 
markets which each IFC is comparatively advantaged in, and the financial 
policies implemented in IFC development. Given the limitations of existing 
quantitative studies, this thesis aims to provide a more nuanced, in-depth and 
contextual understanding of IFC development through the use of qualitative 
data. 
Qualitative data is drawn from in-depth interviews with senior 
financial policy makers, private sector professionals, and experts in the 
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financial industry as well as official speeches, documents and reports 
published by relevant government agencies and major financial institutions. 
Data collection and analysis in the course of the research that underpins this 
thesis is described in greater detail in a later section on field research.  
Qualitative data analysis allows this thesis to fulfil two purposes: (1) provide 
detailed descriptions based on both observable and non-observable 
information, (2) draw and explicate causal relations between variables. These 
correspond to the concepts of descriptive inference and causal inference that, 
according to King, Keohane and Verba, underpin all social science research.277 
Through analyses of archival and interview data, important causal inferences 
were derived with regards to how a specific subsystem configuration resulted 
in the formulation of a policy mix tailored to that configuration in the three 
IFC’s. Quantitative studies of IFC development do not allow for the drawing 
of such causal inferences.  
Instead, existing quantitative IFC studies tend to be more descriptive in 
nature, relying on observable data to understand what makes a successful IFC. 
However, this has resulted in an inadequate understanding of how IFC’s attain 
success, which requires less directly observable data that resides in the 
collective knowledge of policymakers and other subsystem actors. Teasing out 
such unobservable data entails conducting in-depth interviews with the 
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individuals who were involved in financial policymaking within each IFC and 
to a lesser extent, qualitative analyses of archival data  
Triangulation of data is achieved by drawing on different sources of 
data and interviewing different groups of respondents. The first round of 
triangulation involves using both interview data and official publications to 
analyse and assess financial policies enacted in each IFC. This is 
complemented by a second round of triangulation that involves collecting 
interview data from a variety of financial policy actors such as financial 
regulatory policymakers, private sector professionals and independent experts 
such as academics and researchers.  
Drawing on the views of financial regulators and private sector 
professionals who are often the target of regulations brings together two 
opposing viewpoints. The convergence of these two opposing viewpoints 
allows for a more balanced understanding of the nature and impacts of 
financial policies enacted within each case. Independent experts provide an 
autonomous third party viewpoint, given that they are not directly affected by 
financial policies.  
 
Reliability, Relevance and Validity 
Triangulation is also related to issues of reliability and validity. 
Reliability has been described as the consistency or dependability of a 
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measure over time and repetition.278 A key means through which reliability 
was achieved in this thesis was through the design, application and 
documentation of a set of standardized interview questions, which are attached 
in Appendix 1. This allowed the interviews to be structured along similar 
questions and issues, improving the replicability of these interviews.  
While in-depth interviews tend to be less structured and involve further 
investigation of information and issues that may be brought up by 
interviewees, standardized questions help define the general direction of 
interviews. Furthermore, steps were taken to ensure that discussions were kept 
within the confines of the subject matter, with irrelevant diversions kept to a 
minimum. Through in-depth interviewees with policymakers and financial 
sector professionals who are or have been directly involved or affected by 
financial policies, this research also attains a high degree of relevance.  
Relevance refers to whether research findings relate to real world 
events or occurrences. 279  In particular, interviews with policymakers and 
industry actors yield important insights, give that these individuals possess 
extensive on-the-ground experience with financial policies. The official 
speeches and documents analysed in this thesis are also actual policy 
communications that were published for the purpose of recording or 
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announcing policy changes. This means that findings drawn from these 
official documents are representative of the respective governments’ official 
policy orientations and views.  
Reliability and relevance are also related to validity, which refers to the 
extent to which the research design and findings approximate reality. 280 
Several types of validity need to be discussed in order to show how this 
research fulfils the requirements of validity. First, internal validity is necessary 
to ensure that changes in the observed dependent variable are caused by a 
specific independent variable such as a policy or program.281 Internal validity 
in this thesis is ensured through the collection of in-depth qualitative data 
through interviews and the analysis of official speeches and documents.  
Such qualitative data allows for a deep and rich understanding of the 
mechanisms and rationales within the financial policymaking process. Of 
particular importance are the views of policymakers, since these provide an 
‘insider account’ of the rationale and processes that underpin financial policy 
in each IFC. The triangulation of data sources further validates the findings of 
this research by deriving causal inference from multiple independent sources 
of data.  
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Through the collection of qualitative data, ‘thick’ descriptions of each 
case could be developed and process tracing applied. This allowed the 
inferring of causal linkages between subsystem configuration and policy mix 
design as well as those between policy mix design and policy outputs. 
Furthermore, steps were taken to ensure that the cases differed only in terms of 
the independent variable (subsystem configuration and policy mix design). 
Exogenous variables such as history were also reduced by picking cases that 
have developed over the same time-frame and which were exposed to similar 
historical events and other exogenous factors.  
External validity refers to the extent to which research findings can be 
extended or generalized to other cases or studies.282 This contributes to the 
relevance of research findings to real life settings. 283  The selection of a 
heterogeneous set of interview subjects ensured that findings are relevant to 
the broader context. While policymakers represented the views of their 
national and expert domains, the inclusion of financial industry professionals 
and independent experts who study IFC’s comparatively across national 
boundaries ensured a diverse and international set of data that can generate 
findings that are applicable to other IFC’s.  
Lastly, construct validity refers to the ‘fit’ between a construct which 
an instrument is supposed to measure and the actual observations made with 
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the instrument. 284  Construct validity is ensured by the careful design of 
interview questions aimed at minimizing ambiguity in terminology. This is 
achieved through consulting the extensive literature on financial policy and the 
theoretical literatures on policy subsystems and policy instruments. In 
instances where interview subjects were unclear about specific terminology 
used, standardized explanations of these terms prepared prior to the interview 
were used to facilitate interviewee’s understanding of the questions asked.  
Having described the research methods and techniques employed in 




Interviews were carried out between April and November 2013 with 
policymakers at the ministerial and directorial levels, senior financial sector 
professionals and independent experts. The various interview subjects are 
listed in table 3.1 below. However, several interviewees had explicitly 
requested that their interviews be carried out under conditions of anonymity. 
This means that interviewees did not wish to make known their names, 
organizations, jurisdictions within which they operate, or any other personally-
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attributable characteristics. These interviewees are listed here by their relevant 
job positions or functions in the context of financial policy.  
Table 3.1 List of Interview Subjects 
Mr Donald Tsang, Former Financial Secretary: 1995-1997; Former Chief 
Executive: 2005-2012 
Mr Michael Cartland, Former Secretary for Financial Services: 1993-1995 
Mr Ravi Menon, Current MAS Managing Director 
Mr Koh Yong Guan, Former MAS Managing Director: Jan 1998 – March 
2001; Oct 2001 – May 2005 
Mr Simon Topping (Former HKMA Executive Director (Banking Policy) 
from 1995-2008 
Mr Andrew Sheng, Member of Advisory Council on Shanghai as an 
International Financial Centre; Former HKMA Deputy Chief Executive: 1993-
1998; Chairman of SFC: 1998-2003 
Associate Professor Chong Tai Leung, Executive Director of Institute of 
Global Economics and Finance; Associate Professor, Department of 
Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Professor Annie Koh, Singapore Management University 
Mr Lim Siong Guan, Current GIC Group Preseident; Former Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Finance: 1999-2006; Former MAS Board 
Member: 1996-2006; Former EDB Chairman: 2006-2009 
120 
 
Former Finance Minister 
Former Deputy Managing Director at a Regulatory Agency 
Executive Director at a Regulatory Agency 
Former Executive Director at a Regulatory Agency 
Senior Vice-President of an International Bank 
Fund Manager at an American Asset Management Firm 
Former Administrative Service Chief and Regulatory Official 
Member of Hong Kong Economic Development Commission 
 
The desire for anonymity among respondents implies a deep-seated 
aversion towards being identified as a ‘whistle-blower’ or having to face the 
consequences of disclosing sensitive or confidential information. Some 
respondents were also unwilling to be publicly associated with unsuccessful or 
unpopular policies. This raised significant challenges for data collection, as 
well as a high rejection rate from potential interviewees. Given this fear of 
‘getting into trouble’ with the authorities, promising anonymity was an 
important means through which more accurate or candid responses could be 
elicited from interviewees.  
In fact, several individuals refused to participate in the interview, 
unless they could be assured of anonymity. This unwillingness to face the 
consequences of revealing information also reveals somewhat the power 
relations which underpin IFC development in the three cases. In all three 
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cases, power resides in the state and there remains a risk of being seen to be 
subverting state policy processes and power relations. However, field research 
in Hong Kong yielded more instances whereby respondents were willing to be 
personally-attributable and hence did not request anonymity. This corresponds 
with the less interventionist and more liberal stance of the Hong Kong 
government, which is discussed in later chapters.  
In contrast, respondents from the Singapore and Shanghai cases mostly 
requested anonymity. Furthermore, it was also exceedingly difficult to get 
Chinese officials and even financial sector professionals to accede to interview 
requests. In those cases where these actors acceded to interviews, their 
responses were curt and did not deviate from the typical mainstream views 
that can be found in official government publications. In many instances, 
respondents refused to sign the Participant Consent Form provided under 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) rules, hence invalidating their responses as 
interview data for the purposes of this thesis.  
This means that more interview data was collected in Hong Kong and 
Singapore than Shanghai.  Furthermore, there is also a need to understand the 
responses of interviewees in light of the prevailing power relations. In other 
words, interview responses from government officials are likely to be more 
cautious, especially in cases were respondents did not request for anonymity. 




Nonetheless, respondents from Singapore’s MAS proved surprisingly 
candid in their responses. In particular, current Managing Director Ravi 
Menon and former Managing Director Koh Yong Guan provided a wealth of 
information on the internal workings of the Authority as well as its relations 
with industry actors. This is in contrast to public officials in Hong Kong and 
Shanghai, who were less willing to speak on issues which were deemed 
‘sensitive’ or even allow their comments to be personally attributable in the 
first place.  
Furthermore, while some respondents allowed audio recording of the 
interviews, others were not willing to be recorded and taken ad verbatim. This 
affects the presentation of data in this thesis. In other words, some of the 
interview data could be quoted word for word, while others needed some 
amount of paraphrasing. Nonetheless, the substance and gist of interview 
responses were maintained, even in instances where it was not possible to 
quote ad verbatim, since these responses were not voice recorded.  
 Given the challenges and limitations of data-collection in the case of 
Shanghai and the consistent requests for anonymity in both Shanghai and 
Singapore, more effort had to be expended in triangulating the existing 
interview data through the collection and analysis of archival records and 
other secondary data or publications. Such archival data and their collection 
are discussed further below. Suffice to say, these challenges are themselves 
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reflective and evidential of the power relations and dominance of the state 
over financial policy processes in all three cases.    
In terms of interview design, questions were designed to address three 
different groups of interviewees, namely financial regulatory officials, 
financial sector professionals, and independent experts or the ‘interested 
public’. Separate questions were designed for each group of interviewees, 
tailored to their specific fields. The interview questions can be found in 
Appendix 1. While the interview was largely structured by the interview 
questions, there were inadvertently instances where interviewees brought up 
issues or subjects that were of interest or potentially useful for this thesis.  
During these instances, interviewees were encouraged to elaborate on 
these issues. Special care was taken that the interviewer’s prompts for 
elaboration were in no way leading. Furthermore, interview subjects were 
briefed on the general nature of the research before the interview. They were 
also debriefed after the interview, with the debrief focusing in particular on 
how their responses are to be used in this thesis and issues pertaining to 
attribution of comments.  
Interview contacts were obtained through various channels. The first 
channel involved extensive searches for email addresses on the various 
government directories and agency websites. Having obtained email addresses 
of potential interviewees through this search, an email was sent with a 
standardized cover letter and participant information sheet (PIS) to seek 
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permission for an interview. A second channel for obtaining interview 
contacts was through the personal contacts of the Dean and Professors of the 
School. As per procedure, the standardized cover letter and PIS were sent to 
these contacts.  
More interview contacts were subsequently obtained through snowball 
sampling, as interview subjects recommended current and former colleagues 
who may be able to provide more information on a particular subject area. 
Finally, personal contacts from the financial industry were used to obtain more 
potential interviewees.  In short, obtaining potential interview subjects first 
involved ‘cold’ emails sent out to relevant individuals, followed by a process 
of snowball sampling through interview subjects and other contact sources.  
Aside from these in-depth interviews, less formal discussion were also 
carried out with other regulatory officials, financial sector professionals and 
independent experts. These discussions were carried out under conditions of 
anonymity, and interviewees were typically lower ranked than the in-depth 
interview subjects listed above. Aside from their lower rank, these 
interviewees had also refused to participate formally in the interview, refusing 
to sign the IRB Participant Consent Form. They were only willing to discuss 
financial sector development in their respective IFC’s at a more general (and 
cautious) level.  
In other words, these lower ranking officials and industry professionals 
were typically unwilling to provide any detailed or confidential information. 
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Furthermore, they were not in any position to discuss policy decisions at the 
level studied in this thesis, given their lower ranks. While most of these 
discussion do not yield direct quotes or data sets, they have nonetheless been 
useful for providing background information which can be substantiated by 
official documents, allowing for a ‘feel’ of the ground in the three IFC’s. As 
discussed above, the bulk of the data on financial policy decisions was 
collected from interviews with senior level officials and professionals.  
Archival data in the form of official reports, speeches, and documents 
were mostly obtained from the websites of regulatory agencies and online 
databases. In particular, the websites of the relevant financial regulatory 
agencies were perused for official documents, policy announcements and 
publications. The MAS, HKMA, and CSRC websites proved particularly 
comprehensive in maintaining databases of past policy reports and 
publications. However, many of these websites do not provide copies of 
archival data that was published before the 1990s.  
For documents published before the 1990s, hard copies were obtained 
from the National University of Singapore library and the National Library 
Board. Relevant private sector reports and publications were also perused. 
These were largely available on the websites of banks and financial 
institutions, as well as in the University and national libraries. Lastly, reports 
and publications by university and research institutes were also perused.  
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There were also several instances whereby interview respondents 
voluntarily provided hard copies of official reports and publications. For 
instance, an MAS publication on the historical development of the Authority 
was provided by former MAS Managing Director Koh Yong Guan. Former 
HKMA Executive Director Simon Topping also provided several 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reports on Hong Kong’s financial sector 
development and regulation, based on his current employment with the 
company.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed description of the theoretical and 
methodological foundations that underpin this thesis, both of which have 
allowed this thesis to make key theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
field. Through a discussion of the policy instruments and policy subsystems 
approaches, it is clear that neither of these two approaches is sufficient for the 
development of an integrative and nuanced approach to studying IFC 
development in Asia. Rather, they are both limited in their scope of analysis.  
While the policy instruments literature provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the tools that policymakers have at their disposal and how 
these tools have been designed for achieving various policy goals, it has not 
sufficiently addressed the wider political economic context within which 
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policy instruments are designed and implemented. Conversely, the policy 
subsystems literature has yielded important insights on the different 
combinations of state and non-state actors within a given policy area. 
However, it does not adequately address the specific policies used by 
policymakers within subsystems.   
This thesis provides a way to overcome these limitations through the 
nested instrumental approach, which combines the insights of both approaches 
yet at the same time, negates their individual shortcomings. This allows for a 
more integrative approach to understanding financial policy and IFC 
development that takes into account both political context and policy 
processes. This chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the 
development, components and theoretical foundations of the nested 
instrumental approach. The approach will subsequently be applied to the three 
cases in Chapter 7.  
Furthermore, the use of qualitative data and case study methods allows 
this thesis to provide a contextually-driven and in-depth analysis of IFC 
development and success across the three cases. Such nuance and depth of 
analysis is largely missing in the existing literatures on IFC’s and financial 
sector development, given the over-reliance of such studies on quantitative 
methods. In contrast, qualitative research allows for a deeper understanding of 
IFC development, incorporating the political economic context and studying 
the impact of this context on financial policy.  
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Chapter 4: Hong Kong 
Introduction 
Hong Kong’s success as an IFC has traditionally been seen to be a 
function of its low taxes, sound legal system, efficient regulatory regime and 
proximity to China. However, these factors tell only part of Hong Kong’s 
financial success story. Hong Kong’s success as an IFC is based on its 
government’s laissez faire model of financial governance that promotes 
economic freedom and market stability, as well as a strong dominance of the 
state as financial policymaker.  
From a policy perspective, Hong Kong’s development as an IFC has 
thus far been based on a financial policy mix that largely comprises stabilizing 
financial policy instruments, reflecting the government’s laissez faire 
approach that minimizes government intervention in markets, which means 
limited use of enabling or developmental instruments. Such an approach is 
reflected in the government’s “big markets, small government” doctrine that 
largely employs stabilizing policies to ensure market stability, eschewing more 
interventionist developmental and enabling policies.  
While the HKMA is enmeshed within a web of financial sector 
relations that include industry and other non-state actors, these other actors do 
not factor heavily into the HKMA’s financial policies. Rather, financial 
policymaking remains largely state-driven, although paradoxically, this 
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dominance over policy is not always obvious, given the government’s laissez 
faire approach.  Given this simultaneous commitment to minimal government 
intervention and limited policy role of non-state actors, Hong Kong’s financial 
governance model differs significantly from Shanghai’s state-dominated 
approach and Singapore’s state-industry co-creation of financial policy.  
This chapter provides an in-depth understanding of Hong Kong’s 
successful development as an IFC. The next section provides a brief overview 
of the historical development of Hong Kong’s financial sector, followed by a 
section on Hong Kong’s comparative advantages as an IFC. The proceeding 
sections then deal with the policies and politics behind Hong Kong’s success 
as an IFC. In particular, I discuss Hong Kong’s financial governance model, 
its regulatory regime, the HKMA’s financial policy mix, and the financial 




Hong Kong’s beginnings as an IFC can be traced as far back as 1842, 
when Hong Kong had first become a British colony and thriving entrepot for 
the region.285 It would subsequently rise to become a leading IFC, consistently 
maintaining its position within the top three from 1900 to 1975 in Reed’s 
                                                          




ranking of Asian International Banking Centres.286 Given its pre-existing role 
as a trade entrepot and the impact of trade on stimulating financial activity, 
Hong Kong’s development as an IFC has been seen as a “natural process”.287  
 Yet it was only in the post-war period of the 1950s and 1960s that 
Hong Kong truly emerged to become an IFC, by leveraging on the 
agglomeration of trade-related financial services that had accompanied its 
success as an entrepot.288  While financial sector development at this stage 
“tracked the development of the economy”, it would subsequently grow to 
become a “self-sustaining” industry.289   A post-war decline in international 
trade provided the catalyst for banks to shift from commerce to purely 
financial activities, sparking off an influx of foreign investors and banks into 
the territory. 290  Importantly, the presence of markets for various types of 
financial services meant that 1960s Hong Kong already possessed “most of the 
attributes that are used to define an IFC”.291 
While Hong Kong’s origins as an IFC can be traced back to the post-
war period, it was only during the 1970s that Hong Kong truly took off as an 
IFC, with the rapid “internationalization of banking operations and financial 
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activities”.292 Jao notes that two structural changes occurred in Hong Kong’s 
financial sector during the early 1970’s: the intensification of competition with 
the emergence of alternative depository financial institutions such as merchant 
banks and greater concentration in the banking industry due to “acquisitions of 
local Chinese banks by foreign banks or financial concerns”.293 
Hong Kong also experienced an intense period of “financial 
deepening” in the 1970s, marked by a rapid “accumulation and diversification 
of financial assets” that was attributed to the government’s liberal economic 
policy. 294  Along with its free exchange market, strategic location and 
proximity to China, such a liberal economic policy stance allowed Hong Kong 
to tap into the period’s rising demand for multinational banking services and 
internationalize its financial markets.295 
Specific government measures at financial market liberalization, such 
as the issuance of new full-service banking licenses to foreign banks and the 
removal of the interest withholding tax on foreign currency deposits in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, would further lay the ground for Hong Kong’s 
continued growth as an IFC in the following decades.296 A tiered banking 
                                                          
292 Reed, “The Ascent of Tokyo as an International Financial Center,” 45; Y.C. Jao, “Hong 
Kong as a Regional Financial Centre: Evolution and Prospects,” in Dilemmas of Growth, ed. 
Chi-Keung Leung, J.W. Cushman, and Gungwu Wang (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1980), 163. 
293 Jao, “Hong Kong as a Regional Financial Centre: Evolution and Prospects,” 166–169. 
294 Sheng-Yi Lee and Y. C. Jao, Financial Structures and Monetary Policies in Southeast Asia 
(London: Macmillan, 1982), 21–23. 
295 Jao, “Hong Kong as a Regional Financial Centre: Evolution and Prospects,” 176–178. 




system was also introduced in 1981297 and reformed in 1990298 in order to 
attract more foreign financial institutions.  
The 1980s and 1990s were also marked by increasing securitization 
and the advent of new financial innovations, prompting a shift in market 
attention from commercial banking towards financial markets.299 During this 
period, Hong Kong grew to become a “major centre of securitisation”. 300 
Governmental pressure also prompted the merging of the four stock exchanges 
and the launch of computer-assisted trading in 1986, catapulting Hong Kong’s 
stock market to international status.301 In response, the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) was established in 1989 to strengthen regulatory oversight 
of the securities market.  
Pauly identifies two key developments that would come to strengthen 
the commercial banking sector of Hong Kong in the 1990’s: the establishment 
of the HKMA in 1993, and the setting up of Hong Kong Interbank Clearing 
Limited in 1995 followed shortly by the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
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System. 302  Both developments were crucial in ensuring the reliability and 
efficiency of Hong Kong’s financial markets for investors.  
While the 1997 handover saw a transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty 
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the government of Hong Kong 
nonetheless retained independent authority to “formulate monetary and 
financial policies, safeguard the free operation of financial business and 
financial markets, and regulate and supervise them in accordance with law”.303 
The pre-handover signing of the joint British-China declaration had also 
provided clarity over policy and future directions, providing a significant 
boost to Hong Kong’s development as an IFC.304 
Post-handover Hong Kong would come to face its first real test with 
the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Originating in Thailand on 2 
July 1997, the crisis swiftly spread to Hong Kong in October 1997 in the form 
of a weakening of and further speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar, 
prompting the HKMA to defend the Hong Kong dollar by selling US dollars 
in its reserves.305 Speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar in 1998 also 
prompted direct intervention by the HKMA in the purchase of Hang Seng 
index stocks, in an attempt to deter speculators by sending out a “credible 
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signal that the monetary authority would use available funds to buy index 
stocks in the event of a speculative attack”.306 
Recovering from the financial turmoil of the late 1990s, the 2000s 
would herald a period of intense growth and innovation in Hong Kong’s 
financial markets, boosting the SAR’s status as an IFC. With the increasingly 
competitive banking sector, banks in Hong Kong began offering other 
financial products and services such as personal finance and wealth 
management products in 2000.307 Despite brief slowdowns resulting from the 
SARS epidemic in 2003 and the GFC in 2008, the Hong Kong economy 
swiftly recovered.  
 Hong Kong also further consolidated its advantageous proximity to 
China, by signing the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with 
China in 2003 and as a result, transforming itself into a full-fledged offshore 
RMB business centre by 2012. 308  Furthermore, the establishment of the 
Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) scheme in 
December 2011 allowed foreign investors to invest in China’s equity and bond 
markets through “qualified fund management and securities companies in 
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Hong Kong”309, reinforcing the SAR’s position as a “gateway to mainland 
China”.310 
 
Determinants of Competitive Advantage 
Jao categorizes Hong Kong’s competitive advantages by 
differentiating between internal and external success factors.311 Internal factors 
include political and social stability, economic freedom, adherence to GATT 
National Treatment principles, a robust legal system, accountable and 
responsive governing style, favourable tax regime, skilled work force, modern 
and efficient infrastructure, low costs from regulation, free flows of 
information, and the use of English as an official language.312 Conversely, 
external factors include Hong Kong’s strategic location and time zone, 
proximity to a rapidly liberalising Chinese economy (the “China Factor”), 
strong growth among Asian-Pacific economies, and the globalization or 
internationalization of banking and finance.313 
Given that these external factors had previously bolstered Hong 
Kong’s competitive advantage as a trade entrepot and with the development of 
its financial sector, such “natural advantages remained highly relevant as 
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industrial capitalism on a national scale developed into financial capitalism on 
a global scale”.314 Hong Kong has thus been able to transfer its advantages as a 
trading entrepot into its new role as a “financial entrepot”. 315  While these 
external factors have proven important in Hong Kong’s initial development as 
an IFC, internal policy-related factors have proven equally, if not more, 
important. 
Hong Kong’s competitive advantage has been driven by what Schenk 
terms the “classic attributes of an IFC: political stability, infrastructure and 
regulatory freedom”.316 Underlying Hong Kong’s competitive advantages are 
the “favourable institutional structures that set and enforce clear rules of the 
game on a level playing field; motivated and hardworking individuals who 
continually strive for success; and a prevailing ethos that has fostered and 
stimulated economic development”.317  
In particular, Hong Kong’s common law system, with its transparent 
laws and reliable judiciary, underpins the SAR’s success as an IFC.318 Mak 
also identifies factors such as having a free economic system, government 
policies aimed at financial liberalization, equal “National Treatment” of 
foreign and domestic banks, relatively low transaction costs, an advanced 
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telecommunication system, availability of electronic banking services, an 
advantageous location and the presence of a skilled workforce with good 
industrial relations.319  
Lee and Vertinsky attribute Hong Kong’s success as an IFC to: “(1) its 
British legal traditions and legal and financial expertise, (2) its less 
constraining levels of regulation and disclosure, (3) its role in the investment 
in and trade flows to and from the People’s Republic of China ... (4) its role as 
a prime financial centre for overseas Chinese ... and (5) opportunities for 
abnormal profits resulting from the structure of the domestic banking 
market”.320  
McCauley and Chan have also noted that Hong Kong’s advantage as 
an IFC lies in its legal system, regulatory framework, and clearing and 
settlement systems.321 Another significant advantage that Hong Kong enjoys is 
its wholly convertible currency, the Hong Kong dollar, and its peg to the US 
dollar.322 In itself, Hong Kong’s transparent and trusted financial infrastructure 
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with its “multi-currency, multi-dimensional platform” has also been identified 
as a key defining competitive advantage that sets it apart from other IFC’s.323 
Another unique competitive advantage enjoyed by Hong Kong is the 
“China factor”, 324  a unique advantage which, according to Deputy Chief 
Executive of the HKMA Eddie Yue is “difficult for other financial centres to 
replicate”.325 As one of China’s leading IFC’s, Hong Kong has been able to 
benefit from China’s phenomenal rise over the past few decades by tapping 
into China’s financial liberalisation process and acting as a RMB business 
centre amidst increasing external use of China’s currency.326 Hong Kong has 
also found a niche in managing initial public offerings by Mainland firms 
seeking to raise capital in Hong Kong.327  
Hong Kong’s linkages to the Mainland and its “deep knowledge of 
business cultures and practices on the Mainland”328 thus augment its other 
existing advantages, allowing the SAR to become “embedded in China’s 
grander national marketization and globalization project ... becoming a 
Chinese global city”.329 Based on such linkages, Hong Kong’s business and 
                                                          
323 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Financial Infrastructure in Hong Kong, HKMA 
Background Brief (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Monetary Authority, December 2006), 46. 
324 Subacchi et al., Shifting Capital, ix. 
325 Eddie Yue, “Hong Kong as an International Financial Center – the China  Factor” 
(presented at the “Hong Kong: China’s Global Financial Centre” conference, New York, 
March 1, 2011), http://www.bis.org/review/r110302d.pdf. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Pauly, Hong Kong’s International Financial Centre:  Retrospect and Prospect, 48. 
328 Ibid., 83–84. 
329 Tai-lok Lui and Stephen W.K. Chiu, “Becoming a Chinese Global City: Hong Kong (and 
Shanghai) beyond the Global-Local Duality,” in Shanghai Rising: State Power and Local 
139 
 
financial services sector have also become “honed to the needs of ... business 
on the Chinese Mainland”. 330  This makes Hong Kong a “privileged zone 
where arbitrage can thrive between open global markets and a massive and 
internally focused Chinese economy”,331 allowing the SAR to act as a key 
gateway into China.  
Furthermore, Hong Kong’s diverse set of local and foreign firms are 
able to “pack and integrate” international financial activity and use Hong 
Kong as a platform from which to invest in China.332 However, observers have 
also noted that Hong Kong’s political proximity to the Mainland may also 
raise doubts over its judicial and political independence, with investors 
flocking to independent Singapore instead.333   
In sum, three key factors have been unanimously accepted as Hong 
Kong’s unique determinants of competitive advantage. These are (i) economic 
freedom based on a laissez faire limited government approach to economic 
governance, (ii) a robust legal and regulatory infrastructure, and (iii) proximity 
to an increasingly affluent and powerful China. However, these factors do not 
sufficiently explain the exact means through which Hong Kong was able to 
attain its pre-eminence as an IFC.  
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Rather than explaining the role of policy and government in IFC development, 
these factors focus instead on external demand conditions and responses to 
structural conditions. How the government establishes these structural 
conditions and the ways in which these conditions and other factors are used 
by the government for IFC development remain under-investigated. The next 
section describes the Hong Kong government’s financial governance style, 
which provides a broad view of the general practices and enduring beliefs 
which underpin the government’s approach to financial policymaking.  
 
Financial Governance  
Hong Kong’s model of financial governance stems from its 
commitment to economic freedom and its adherence to the rule of law. 
Economic freedom is a consequence of the government’s active attempts to 
maintain free markets through its early doctrine of “positive non-intervention” 
and more recently, its “big market, small government” approach. Furthermore, 
adherence to due process and the rule of law stems from Hong Kong’s British-
influenced common law system. This section discusses Hong Kong’s financial 
governance model in the context of economic freedom and the rule of law. 
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  In general, Hong Kong’s financial governance approach flows from a 
“‘laissez faire’ government economic policy”334 that has boosted the SAR’s 
competitiveness by endowing it with “freedom from onerous regulation”.335 
This means that there is “no intervention from the government unless market 
failure occurs”. 336  As former HKMA chief Joseph Yam has noted, Hong 
Kong’s success as an IFC is based on its adherence to “sound principles of the 
free market with minimal governmental intervention” 337 . Hong Kong’s 
adherence to a “neoclassical principle of limited government” thus provides a 
measure of economic resilience and flexibility that is conducive to financial 
sector development338.  
Li situates Hong Kong’s economic freedom within a growth-oriented 
“paradigm of economism” that involves an indirect yet active role of 
government in maintaining the conditions necessary for laissez faire.339 Jao 
similarly notes that the Hong Kong government generally adopts a 
“permissive or accommodating posture: it merely aims to provide a stable 
framework for the development of the city as a financial centre, but does not, 
however, offer specific concessions or incentives to encourage such a 
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trend”. 340  This non-interventionist approach has been attributed to the 
“political apathy” of a shallowly-rooted populace that had accommodated the 
continuance of the British laissez faire style of economic governance even 
after the Chinese hand-over.341 
Hong Kong thus represents the extreme exemplification of self-
regulation and has been described as the “paradigm case of a laissez-faire 
economy”,342 especially when compared with more state-driven IFC’s such as 
Shanghai and Singapore. Paradoxically, this lack of direct government action 
is in itself a means to promote the territory as an IFC, since Hong Kong’s 
attractiveness as an IFC lies in its business-friendly, laissez faire economic 
environment. Hong Kong’s economic openness has thus been used as an 
“instrument for attracting inward capital in the form of foreign investment and 
external demand in the form of manufactured goods and services exports”,343 
providing a key stimulus for economic growth in the territory. 
As such, it is important to note that Hong Kong’s ‘laissez faire’ image 
belies an active role played by the government in Hong Kong’s success. This 
means that Hong Kong’s laissez faire economic policy is a “deliberate policy 
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choice rather than merely an absence of policy”.344 This is a policy choice that 
is “guided by a liberal economic ideology”345 and hence requires considerable 
governmental restraint from market intervention. Former financial secretary 
John J. Cowperthwaite has described Hong Kong’s unique brand of economic 
policy-making as “positive non-interventionism”,346 with the ‘positive’ aspect 
suggesting an active coordinative role of government and ‘non-intervention’ 
denoting the favouring of laissez faire capitalism.347  
Hong Kong’s financial governance model has since evolved from 
“positive non-intervention” to what former Chief Executive Donald Tsang has 
termed “big market, small government”.348 The central belief of “big market, 
small government” is that “government will only do the things which the 
market does not do”.349 This means “highly selective intervention”350 by the 
government on the basis of necessity, especially during crises or in the face of 
market failure. In other words, Hong Kong’s financial governance model is 
predicated upon the need to maintain the efficient functioning of its free 
markets without any unnecessary intervention from the state.  
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 Pauly characterises Hong Kong’s government as a “facilitator” that 
intervenes in the economy only in reaction to crises, enabling the formation of 
a “strong society” capable of functioning with minimal government 
direction.351 This means that industry actors are able to drive financial sector 
growth with little government interference, although they still operate within 
the regulatory oversight of the government. Hence, there is a “clear separation 
in Hong Kong between the role of government as referee, and the role of 
private companies as active players in the economy”.352  
This means that Hong Kong’s success formula comprises of 
“combining industrial entrepreneurship with access to financial and land 
resources directly or indirectly sustained and steered by government 
policies”.353 This separation of government and industry policy roles in Hong 
Kong’s financial governance and policymaking is elaborated in a later section 
on Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem. Nonetheless, more recent efforts 
by the government to promote Hong Kong as an IFC and financial gateway to 
China suggest more interventionist efforts at marketing and promotion.354 
Another key aspect of Hong Kong’s financial governance model is the 
SAR’s adherence to the rule of law. Hong Kong’s robust legal system is 
essentially based on the English common law that it had been endowed with as 
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a British colony, prior to the 1997 handover. The British administration had in 
fact ensured that the “tradition of judicial independence and the rule of law has 
been transplanted and firmly entrenched in Hong Kong”.355 This legal system 
ensures the protection of property rights and civil liberties, effectively 
preventing the government of the day from violating these rights and 
liberties. 356  Former Chief Executive Donald Tsang has noted that Hong 
Kong’s common law system provides a significant measure of flexibility or 
adaptability to rapid changes in global financial markets357.  
Furthermore, Lee considers Hong Kong’s fair and robust legal system 
to be the “bedrock of its economic success”.358 Transparency, predictability of 
rules and availability of investor protection define the business fundamentals 
upon which the SAR’s reputation as a world-class IFC depends.359 Although 
initially inherited from the British administration, Hong Kong’s legal system 
has since been “developed to meet its needs for financial development”.360  
This reflects the government’s attempts to keep its legal framework 
relevant to constantly evolving financial markets, while at the same time 
maintaining its transparency and efficiency. Banking regulation is guided by 
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the Basic Law as well as the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap 66), Banking 
Ordinance (Cap 155), Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance (Cap 364), 
and any other supplementary legislation supported by various codes of 
practice, rules and guidelines.361  
Hong Kong’s legal system can thus be seen as complementary to the 
government’s commitment to positive non-intervention, providing a legal 
safeguard against excessive government intervention and facilitating the 
smooth functioning of Hong Kong’s free markets. With regards to the latter, 
Hong Kong’s Western-styled legal system underpins its free markets by 
“providing a level playing field, due process, protection of property rights and 
legal contracts”.362  
As Li has noted, Hong Kong’s “principles of free enterprise, and the 
supporting legal framework, are enshrined in the Basic Law”.363 Hong Kong’s 
legal system thus provides the legal basis and foundation for the SAR’s key 
competitive advantage of economic freedom, even as it remains a competitive 
advantage in its own right. An important consequence of Hong Kong’s 
commonwealth legal system is its acceptability by other developed nations and 
its adaptability to international standards. 
In sum, Hong Kong’s economy remains free and open, driven by the 
government’s doctrine of “big market, small government”. This is 
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complimented by a robust legal system that limits government intervention in 
financial markets through an adherence to due process and the rule of law, 
providing investor protection through transparent predictable rules. As such, 
economic freedom in the form of the “big market, small government” doctrine 
and the rule of law make up the two foundational pillars upon which financial 
governance in Hong Kong is built.  
It is also evident that the Hong Kong government plays an important 
role in maintaining the economic freedom and robust legal system that 
constitute the Hong Kong’s core competitive advantages as an IFC. This is a 
role that involves the formulation and implementation of sound regulations 
through a transparent and reliable regulatory infrastructure, which is discussed 
in the next section. 
 
Regulatory Regime  
In Hong Kong, the Financial Secretary is tasked with “overseeing 
policy formulation and implementation in financial, monetary, economic, 
trade and employment matters”. 364  Specifically, the Financial Secretary is 
responsible for:365  
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(1)  The money system (including formulating monetary policy objectives 
and determining Hong Kong’s monetary system),  
(2)  The Exchange Fund  
(3)  Public finance  
(4)  The financial system  
(5)  Hong Kong’s status as an IFC. 
 
With regards to (3), (4), and (5), the Financial Secretary is only 
responsible for formulating macro policy objectives while the Secretary for 
Financial Services and the Treasury formulates more specific policy objectives 
and ensures effective implementation through the various regulatory 
agencies. 366  While financial policy-making is generally carried out by the 
Financial Secretary, the Financial Services Bureau (FSB) is in charge of 
“translating policy into regulation” and other specialist regulatory agencies 
tasked with the actual regulation and supervision of financial services. 367 
These specialist regulatory agencies include the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA), Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), and the Office 
of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI).368  
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Established on 1 April 1993 through a merger between the Office of 
the Exchange Fund and the Office of the Commissioner of banking, the 
HKMA is the Hong Kong government’s chief financial regulatory agency.369 
The responsibilities, authorities and functions of the HKMA are largely spelt 
out in the Exchange Fund Ordnance, Banking Ordnance, Clearing and 
Settlement Systems Ordnance, with Legislative Council amendments to the 
Exchange Fund Ordinance in 1992 granting the Financial Secretary full 
authority in appointing the Chief Executive of the HKMA.370 
Although the HKMA is tasked with implementing the broad financial 
and monetary policy objectives set by the Financial Secretary, it nonetheless 
possesses significant autonomy in terms of “determining the strategy, 
instruments and operational means” for achieving these policy objectives.371 In 
general, the HKMA performs the four main functions of ensuring monetary or 
currency stability, maintaining financial system stability, managing the 
Exchange Fund, and maintaining Hong Kong’s position as an IFC.372  
The mandates of the HKMA include maintaining open and efficient 
markets with an appropriate regulatory and legal system, playing a larger role 
in international financial intermediation, ensuring an efficient financial 
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infrastructure for safer cross-border transactions, raising standards of 
corporate governance to increase investor confidence, and attracting foreign 
capital.373 
More specifically, the HKMA’s responsibilities are comprised of: 
“promoting the general stability and effective working of the banking system; 
promoting the development of the debt market, in co-operation with other 
relevant bodies; matters relating to the issuance and circulation of legal tender 
notes and coins; promoting the safety and efficiency of the financial 
infrastructure through the development of payment, clearing and settlement 
systems and, where appropriate, the operation of these systems; seeking to 
promote, in co-operation with other relevant bodies, confidence in Hong 
Kong’s monetary and financial systems, and market development initiatives to 
help strengthen the international competitiveness of Hong Kong’s financial 
services”.374  
These responsibilities reflect the Financial Secretary’s dual focus on 
“maintaining the stability and integrity of Hong Kong’s financial system and 
the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre”.375 Other agencies 
are also involved in regulating Hong Kong’s financial markets, although the 
HKMA remains the chief regulator coordinating the activities of all other 
regulatory agencies. While the SFC is tasked with regulating Hong Kong’s 
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securities and futures markets through the Securities and Futures Ordinance 
(SFO),376 the publicly-listed HKEx regulates frontline issuers who list in the 
stock and futures exchanges it operates. 377  The OCI is a government 
department that is independent in regulating the insurance industry, under the 
Insurance Companies Ordnance.378  
Recognizing the increasingly dense cross-sector linkages in financial 
markets and its implications for financial regulation, the Hong Kong 
government has sought to improve cross-sector policy coordination through 
the establishment of the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) and the 
Financial Stability Committee (FSC)379. While the CFR deals with cross-sector 
regulatory issues, the FSC monitors and ensures financial system 
stability. 380 The CFR is chaired by the Financial Secretary and includes 
representatives from the HKMA, SFC, OCI, Mandatory Provident Fund 
Authority, and Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau.381  
With the aim of ensuring the “efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions”, the CFR fosters 
coordination and cooperation among its members, promotes information-
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sharing, minimizes regulatory costs by reducing regulatory gaps and 
duplications, monitors trends and developments in international financial 
markets and financial regulation to encourage lesson-drawing, and allows for 
cross-sector discussions of individual regulatory issues.382 
Conversely, the FSC is chaired by the Secretary for Financial Services 
and the Treasury and includes representatives from the HKMA, SFC and 
OCI.383 In ensuring financial system stability, the FSC regularly monitors the 
various financial markets (including banking, equity, debt, and insurance), 
discusses current developments that carry cross market and systemic 
implications, formulates and coordinates possible responses to such 
developments, and reports its findings to the Financial Secretary regularly.384 
In addition, the HKMA has signed several Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOU’s) with other financial regulatory authorities.385 These 
include the MOU’s signed with the SFC in December 2002 and the OCI in 
September 2003 as well an MOU among the HKMA, OCI, SFC and the 
Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority that was signed in October 
1999 and revised in December 2003.386 These MOU’s serve to foster greater 
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cooperation among financial regulatory authorities, improve regulatory policy 
consistence, as well as reduce regulatory duplication and gaps.387 
Having addressed Hong Kong’s model of financial governance as well 
as its regulatory regime, the next section discusses the financial policy mix 
used by the Hong Kong government, in particular the HKMA, in regulating 
and developing Hong Kong as an IFC.  
 
Financial Policy Mix 
Given its position as a leading IFC and the contribution of its financial 
sector to GDP,388 policy-makers in Hong Kong place significant priority on 
financial sector development. However, Hong Kong’s approach to financial 
sector development differs from that in Singapore and Shanghai, particularly 
in terms of financial policy instrument preferences. The government’s laissez 
faire approach has resulted in a preference for stabilizing financial policy 
instruments that aim to maintain stable and functioning markets, in contrast to 
the  presence of development-oriented and interventionist instruments in 
Singapore’s and Shanghai’s financial policy mixes. This section discusses the 
                                                          
387 Ibid., 84–89. 
388  Financial services represent one of Hong Kong’s four ‘pillar economic sectors’ and 
account for approximately 16% of GDP value added. HKTDC Research, Economic and Trade 





financial policy mix used by the Hong Kong government in governing and 
guiding the SAR’s development as an IFC.  
As enshrined in its basic laws, the Hong Kong government is 
committed to providing “an appropriate economic and legal environment for 
the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial 
centre”.389 Upholding Hong Kong’s status as an IFC is a major macro policy 
objective for the Financial Secretary, along with maintaining stability and 
efficiency in the financial system and public finance.390  
The Financial Secretary’s policy objectives concerning the 
maintenance of a sound and efficient financial system are also geared towards 
enhancing Hong Kong’s status as an IFC, especially given the SAR’s 
externally-oriented economy and open financial markets. 391  Evidently, 
ensuring a sound and stable financial system contributes towards further 
expansion in Hong Kong’s financial markets, by allowing existing financial 
actors to operate safely within the SAR’s free markets and attracting more 
foreign financial institutions.  
Given Hong Kong’s reputational advantages as a stable IFC and its 
government’s commitment to free markets, stabilizing financial policies have 
traditionally been an important part of the HKMA’s policy toolkit. According 
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to former HKMA executive director Simon Topping, the HKMA’s 
supervisory policies are mostly aimed at maintaining financial market stability 
and protecting depositors or investors.392  
Given the attractiveness of Hong Kong’s free markets, a key aspect of 
the HKMA’s role in promoting Hong Kong as an IFC involves the 
implementation of “free and liberal policies” that reduce regulatory or 
business costs and uphold investor confidence.393 At a fundamental level, the 
HKMA is officially tasked with enhancing the SAR’s competitiveness in 
international financial markets, fostering confidence in its financial system as 
well as developing and maintaining its financial infrastructure.394  
Financial regulation represents a stabilizing financial policy instrument 
that serves to ensure market stability and through such market stability, further 
enhance Hong Kong’s status as an IFC.  According to the Financial 
Secretary’s policy objective 3(c), the “regulatory regime should aim to provide 
a regulatory framework that promotes the stability of the financial system, 
provides an appropriate measure of protection to users of financial services 
and facilitates competition, and is consistent with the standards and practices 
of major international financial centres”.395  
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As the Hong Kong’s chief financial regulator, the role of the HKMA in 
promoting Hong Kong as an IFC cannot be understated. The HKMA’s specific 
roles have been spelt out in a letter from the Financial Secretary to the 
Monetary Authority.396 These include ensuring safe and efficient cross-border 
transactions through a sound financial infrastructure, participation in 
international forums to increase confidence in Hong Kong’s financial system, 
and “appropriate market development initiatives that help strengthen the 
international competitiveness of Hong Kong’s financial services”.397  
An important part of the HKMA’s efforts at promoting financial 
market stability is the maintenance of a sound and stable financial 
infrastructure.  As noted by Yam, Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure is a 
key competitive advantage driving its success as an IFC.398 The Hong Kong 
financial infrastructure’s “multi-currency, multi-dimensional platform ... helps 
maintain the stability and integrity of the monetary and financial systems, and 
consolidate Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre”.399  
Having such a “multi-currency, multi-dimensional platform” facilitates 
multi-currency transfers, payments and settlements in the financial markets 
through diverse channels of financial intermediation, maintaining currency 
stability, enhancing Hong Kong’s position as a regional hub for fund transfers 
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and debt settlements, and reducing overall systemic risk.400 This ensures the 
stability of Hong Kong’s financial markets by providing a significant measure 
of transparency and predictability to capital flows.  
However, the HKMA’s policies extend beyond achieving market 
stability. Given the importance of financial markets as a key source of revenue 
for the government, developmental financial policy instruments have on 
occasion been used to develop potential streams of revenue from new and 
burgeoning financial sectors. For instance, recent reforms to the financial 
infrastructure were targeted at encouraging the formation of new financial 
market niches and increasing transactions in these niches. Specifically, the 
launch of the Renminbi Settlement System on March 2006 has allowed Hong 
Kong to “cater for the settlement needs arising from expanded renminbi 
business”401 and leverage on China’s rapidly expanding economic clout.  
Recent plans by the HKMA to establish a local repository for trade in 
over-the-counter [OTC] derivatives 402  also aimed to “make Hong Kong a 
relatively more attractive centre than its regional competitors” 403  for OTC 
derivatives trading. Such reforms are part of the HKMA’s “market 
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development initiatives”,404 aimed at enhancing Hong Kong’s competitiveness 
and contributing directly to its revenue stream.  
The HKMA has also enacted policies that are enabling in nature, 
targeting specific market sectors or niches and establishing the necessary 
conditions for their development. In particular, the upgrade of licensed DTC’s 
to restricted license banks in 1990 was part of the government’s moves to 
promote Hong Kong as an international financial centre.405 This reform was 
particularly advantageous to foreign and merchant banks that wished to 
establish a presence in Hong Kong, providing them with the regulatory space 
to develop their businesses in the SAR.  
The HKMA also launched the CMU in the same year, as part of its 
efforts to “strengthen and deepen Hong Kong’s financial markets” 406  and 
develop the market for Hong Kong-dollar debt. More recently, the HKMA has 
been aggressively driving the development of the SAR as an offshore RMB 
centre and participating in various international financial fora and 
committees.407 The development of RMB business in Hong Kong has involved 
significant reductions in restrictions to RMB trade and the promotion of 
greater cooperation among banks and other financial institutions across the 
Hong Kong-Mainland border. 
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Another aspect of Hong Kong’s financial policy mix is its inclusion of 
direct and indirect policy instruments in accordance with the international and 
domestic contexts, the result of which is an “optimal policy mix” that sustains 
confidence in Hong Kong as an IFC through internal improvements to the 
financial infrastructure and external collaboration with other governments.408 
According to Pauly, less direct regulatory instruments aimed at a stable 
financial infrastructure are used in the domestic sphere, while more aggressive 
lobbying efforts are employed in the international sphere to create an 
international environment that allows the Hong Kong to thrive as an 
international banking and finance hub. 409  This generally means the 
enforcement of stabilizing policies domestically and the promulgation of 
development-oriented financial policies internationally.  
However, interviews with senior policymakers and analysts show that 
Hong Kong’s financial policy mix remains heavily skewed towards stabilizing 
policy instruments. In general, there is a belief that the Hong Kong 
government regulates and governs the financial sector in a laissez faire style 
and that Hong Kong’s development as a financial centre has more or less been 
a natural process thus far.410 According to former Chief Executive Donald 
Tsang, Hong Kong practices a “totally free market economy”, with 
government interventions maintained only in areas which are absolutely 
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necessary.411  Instances of “absolute necessity” typically include bank failures 
or even market failures.412  
As such, the HKMA’s banking supervisory policy is primarily aimed 
at banking sector stability and depositor protection, with monetary stability, 
effective working of the financial system, and promotion of Hong Kong as an 
IFC taken to be secondary objectives.413 Furthermore, the government’s heavy 
reliance on stabilizing instruments provides a measure of political stability. It 
has been noted that the Hong Kong government’s stable and transparent 
financial management policies plays a big part in gaining the trust of investors 
and attracting them to the city.414  Even the HKMA’s efforts at developing the 
banking sector in the late 1990s were based on stabilizing instruments such as 
promoting competition or measures to enhance the regulatory infrastructure.415 
However, stabilizing policy instruments can also be used for 
developmental purposes. Stabilizing policy instruments act as means through 
which the HKMA may develop Hong Kong as an IFC, by “making Hong 
Kong an attractive place to do business”.416  In particular, the Hong Kong 
government’s role in developing the financial sector is essentially based on the 
development of the necessary ‘software’ such as human capital, an English-
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speaking environment, a robust judicial system and the rule of law, as well as 
accounting systems.417  
Other important stabilizing factors identified as key contributors to 
Hong Kong’s continued development as an IFC include a regulatory regime 
that follows the highest international standards, a fully convertible currency, 
and a common law environment that is particularly attractive to international 
financiers. 418  In short, stabilizing financial policy instruments that aim to 
establish the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of financial 
markets may inadvertently contribute towards developmental goals, given that 
international financial institutions tend to be attracted to Hong Kong’s stable 
markets and hence establish themselves in the SAR, contributing to Hong 
Kong’s financial sector development and growth.  
Furthermore, interview respondents also acknowledge that recent 
events have prompted the HKMA to take a more development-oriented 
approach. In particular, the emergence of Hong Kong as an offshore RMB 
centre has necessitated the fulfilment of two new objectives by the HKMA: 
developing market depth and “trying to provide revenue for the institutions”, 
particularly through the payments system. 419  Both objectives are aimed at 
attracting more RMB business, by creating favourable market conditions and 
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ensuring a potential stream of revenues respectively. However, it has been 
noted that Hong Kong’s approach differs from that of Singapore.  
According to former HKMA Executive Director Simon Topping, the 
HKMA promotes Hong Kong largely through “appropriate supervision and 
infrastructure... there’s no financial incentives, tax incentives, or promissory 
government bond issues”. 420  As such, development-oriented regulations 
promulgated for the purpose of developing Hong Kong’s RMB market are 
typically of the enabling type. These regulations create conditions that are 
conducive for RMB business to take root and flourish. As former Secretary of 
Financial Services Michael Cartland has noted, the Hong Kong government’s 
job was to “provide an environment in which market players can succeed”.421 
As this section has shown, Hong Kong’s financial policy mix largely 
comprises stabilizing financial policy instruments, although the authorities 
have on occasion relied on enabling and developmental policy instruments to 
facilitate the development of specific financial markets or niches. Nonetheless, 
Hong Kong’s financial policy mix remains largely skewed towards stabilizing 
financial policy instruments, with such instruments inadvertently contributing 
to financial sector development by establishing the stable market conditions 
that are attractive to international financial institutions. The next section 
describes Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem.  
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Financial Policy Subsystem 
Hong Kong’s financial governance model of “big market, small 
government” suggests a financial policy system that involves strong industry 
actors and limited government intervention. The existing literature and official 
government publications suggest as much. However, interviews with senior 
policymakers paint a different picture of Hong Kong’s financial policy 
subsystem. Rather, the government retains significant control over financial 
policymaking, with limited financial policy participation or influence by 
industry and other non-state actors. This differs from the case of Singapore, 
where almost all financial policies and regulations are informed by industry 
input or Shanghai, where financial institutions and other market participants 
are closely linked to state interests.  
Furthermore and as previous sections have shown, the Hong Kong 
government is committed to a laissez faire financial governance approach and 
relies on a stabilizing financial policy mix in financial sector development. 
While commitment to free market principles suggest that Hong Kong’s 
dominant state actors are part of an advocacy coalition formed around laissez 
faire policy beliefs, the preference for stabilizing financial policy instruments 
also suggest that these state actors are further part of a stabilizing instruments 
constituency. This suggests overlapping dominant actor membership in a 
stabilizing instruments constituency and a free market-oriented advocacy 
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coalition. The rest of this section discusses Hong Kong’s financial policy 
subsystem. 
Existing studies of Hong Kong’s financial policy processes tend to 
highlight the involvement of both a strong state and strong society. Tang notes 
that Hong Kong’s “limited government” approach is underwritten by a “strong 
state in terms of its institutional capacity and political dominance”,422 with the 
state’s “political dominance” shared among the government, business 
community and prominent individuals.  
While Hong Kong’s early adherence to “positive non-intervention” had 
ensured a “separation of interests of public servants and business people”,423 
the relationship between government and business remains close and 
“characterized by consultation rather than confrontation”. 424  Scholars have 
noted that such consultation has permitted the formation of “opaque linkages 
between public and private sectors that, relatively speaking, permitted deep 
interaction between domestic and international markets”. 425  This close 
collaborative relationship between the government and private sector became 
institutionalized in financial law, with the modernization of financial law after 
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1987 resulting in the “relationship between government, business and the 
financial system becoming increasingly rule-based and transparent”.426 
Importantly, private actors in Hong Kong play a “leadership role in 
business and economic development” 427  through their representation in the 
Executive and Legislative Councils. Industry interests from the finance and 
insurance sectors are typically represented in the Legislative Council’s 
“functional constituencies”. 428  Furthermore, commercial banks such as the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) play a significant developmental role 
by financing local companies and industrial projects, “operating almost as a 
development bank”. 429  As such, Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach to 
economic governance has culminated in the evolution of “production 
organization based on social networks” 430  revolving around manufacturers, 
traders and financiers. 
Nonetheless, the government continues to play an important role in the 
territory’s financial sector development. Just as private actors can influence 
the policy-making process, the Hong Kong government also influences private 
actors “through a complex of committees and commissions”.431 As Tang has 
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noted, Hong Kong’s “administration ruled in coalition with the major business 
corporations with the support of prominent local Chinese”.432   
The Financial Secretary and HKMA also receive advice and guidance 
from several advisory committees, with the Exchange Fund Advisory 
Committee (EFAC) and its sub-committees being the most significant in 
carrying out the various functions of a management board.433 Under Section 
3(1) of the Exchange Fund Ordnance, the Financial Secretary chairs the EFAC 
and is required to consult the committee with regards to his control of the 
exchange fund.434  
Members of the EFAC are appointed by the Financial Secretary and 
currently include representatives from the HKMA, banks, investments and 
holdings companies, legal and auditing firms, as well as academia.435 As Tang 
has noted, committee members represent major banks operating in Hong Kong 
such as HSBC, the Standard Chartered Bank, and the Bank of China.436 The 
EFAC also consists of governance, audit, currency board, investment, and 
financial infrastructure subcommittees which “monitor specific areas of the 
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HKMA’s work and report and make recommendations to the Financial 
Secretary through the EFAC”.437 
Other advisory committees include the Banking Advisory Committee 
(BAC) chaired by the Financial Secretary and which includes the Secretary for 
Financial Services and the Treasury, as well as representatives from the 
HKMA, SFC and banks, providing advice to the Chief Executive on issues 
related to the Banking Ordnance 438  and the Deposit-Taking Companies 
Advisory Committee (DTCAC), which advises the Chief Executive on issues 
related to deposit-taking companies as well as restricted license banks.439  
The DTCAC is also chaired by the Financial Secretary and includes 
the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury and representatives from 
the HKMA, consumer council, association of Restricted License Banks and 
Deposit-taking Companies , banks, auditors and legislative council. 440  In 
addition, the Insurance Advisory Committee provides advice on the insurance 
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industry, under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Financial Services and 
the Treasure.441 
Appendix 2 provides a list of the current members of the EFAC, BAC, 
and DTCAC. While all three committees are chaired by the financial secretary 
and include regulatory agencies such as the HKMA and SFC, major banks 
such as HSBC, Bank of China, Citibank, and Standard Chartered feature 
heavily in these committees. Furthermore, these banks have enjoyed 
membership in the BAC over a long period of time. Appendix 3 provides a list 
of BAC members from 1993 to 2012.  
As shown in Appendix 3, BAC participation by HSBC, Standard 
Chartered, and Bank of China have been consistent over the 2 decades covered 
in this data. Other banks such as Citibank, the Bank of East Asia, DBS, BNP 
Paribas, and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi have also become mainstays of the 
BAC, attaining membership at different points in time. While individuals 
representing these banks have changed over time, the banks themselves have 
remained heavily involved in their advisory roles. The BAC also includes 
consultants such as Arthur Andersen and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, industry 
associations, and experts drawn from academia.  
However, this broad overview of advisory committee membership 
does not allow for the identification of dominant actors or coalitions. This 
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means an insufficient understanding of the exact impact of different subsystem 
actors on financial policymaking or policy mix design, reflecting the 
limitations of the policy subsystems approach identified in Chapter 2. This 
shortcoming is overcome in Chapter 7, through the application of the Nested 
Instrumental Approach to the three cases that allows for the analysis of both 
subsystem and instruments variables in the financial policy process. 
Financial and regulatory policy-making in Hong Kong also involves 
non-state actors in less formal capacities. Consultant firm KPMG Barents was 
commissioned by the HKMA in March 1998 to review the banking sector of 
Hong Kong as well as provide recommendations, with the government 
accepting most of the recommendations pertaining to deregulation and 
clarifying the HKMA’s role as lender of last resort. 442  Independent non-
governmental experts have also been included in consultative organizations 
such as the Hong Kong government’s Central Policy Unit, which draws its 
members from academia, industry, and elites443 as well as the Hong Kong 
Economic Development Commission, which includes local and foreign 
experts.444  
However, interviews with senior policymakers suggest that the role of 
the private sector and other non-state actors in financial policymaking is often 
over-stated. As noted by former HKMA executive director Simon Topping, 
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HKMA consultation is effectively “taking the views of the people, and then 
making up your mind on what you want to do. It doesn’t mean taking 
accountable the views of people or coming to a compromise”.445 As noted by 
Mr Topping, the HKMA has often pushed through policies that are 
unfavourable to banks, such as the implementation of a minimum risk weight 
of 15% on residential mortgages, despite industry resistance during 
consultation.446  
Having participated in government consultations as an independent 
expert through the Hong Kong government’s Central Policy Unit, Professor 
Chong Tai Leung notes that “consultation (in Hong Kong) is only a procedure, 
it is a way for the government to inform the industry about what kind of policy 
it plans to do, rather than take in policy advice from the industry”.447 In the 
words of Glassburner and Reidel, there is “far more centralization of economic 
activity in Hong Kong than meets the eye”.448 Government agencies remain 
the dominant financial policy subsystem actors in Hong Kong.  
Such a view is not completely new. Scholars have noted this state-
driven aspect of Hong Kong’s economic and financial development, 
characterized by a state-centred policy process and the insulation of 
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policymakers from political and societal forces449. This dominance of state 
policymaking bodies amidst the government’s continued commitment to 
laissez faire principles has allowed the government to effectively implement 
policies and manage crises, even as Hong Kong continues to enjoy the benefits 
of free market-driven economic growth450.  
Although Lim has attempted to show how the Hong Kong 
government’s response to the AFC was motivated by the interests of a 
‘property cartel’ that comprised powerful property market interests, 451  her 
account is based on secondary information gleaned from newspapers and other 
journalistic sources. Rather, as former HKMA deputy chief executive Andrew 
Sheng notes, the Hong Kong government’s moves to intervene in the stock 
markets during the AFC was “instinctive action against speculation” taken to 
prevent a liquidity squeeze and in its focus on maintaining financial market 
stability, “did not go against Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach”.452 
Post-handover Hong Kong’s financial subsystem has also come to 
involve Mainland actors such as the Chinese central government, state banks 
and regulatory authorities. Hong Kong’s linkages with the Mainland has 
existed since the 1870’s, forming a “social network of capital” that is 
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attractive to foreign banks and financial institutions seeking to ply their trade 
in the East Asian region.453 Indeed, Hong Kong’s status as an IFC is dependent 
on the “relationship between the local government, mainland interests, and 
local financial institutions”.454  
With Mainland firms becoming more active in Hong Kong, financial 
governance in the territory will see greater involvement of major Chinese 
banks and financial institutions. One instance of this is their greater 
representation on corporate boards as well as public institutions such as 
advisory boards. 455  However, this does not mean a dominance of Chinese 
interests. Rather, Hong Kong’s financial subsystem will continue to be 
characterized by a “diverse economic structure and fragmentation of business 
and pro-China interests as well as resistance within the administration”.456  
Hong Kong’s financial subsystem also involves regional and 
international actors, by virtue of the SAR’s involvement in international 
forums and organizations. For instance, HKMA is a member of the ASEAN 
Plus Three Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). This is a regional 
macroeconomic surveillance unit set up under the aegis of the ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT) grouping’s Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CIMM) 
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programme, aimed at monitoring risk among member economies as well as 
facilitating remedial actions upon detection of risk.457  
The CIMM is a multilateral currency swap agreement established 
among APT members in 2010 for the purpose of addressing “balance of 
payment and short-term liquidity difficulties in the region”.458 As a regional 
surveillance unit, the AMRO ensures regional economic stability by providing 
early warning of potential risks and hazards. Hong Kong’s participation in the 
AMRO and the CIMM initiative is important for ensuring the territory’s status 
and stability as an IFC, given the vulnerability of its open markets to crises 
and contagion effects.  
  While Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem includes government 
actors of all levels as well as both domestic and international industry and 
other non-state organizations, interviews with senior policymakers and 
independent experts involved in Hong Kong’s financial policy process are 
unanimously in favour of the view that the Hong Kong government retains 
significant authority over financial policy. In other words, government actors 
such as the HKMA remain dominant in financial policymaking.  
Yet the government’s dominance over financial policy is balanced by 
its adherence to a laissez faire approach that involves limited government 
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intervention. As such, state agencies such as the HKMA are members of an 
advocacy coalition formed around a long-standing belief in free market 
principles and a laissez faire approach to financial governance. Furthermore, 
while the HKMA occupies a dominant policy role in Hong Kong’s policy 
subsystem, it limits its direct influence over financial sector development and 
focuses instead on maintaining financial market stability and investor 
protection. The consequent reliance on and preference for a stabilizing 
financial policy mix, as discussed in the previous section, further suggests that 
dominant state actors form a stabilizing instruments constituency.  
Hong Kong’s success as an IFC is thus underpinned by a ‘balance’ 
struck by the state and industry. While financial institutions are allowed to 
operate and flourish in a free and open market, the state’s dominance over 
financial policies and its commitment to free market principles ensure both 
market and political stability. In contrast to the more proactive and 
interventionist role of the state in Singapore’s financial markets, the 
development of financial markets in Hong Kong is largely “market-driven” 
and has “relied on efforts of firms rather than government sponsorship”459.  
Importantly, the participation of Hong Kong’s dominant state actors in 
a free market-oriented advocacy coalition and a stabilizing instrument 
constituency allows policymakers to exercise their influence on financial 
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policy mix design through both ideational and instrumental channels. This is 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, the Hong Kong government is committed to 
ensuring economic freedom through a governing doctrine of “big market, 
small government” that involves minimal government intervention. While 
Hong Kong’ financial policy subsystem includes state actors, private sector 
industry actors and independent non-state experts, financial policymaking 
remains well within the purview of the government. Consultation is seen by 
policymakers as a means to inform industry actors about intended policies 
rather than a mechanism for including private sector actors in the policy 
process.  
Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach to financial policy also flows into 
its financial policy mix. Stabilizing and enabling instruments are used 
respectively to maintain financial market stability and establish necessary 
conditions for new financial activities such as RMB businesses to take root.  
Unlike Singapore and Shanghai, the Hong Kong government does not use 
developmental instruments to stimulate financial sector development. 
Stabilizing and enabling instruments are thus reflective of the Hong Kong 
government’s preference for policies that enhance Hong Kong’s attractiveness 
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to investors as well as the proper functioning of its markets, driven by a firm 
belief in free market principles.  
In sum, the Hong Kong government’s laissez faire governing style of 
“big market, small government” entails limited government intervention in 
financial markets and limited influence by non-state actors over financial 
policies. This means that the government is focused on maintaining the 
stability and attractiveness of Hong Kong’s financial sector rather than the 
interests of industry actors. As a result, Hong Kong’s financial policy mix is 
skewed towards stabilizing instruments, although the government has on 
occasion used enabling instruments in developing new financial market niches 
such as RMB trade.  
Therefore, Hong Kong’s financial governance model defines its 
financial policy subsystem configuration, in terms of membership and inter-
actor relations. This state-dominated financial policy subsystem in turn defines 
Hong Kong’s financial policy mix, which largely comprises stabilizing policy 
instruments and is geared towards the attainment of financial market stability. 
These linkages between subsystem configuration, policy mix design, and 






Chapter 5: Singapore 
Introduction 
Although enjoying natural advantages such as a strategic location and 
favourable time zone, the development of Singapore’s financial sector stems 
from a post-independence “systematic effort” by the government to develop 
the then-newly formed republic into an IFC,460 based on a “conceived vision 
deliberately nurtured with far-sighted liberal monetary policies ... and 
managed with administrative efficacy”. 461  Such early efforts included the 
establishment of a favourable tax system, rule of law, a sound and reliable 
regulatory regime, as well as a pool of trained financial professionals.  
However, government efforts at IFC development only tell half the 
story. Singapore’s success as an IFC is also based on the active participation 
of industry and other non-state actors in financial policymaking. While the 
Bank of America was instrumental in Singapore’s establishment of its Asian 
Dollar Market, it was Professor Albert Winsemius who first proposed the 
establishment of a financial centre to the Singapore government. Financial 
institutions and academics continue to play significant roles in the Singapore 
government’s financial policymaking.  
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This has resulted in a financial policy subsystem that involves financial 
policy ‘co-creation’ by a closely-knit set of state and non-state actors who 
form Singapore’s “governing elite”.462 This important role of the private sector 
and other non-state actors in financial policymaking constitutes a key defining 
feature of Singapore’s development as an IFC. While industry and non-state 
actors are also present in Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem, they 
possess very limited influence over the HKMA’s financial policies. This 
stands in stark contrast to the state-industry policy ‘co-creation’ that takes 
place in Singapore.  
As a reflection of the mix of state and non-state actors in Singapore’s 
financial governing elite, the government’s financial policy mix comprises a 
full spectrum of financial policy instruments, including stabilizing, enabling, 
and developmental instruments. This suggests the lack of a coherent 
instruments constituency and hence lower reliance by dominant subsystem 
actors on the instruments channel to influence policy mix design. While 
stabilizing instruments reflect governmental desire to maintain market 
stability, enabling and developmental instruments are designed and 
implemented in order to fulfil the both state and industry interests.  
Given the government’s and industry’s development-focus, 
developmental policy beliefs flow into policy mix design through an ideational 
channel exercised by a developmental advocacy coalition comprising key state 
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and industry actors. As such, developmental policy beliefs encourage the 
inclusion of enabling and developmental policies in Singapore’s financial 
policy mix. These policies in turn provide industry actors with the business 
environment and access to capital that are necessary for their growth and 
success, in turn stimulating financial sector development and fulfilling the 
Singapore government’s developmental objectives.  
This chapter provides a broad overview of Singapore’s development as 
an IFC, focusing on the policies and politics behind its success. I begin with a 
brief overview of Singapore’s historical development as an IFC and a 
description of Singapore’s comparative advantages as an IFC. This is followed 
by sections on Singapore’s financial governance model, its regulatory regime, 
the financial policy mix used by the government in IFC development, and the 




Singapore’s development as an IFC formally began with its founding 
as an independent republic in 1965. As part of a “two-pronged strategy”, the 
government identified financial services as a key sector that could both 
support the development of existing industries and become a growth industry 
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in its own right.463 Having been developed as an important source of revenue 
in its own right, the expansion of Singapore’s financial sector has since 
become less dependent on developments in the real sector, as compared to 
many other IFC’s 464  such as Hong Kong, where the financial sector was 
initially developed to service already successful real sectors such as trade and 
manufacturing. 
More importantly, Singapore’s emergence as an IFC was “a result of 
orderly stimulation by the Government through legislative measures and 
administrative monitoring by the MAS”. 465  This involved the government 
playing an “active role in promoting Singapore as an international financial 
centre”.466 Compared to Hong Kong, the Singapore government plays a “more 
‘activist’ role in guiding the development of its financial sector”.467. As Austin 
has noted, the “success of Singapore as Southeast Asia’s premier financial and 
industrial centre was the product of the State”468. 
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From the beginning, the Singapore government has been “actively 
involved in the planning and development of the financial sector”,469 through 
its “policy of identifying and targeting the development of specific financial 
activities, which were then provided with tax and other fiscal incentives”.470 
This policy is evident in the establishment of the Asian Dollar Market (ADM) 
in 1968, which was built on Singapore’s time zone advantage, allowing it to 
bridge the “gap between the close of markets in the United States and the 
reopening of business the next day in Europe”.471 
 Underpinning the ADM’s subsequent success was a key move by the 
government to abolish a withholding tax on interest income from non-resident 
foreign currency deposits in 1968. 472  The government also established 
regulations, in the form of the 1970 Banking Act and Foreign Exchange Act, 
aimed at encouraging entry into Singapore’s burgeoning offshore banking 
sector.473  This was followed by a slew of tax and fiscal incentives introduced 
with the aim of expanding the ADM and attracting foreign financial 
institutions.474  
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With Singapore’s financial industry becoming increasingly complex, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) was formed on 1 January 1971 
under the aegis of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act.475 The MAS 
serves as central bank and chief regulator of Singapore’s financial markets, 
and has been tasked with promoting Singapore as an IFC. The MAS also 
represents an institutionalisation of then-finance minister Goh Keng Swee’s 
twin philosophies of pragmatism and interventionism.476  
This makes the MAS an active policy arm of the government and an 
important component of Singapore’s overall economic governance machinery, 
rather than a “standalone statutory entity”.477 Suffice to say, the formation of 
the MAS immediately set the stage for major financial sector reforms in the 
1970s that would drive the internationalization of Singapore’s financial 
markets478. Importantly, the abolishment of exchange controls resulted in the 
formation of Singapore’s foreign exchange market.479  
The 10-year development plan of 1975 explicitly articulated the 
government’s desire to make Singapore an IFC and guided subsequent 
measures taken by the government to stimulate Singapore’s development as an 
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IFC. 480  Underlying these regulatory reforms was Singapore’s structural 
transformation “through deliberate government policies from a largely trading 
economy to a manufacturing-finance-service and trading economy”.481  
 The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) was established in 1973, 
allowing companies to raise capital through the equity capital market.482 New 
financial instruments were subsequently introduced, including the Singapore 
dollar negotiable certificate of deposit in 1975, US dollar negotiable certificate 
of deposit in 1977, and SDR deposits in ACU in 1979.483 A Gold Exchange 
was also established in 1978, with the government subsequently seeking to 
encourage the development of the gold market through a reduction of taxes on 
income from gold transactions from 40% to 10% in 1980.484 
Yet it was only in the 1980s that Singapore’s financial markets really 
took on an international character.485 Ground zero of the financial sector’s 
internationalization can be traced to the recommendations of the Economic 
Review Committee in 1985, which identified “7 areas of growth for the 
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financial sector, namely: Risk Management; Fund Management; Capital 
Markets; Unlisted Securities Market (USM); Financial and Commodity 
Futures; Financing of Third Country Trading and Reinsurance”.486 These new 
areas of growth were identified in response to the 1984-1985 recessions and 
more importantly, the emerging trends of liberalization and deregulation in 
international financial markets that were beginning to threaten Singapore’s 
traditional market niches.487  
This coincided with further development of Singapore’s market for 
securities, with the formation of the Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange (SIMEX) in 1983 and the setting up of the SESDAQ board in 
1987.488 The ongoing internationalization of Singapore’s financial markets, in 
particular banking, in the 1980s resulted in greater foreign exchange trading 
and as a consequence, rapid expansion of the financial sector.489  
Between the 1970s and 1990s, Singapore’s banking industry also 
experienced a government-driven process of “rationalization” and 
consolidation.490 This was largely based on the government’s belief in a need 
to increase the size of local banks to ensure their competitiveness491 and align 
                                                          
486 Donald R. Lessard, “Singapore as an International Financial Centre,” in Offshore Financial 
Centres, ed. Richard Roberts, vol. 4, International Financial Centres (Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 1994), 203. 
487 Lee and Vertinsky, “Strategic Adjustment of International Financial Centres (IFCs) in 
Small Economies: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong and Singapore,” 162. 
488 Tan, Financial Services and Wealth Management in Singapore, 17. 
489 Bryant, “The Evolution of Singapore as a Financial Centre,” 344. 




their long term interests with the local economy.492 For the latter, the MAS 
required local banks to appoint a Nominating Committee which ensures that 
local banks “act in a manner consistent with the national interest”.493 The stock 
exchange crisis of 1985 also prompted further consolidation, with the MAS 
encouraging a takeover of the fragmented brokerage system by local banks.494 
 Another important development of the 1980s was the development of 
Singapore’s asset management industry. It was during this period that the 
government’s national development plans had first identified fund 
management as an important sector for development, with various incentives 
such as grants and tax incentives offered to attract fund managers. 495 
Government policy throughout the 1990’s would continue to be targeted at 
developing and expanding the fund management industry.496 Singapore has 
since emerged to become the “premier asset management location in Asia”, 
with total assets under management reaching SGD $1.4 trillion.497   
The increasingly integrated nature of financial markets in the 1990s 
further prompted financial sector reforms by the MAS that were predicated on 
the “main thrusts” of creating a “more conducive regulatory environment” and 
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playing a “more proactive role in promoting the financial sector”.498 This dual 
focus on stability and development were also reflected in an organizational 
restructuring in the MAS in 1997 that yielded the formation of a Financial 
Sector Promotion Department aimed at promoting financial activities and 
developing Singapore’s role as an IFC.499 
In order to further internationalize Singapore’s financial sector, the 
MAS made “numerous reforms to attract more international institutions”.500 
For instance, the 1992 Budget saw a reduction of the corporate tax rate to 30% 
and the introduction of double tax deductions for expenses incurred by 
financial institutions seeking to develop skill and knowledge-intensive 
financial activities.501 Incentives unveiled in the 1993 Budget further sought to 
“develop an external economy” and “attract offshore activities to 
Singapore”.502 The 1990s also saw the emergence of Singapore’s commodities 
market, with the establishment of the Rubber Association of Singapore (RAS) 
Commodity Exchange in 1992 and its re-organization into the Singapore 
Commodity Exchange (SICOM) in 1994.503 
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 While the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 caused a 
slowdown in Singapore’s economy and had particularly negative impacts on 
its financial sector due to the vulnerability of Singapore’s open financial 
markets to contagion,504 Singapore’s financial sector recovered in 1999. As 
part of the MAS’s five-year plan to liberalise the commercial banking sector 
and upgrade local banks,505 a new category of “Qualifying Full Bank” (QFB) 
was introduced in 1999 to increase the range of services which foreign banks 
could offer,506 along with complementary moves to increase the number of 
restricted banks, grant offshore banks with greater flexibility in SGD 
wholesale business, and the lifting of a 40% foreign shareholding limit on 
local banks.507  
 Importantly, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) was formed in 1999 with 
the demutualisation and merger of the Stock Exchange of Singapore and 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange.508 The SGX subsequently started 
electronic trading, along with a deregulation of commission rates, widening of 
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product range and the formation of “strategic alliances with overseas 
exchanges to enlarge the issue base and investor pool”509.  
The 2000s saw a carrying over of the government’s plans in the late 
1990s to liberalize financial markets. Government measures in the early 2000s 
thus aimed to promote “consolidation and liberalisation of the financial 
industry”, with the MAS strengthening its regulatory and supervisory 
framework at the same time.510 Singapore’s financial markets also became 
increasingly diverse in this period, with consolidation in the banking sector 
and expansion in the insurance industry and capital markets.511  
However, Singapore’s open economy would prove vulnerable to the 
GFC of 2007, dipping into technical recession between end 2008 and early 
2009. As a consequence of the GFC, financial sector supervision was 
tightened and intensified by the MAS. 512  Singapore nonetheless recovered 
from the GFC in mid-2009 on the back of increased industrial output and 
improvements in financial market conditions.513 Singapore’s economy would 
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experience a record growth of 14.5% in 2010, 514  with the financial sector 
expanding by 12% in the same year.515  
In light of a post-GFC need to maintain the resilience of Singapore’s 
financial sector during crises, the MAS sought to “build depth and diversity in 
the offering of financial products and services” as well as enhance risk 
management and transparency.516 The MAS is also working to ensure that 
financial institutions in Singapore comply with Basel III capital standards, 
which were issued in response to the GFC. 517  In terms of infrastructural 
developments, the Marina Bay Financial Centre (MBFC) was developed in 
2012 to “seamlessly extend the existing business district and double the size of 
the financial district to support the long term growth of Singapore’s financial 
industry”.518 
Importantly, the Asia-driven post-GFC recovery of the global economy 
had significant impacts for Singapore’s financial sector, with “the surge in 
trade and capital flows, strong growth of Asian corporate activity and 
increasing wealth accumulation in Asia” 519  driving demands for financial 
services in the region. As MAS Managing Director Ravi Menon noted in a 
speech delivered on 13 March 2013, Singapore’s “pan-Asian focus” drives the 
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republic’s continued development and value proposition as an IFC.520 Given 
the growth of RMB-denominated investment in the ASEAN region, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam has 
emphasized Singapore’s growing role and potential as an offshore RMB centre 
in a speech delivered on 15 March 2013.521  
Singapore’s emergence and development as an offshore RMB centre 
was further bolstered by the appointment of Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC) as the official RMB clearing bank in Singapore by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) in February 2013 and the announcement of an 
expanded Currency Swap Facility between the PBC and MAS in March 
2013.522 Similar to the case of Hong Kong, the economic rise of China has 
significant implications for Singapore’s development and success as an IFC.  
 However, the historical account of Singapore’s success as an IFC is 
flawed by its over-emphasis on the role of the state. While government 
agencies such as the MAS have no doubt played an important role in 
implementing the policies which have driven Singapore’s emergence and 
success as an IFC, interviews with policymakers and financial sector 
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professionals have shown that industry actors are also heavily involved in the 
formulation and implementation of financial policies through a process of 
“policy co-creation”. This is discussed in a later section on Singapore’s 
financial policy subsystem. 
 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
In her conceptualization of a “government-made” Singapore, Low 
differentiates between the republic’s naturally-occurring comparative 
advantages of strategic location and “initial conditions of cheap and plentiful 
disciplined labour” 523  from its state-driven competitive advantages. State-
driven competitive advantages arise from the “the government’s active 
involvement to restructure the economic and inject new activities”, 524 
representing a form of “artificial or acquired comparative advantage”.525  
This categorization is echoed in the MAS’s view that Singapore’s 
success as an IFC is driven by “tangible” advantages such as a favourable time 
zone as well as good communications and payments networks and 
“intangible” advantages including rule of law, currency stability, and “an 
honest and competent government”.526 Even as both Hong Kong and Shanghai 
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share many of these natural and tangible advantages to varying degrees, less 
tangible government-made advantages are unique to Singapore. Yet as the 
next chapter will show, Shanghai has been trying to build up such 
government-made competencies.  
While Singapore’s strategic location and talent pool remain important 
factors contributing to the republic’s growth as an IFC,527 it is only through 
deliberate policy that the government has been able to leverage on and convert 
these existing advantages into IFC success. This makes Singapore’s “strong, 
stable and pro-active government” its core competitive advantage,528 with the 
republic’s “natural locational advantages of time zone and central position in 
international trade routes ... exploited to the fullest by deliberate government 
policy”.529  
According to MAS Managing Director Mr Ravi Menon, Singapore’s 
“number one value proposition is that we (Singapore) are well regulated and 
supervised”. 530  As such, Singapore’s government-sanctioned regulatory and 
tax benefits as well as the virtuous cycle of agglomeration sparked off by these 
benefits are more important in explaining Singapore’s success as an IFC than 
its naturally-occurring competitive advantages of location and time-zone.531  
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This means that proactive government policy underpins many of 
Singapore’s key advantages as an IFC. These key advantages include its sound 
and stable regulatory framework, robust legal system, and low tax rates. 
Singapore’s success as an IFC is thus driven by its strong fundamentals of “a 
well-respected regulatory and supervisory regime, a stable domestic economy, 
a pro-business operating environment and a highly competent financial sector 
workforce”.532 This makes Singapore “an international financial centre trusted 
for its high standards of regulation, integrity and efficiency”.533  
Singapore’s efficient infrastructure and educated workforce are also 
competitive advantages developed by the government for the purpose of 
supporting its growth as an IFC, with government investments in areas such as 
education and telecommunications serving to “augment the comparative 
advantages that Singapore already possesses”.534 Taken together, Singapore’s 
efficient infrastructure represents the “hardware” of its financial sector while 
regulations and incentives make up its “software”.535 
Such proactive government policy also typically involves the 
identification and development of key sectors or niches that eventually grow 
to become new competitive advantages for Singapore. As Lee and Vertinsky 
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have noted, Singapore’s success as an IFC is driven by the government’s 
“attempts at niche creation”. 536  This identification of new niches requires 
governmental efforts in adapting to ever-changing market conditions, with the 
government possessing an inordinate amount of “flexibility in restructuring its 
economy as particular industrial comparative advantages are eroded by new 
competitors”.537  
Niche creation represents an important second dimension of 
Singapore’s competitive advantages as an IFC. New niches identified and 
successfully developed through proactive government policy tend to become 
unique selling points for Singapore’s role as an international financial services 
provider. As noted by Tan and Lim, the Singapore government “creates and 
maintains Singapore’s niche in the international financial market by adaptive 
maintenance of internationally competitive tax structures and constant 
provision of a sound and stable financial system”.538  
In reflection of the government’s belief in niche creation, former 
finance minister and MAS chairman Richard Hu has noted that Singapore 
needed to “become ‘number one’ in a particular niche of financial services” in 
order to fulfil its goals of becoming a successful IFC.539 The MAS also steered 
clear of the loan syndication market so as not to engage in direct competition 
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with Hong Kong, given the SAR’s strength as a loan syndication centre.540 A 
more recent instance of niche creation is the government’s identification of the 
burgeoning offshore RMB market and the increasingly integrated ASEAN 
financial markets as key pillars of Singapore’s growth as an IFC, which was 
subsequently followed by the promulgation of polices aimed at enhancing the 
republic’s position in these areas.541 
Niche creation and proactive government policy are in fact 
complementary factors that drive Singapore’s success as an IFC. In particular, 
proactive government policies give rise to new niches that subsequently 
become new competitive advantages driving Singapore’s pre-eminence as an 
IFC. This requires flexible and responsive policymaking that involves close 
consultation and cooperation with industry actors as well as a willingness to 
adjust policies to industry needs and changing circumstances. Industry 
participation in Singapore’s financial policy processes and the impacts of the 
private sector’s policy role on policy instrument choice are discussed in a later 
section on Singapore’s financial policy subsystem.  
  Another perceived competitive advantage enjoyed by Singapore is its 
status as an independent sovereign state. This is in contrast to Hong Kong and 
Shanghai, which both remain under the purview of the Chinese central 
government. Observers have noted how Singapore’s strength arises from the 
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fact that it is “similar to Hong Kong but is importantly not Hong Kong”, with 
its independence from China and its strong legal system providing confidence 
to investors.542 Furthermore, Singapore’s independence makes the city-state a 
“gateway to Asia, not China” and is likely to become the IFC of Asia at Hong 
Kong’s expense.543  
Related to Singapore’s sovereign status is its reputation for political 
stability and good governance, which have “attracted the world’s leading 
commercial banks”.544 Along with effective government policy and advanced 
infrastructure, political and social stability has been identified as one of the 
most important factors contributing to Singapore’s development as a financial 
centre. 545  Furthermore, political stability in Singapore has facilitated the 
establishment of a stable regulatory regime that establishes and enforces clear 
and consistent rules, culminating in a “stable and predictable regulatory 
environment”.546  
However as later sections will show, Singapore’s advantage as a 
sovereign state are largely exaggerated. First, both Hong Kong and Shanghai 
possess significant autonomy from the central government in the realms of 
financial and economic policy. Second, financial policies in Singapore are the 
                                                          
542 “From Offshore to Mid-Shore.” 
543 Ibid. 
544 Tong Dow Ngiam, Dynamics of the Singapore Success Story: Insights by Ngiam Tong 
Dow, 1st ed. (Singapore: Cengage Learning Asia, 2010), 31. 
545 Lessard, “Singapore as an International Financial Centre,” 219–220. 
546 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Tenets of Effective Regulation, MAS Monograph 
(Singapore: Monetary Authority of Singapore, June 2010), 31. 
197 
 
result of a state-industry policy co-creation process. While the existing 
conventional wisdom emphasizes Singapore’s sovereignty and autonomy, this 
thesis will show instead that the private sector plays a strong role in financial 
policymaking.      
In sum, Singapore’s competitive advantages as an IFC stem from its 
proactive and responsive government. Such proactive government policies 
aimed at developing Singapore as an IFC have further resulted in the creation 
of two specific layers of competitive advantages. The first layer includes 
structural advantages such as a sound legal and regulatory infrastructure, 
competent and educated workforce, and pro-business environment. The 
second layer comprises the financial market niches which the government has 
identified and developed into Singapore’s strengths, such as forex and wealth 
management.  
However, this current understanding of Singapore’s competitive 
advantages still does not explain how proactive government policies are 
formulated and implemented. In other words, the linkage between these 
competitive advantages and Singapore’s success as an IFC remains under-
explored. There is thus a need to understand the roles of both state and non-
state actors in the formulation of financial policies within the political 
economic context of Singapore’s financial policy subsystem, as well as the 
financial policy instruments or instrument mixes through which financial 




Singapore’s government-driven approach to economic policy has been 
characterized as a form of “state-run capitalism”.547 Through its practice of 
state-run capitalism, the government and its lead economic development 
agency, the EDB, have frequently “thought like businessmen”548 and played 
the role of entrepreneurs. Such a model has been contrasted with Hong Kong, 
“where “true” private entrepreneurship was highly encouraged and 
rampant”.549 Underlying the key role of the EDB in economic governance is 
the government’s ability to create “specialist institutions and agencies tasked 
with the performance of specific key roles”.550  
Financial governance in Singapore also approximates what Schein has 
termed “strategic pragmatism”, 551  a governance style that originated from 
Singapore’s first finance minister Goh Keng Swee and was subsequently 
“institutionalised ... in the paradigm of the Singapore governance”.552 This is a 
governance style that is “strategic in thinking and pragmatic in execution”,553 
requiring a master vision or strategy and the “practical intelligence” to 
implement this strategy or vision without compromising it in the process.554 
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This requires close government-business links. As discussed in a later section, 
strong state-industry linkages are an important feature of Singapore’s financial 
policy subsystem.  
An important point to note is that the success of Singapore’s 
interventionist and facilitative style of financial governance depends on the 
“governing capacity” of its government, defined as the “ability to implement 
policy in a consistent and rule-abiding way”.555 More importantly, governing 
capacity is dependent upon both Singapore’s moderately Weberian legal-
rational public organizations as wee as the “informal institutions that link 
public and private spheres”.556   
This means that financial policymaking involves both state and private 
actors. As Schein has noted, nation-building and economic development in 
Singapore involves collaboration between the government, business, and 
labour.557 This originated in the 1980s with excessive regulation, high taxes 
and rising wage costs prompting the government to switch to a less 
interventionist style of “managing the economy through partnership with 
business and labour”. 558  This is further explored in a later section on 
Singapore’s financial policy subsystem. 
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In sum, Singapore’s financial governance involves a capable 
government abiding by a doctrine of “strategic pragmatism” that melds long-
term strategic planning with flexibility and pragmatism at the implementation 
level. Linkages between the private and public sector also makes economic 
governance in Singapore a collaborative affair, manifested in a ‘governing 
elite’ that comprises a variety of actors socialized and integrated into 
Singapore’s prevailing governing style.  
This melding of state and non-state actors within the governing elite is 
unique to Singapore. In contrast, the Hong Kong and Shanghai governments 
have retained full control over financial policymaking, with non-state inputs 
into financial policy generally limited and superficial. Furthermore, as later 
sections will show, industry influence over financial policymaking is further 
entrenched in the MAS’s practice of extensive industry consultation for all its 
financial policies.  
Naturally, Singapore’s unique style of economic and financial 
governance flows into its financial and regulatory policy, with former MAS 
Chairman Lee Hsien Loong noting that a “competent MAS is part of the 
Singapore government, just as a vibrant financial hub is part of the Singapore 
economy”.559 The MAS is discussed at greater length in the following section 
on Singapore’s regulatory regime.   
 
                                                          




Singapore’s regulatory regime has been crucial to its success as an 
IFC. As former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has noted, the history of 
Singapore’s financial centre is the “story of how we [the Singapore state] built 
up credibility as a place of integrity, and developed the officers with the 
knowledge and skills to regulate and supervise the banks, security houses and 
other financial institutions so that the risk of systemic failure is minimised”.560  
The main regulators governing Singapore’s financial services sector 
are the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Singapore Exchange (SGX), 
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA), and Central 
Provident Fund Board.561 
The MAS is the overall “integrated regulator and supervisor of 
financial institutions in Singapore”,562 tasked with regulating financial services 
associated with the banking, finance, insurance, and securities markets.563 Its 
main functions include acting as Singapore’s central bank (through the 
conduct of monetary policy, issuance of currency, oversight of payments 
systems and acting as a banker to the government), conducting “integrated 
supervision of financial services and financial stability surveillance”, 
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managing the country’s official foreign reserves, and developing Singapore as 
an IFC. 564  The MAS is driven by its two principles of consistency and 
flexibility, with consistency providing predictability as well as credibility and 
flexibility fostering financial innovation and adjustment to global changes.565 
In general, the MAS is tasked with ensuring a “sound and progressive 
financial services sector” through the use of a “full toolkit of regulatory 
instruments” that includes instruments such as regulations detailing the 
responsibilities of financial institutions, risk-based measures, rules of 
compliance, depositor safety nets, power to intervene when supervisory 
objectives are not met, and incentives to encourage compliance.566 Given its 
closes relationship with the financial sector, the MAS also employs moral 
suasion as a “qualitative method of supervision”.567 Underlying the MAS’s 
work are its four principles of financial supervision: risk-focused, business-
friendly, disclosure-based, and stakeholder-reliant.568 
The MAS’s regulatory style has also taken on a more flexible and 
systemic perspective over the years. A strategic review conducted by the MAS 
in 1997 resulted in a shift from “one-size-fits-all prescriptive regulation 
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towards a more flexible risk-focused supervisory approach”. 569  This risk-
focused approach involves evaluating the risk profiles of financial institutions, 
granting “greater business latitude to well-managed institutions while retaining 
higher requirements or tighter restrictions for weaker ones”.570  
Importantly, the tailoring of restrictions to an institution’s risk profile 
allows the MAS to “promote greater competition, efficiency and growth in the 
financial sector without compromising the safety and soundness of institutions 
or the resilience and stability of the system”.571 In other words, the MAS’ risk-
based regulatory approach entails the setting or formulation of high regulatory 
standards combined with flexible implementation of these standards.572 This 
practice of “Smart Regulation” has been seen by the MAS as a key pillar 
underlying Singapore’s value proposition as a financial centre.573 
The SGX was formed in 1999 with the merger of the Stock Exchange 
of Singapore (SES) and Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) 
and is a “self-regulatory organisation” that performs frontline regulation of the 
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markets and clearing houses that it operates. 574  Regulatory functions 
performed by the SGX include issuer regulation, catalyst regulation, member 
supervision, market surveillance, enforcement and risk management. 575 
Furthermore, the SGX’s Risk Management and Regulatory Division is tasked 
with regulating and monitoring SGX members, including their employees, 
trading representatives, and directors.576 Given its dual role as market regulator 
and profit-maximizing listed company, the SGX is itself supervised by the 
MAS for Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) risks.577 
Formed in April 2004 with the merger of the Registry of Companies 
and Businesses and the Public Accountants’ Board, ACRA regulates business 
entities and public accountants by monitoring corporate compliance with 
requirements pertaining to disclosure and regulating public accountants who 
perform statutory audits.578 Lastly, the CPF is a mandatory retirement savings 
scheme that was set up in 1955 and comprises a wide variety of schemes 
allowing its members to invest their funds in various financial instruments.579 
It regulates fund managers handling members’ savings through its Investment 
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Guidelines and monitors the performance of the unit trusts which its members 
have invested in580. 
 
Financial Policy Mix 
Broadly speaking, Bryant has identified three “paramount 
characteristics” which have underpinned Singapore’s financial policies since 
the dawn of the Republic’s emergence as an IFC.581 Specifically, Singapore’s 
financial policy has involved encouraging the location of financial 
intermediaries in Singapore through preferential regulation and tax incentives, 
the maintenance of a “separating fence”582 between domestic and international 
financial activities, and the preservation of Singapore’s sound and resilient 
financial system through prudential oversight by the MAS and other 
regulatory authorities.583  
These three financial policy characteristics reflect the stabilizing, 
enabling and developmental financial policies which make up Singapore’s 
financial policy mix. First, prudential oversight and regulatory policy make up 
the stabilizing policies which allow the MAS to maintain financial market 
stability. As Lee and Vertinsky have noted, Singapore’s establishment of an 
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“unambiguous, stable legal and regulatory framework”584 brought forth greater 
financial system stability. 
Efforts at attracting international financial intermediaries and 
maintaining a “separating fence” between domestic and international financial 
activities represent respectively enabling policies that establish attractive 
locational conditions and developmental policies that channel benefits towards 
a select group of actors, in this case domestic financial institutions, whose 
survival or success is deemed crucial to IFC development.  As such, 
Singapore’s ‘separating fence’ has brought the government success in 
“broadening the economic base through the development of the financial 
sector and its international content without excessively exposing the domestic 
economy to external influences”.585  
As noted by then-DPM Lee Hsien Loong, the separation of domestic 
and offshore finance provided protection to Singaporean investors and 
depositors and ensured market stability amidst the influx of foreign financial 
firms and rapid regulatory liberalization.586 This dual existence of domestic 
and international financial firms is most clearly exhibited in Singapore’s 
banking sector, with a small number of systematically important domestic 
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banks representing 30% of total banking assets, while foreign banks represent 
65% of total banking assets.587 
The use of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental financial policy 
instruments also extend beyond these few examples discussed. The rest of this 
section describes these three types of financial policy instruments, which make 
up the financial policy mix designed and used by the government in 
developing Singapore into a successful IFC.  
Like any other financial regulatory agency, the MAS places a 
significant premium on regulations that ensure market stability. According to 
MAS Managing Director Ravi Menon, an important mandate that underpins 
the MAS’s work is “financial stability – ensure the safety and soundness of 
our financial institutions and to prevent systemic problems from emerging. 
That’s foremost”. 588  More importantly, the MAS sees this maintenance of 
market stability as a key means of maintaining stability in the real economy as 
well as facilitating Singapore’s overall economic growth.  
Hence an important aspect of the MAS’s regulatory and supervisory 
policy involves “ensuring the success and resilience of the Singapore 
economy”.589 This is predicated upon the MAS’s belief that a “sound and 
progressive financial services sector” contributes directly to the GDP, 
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intermediates between borrowers and savers, ensures efficient allocation of 
financial resources, and “thereby enhances economic growth and job 
creation”.590  
Through its risk-focused supervisory approach, the MAS has shown 
that sound financial regulation is not an end in itself but a means of “ensuring 
a stable and efficient financial system to support the growth of the economy 
with minimum disruption”. 591  Underlying this focus on financial system 
stability is the MAS’s belief that “the purpose of the financial sector is to 
facilitate the real economy”.592  
As then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has noted, 
Singapore’s “emphasis on high prudential standards has allowed us [the 
Singapore state] to sustain strong financial sector growth over a long 
period”.593 While the MAS’s stabilizing financial regulations are in the short-
term aimed at maintaining market stability, they contribute to developmental 
goals in the long run through their impacts on the real economy. 
However, this stabilizing aspect of financial regulation tells only half 
the story. According to Mr Menon, the MAS’s other mandate is “developing 
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the financial centre, which is quite separate, and we have a different team and 
a different group of people, so there’s no conflict of interest”.594 This began in 
1998, when the MAS made an official shift from a purely regulatory role to a 
“more promotional role regarding the financial-services industry”.595 A former 
senior regulatory official has noted that this shift in organizational disposition 
was due to changes in MAS leadership in 1998 as well as the prevailing 
influence of free market ideologies, particularly in the form of Thatcherism or 
Reagonism, which advocated less direct regulation of markets.596  
This new leadership included Mr Koh Yong Guan, who assumed office 
as MAS Managing Director in January 1998. According to Mr Koh, the 
government was then concerned with “positioning Singapore for the next 
phase of growth as a financial centre; we saw a need to set up a promotional 
function within the MAS”.597 This promotional function included stimulating 
financial sector growth and attracting financial institutions into Singapore, 
both of which were crucial for the continued growth and positioning of 
Singapore as an IFC.598  
Despite potential tensions between the MAS’s promotional and 
regulatory roles, the MAS was chosen as the promotional agency for the 
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financial sector due to its strong domain knowledge.599 Given the potential for 
conflicts of interest, separate departments were established within the MAS to 
perform the roles of financial supervision and financial centre development.600 
This means that the MAS’s prudential and promotional activities are carried 
out by different personnel with different reporting structures. The MAS’s dual 
mandates also produce a “creative tension” that is deemed beneficial to the 
organization.601  Nonetheless, the MAS gives equal priority to both regulatory 
and promotional or developmental goals, and “in 90% of the cases, the goals 
are aligned”.602.  
The MAS has since promulgated a vast variety of proactive strategies 
and regulations that directly promote the development of Singapore’s financial 
markets, enhancing the financial sector’s contribution to Singapore’s 
economic growth and development. As noted by a former senior policy-maker 
who was involved in this drive for development, the Singapore government’s 
efforts at developing its financial sector was predicated upon a need to develop 
“exportable services” to complement its manufacturing base. 603  Given that 
Singapore’s financial sector development has become an integral part of the 
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city-state’s overall industrialization journey, financial sector policy is 
therefore no longer “just about regulation, but promotion as well”.604  
As a former senior regulatory official has further noted, MAS 
regulations are now “mostly promotional”.605 This has resulted in the MAS’s 
inclusion of non-regulatory instruments such as tax incentives, subsidies, and 
provision of funding in Singapore’s financial policy mix.  In particular, the 
MAS has sought to “develop the financial markets, introduce new financial 
instruments to add depth to the market, and to promote stability through timely 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets”.606   In describing the main 
goals of his department, a senior MAS official has stated that “it’s not purely 
just financial stability, but we also have to facilitate the financial sector, to 
support its growth and development”.607  
Lee and Vertinsky have noted that the Singapore government has often 
sought to directly stimulate the development of Singapore’s financial markets 
by liberalizing regulations for foreign financial institutions, removing 
exchange controls, providing tax incentives for offshore financial services, 
introducing new financial instruments and creating new financial markets 
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through “legislation, tax incentives and direct participation using government 
spending power and its influence on private spending”.608  
Furthermore, public investments in physical, technological, social and 
institutional infrastructures have played enabling roles in the development of 
Singapore as an IFC.609 These represent enabling and developmental financial 
policy instruments that have allowed the government to create the conditions 
necessary for financial sector growth and to promulgate policies that facilitate 
financial sector development. Through its dual functions as regulator and 
implementer of financial policy, the MAS is also involved in “encouraging the 
development of selected financial markets”.610  
This identification of selected markets requires the MAS to “scan the 
horizon very carefully, look at long-term trends. Where is the world heading, 
where are the demand drivers, what are the developments taking place 
elsewhere? And then we [MAS] ask ourselves, what are our strengths, which 
can help to match some of these demands”.611 Enabling regulations are then 
promulgated to create the conditions required for particular markets or niches 
to develop and flourish.  
An early instance of this was the development of capital markets in the 
1980s, with regulations enacted during this period playing “important enabling 
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and promotional roles”.612 Various initiatives were subsequently introduced to 
promote the development of Singapore’s offshore banking, Asian bond, 
foreign exchange, money, and futures markets.613 With regards to the foreign 
exchange market, the government liberalized currency trading by issuing 
licenses to banks that allowed them to trade currencies.614   
Tax incentives also represent a key instrument used by the MAS to 
promote and develop new emerging markets, such as larger varieties of 
banking services in the 1980s.615 More recently, tax incentives were offered to 
fund managers in order to encourage and develop a wealth management 
industry in Singapore.616 These tax incentives are seen as an “important part of 
the (MAS’s) toolkit” and act as a “sweetener” for fund managers to establish 
or locate themselves in Singapore.617  
However, efforts at developing a wealth management industry in 
Singapore pre-date these tax incentives. The MAS had already been working 
extensively at establishing the necessary market and infrastructural conditions 
in order that a wealth management industry could take root and flourish. This 
has involved enabling policies such as deliberately growing the Singapore 
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Dollar Bond market, relaxing the Singapore Dollar non-internationalization 
policy, and engaging private fund managers for the management of reserves.618   
According to former MAS Managing Director Koh Yong Guan, these 
policies were deliberately aimed at eventually growing a wealth management 
industry, by establishing a market benchmark for the fixed income and 
securities market and attracting fund managers to Singapore.619 In addition, the 
MAS also had to enhance Singapore’s connectivity to the rest of Asia, 
maintain the strong presence of many financial institutions, and develop a 
deep talent pool.620  
With regards to building up a pool of professional talent, Mr Menon 
has noted that “we [MAS] have a variety of competence building programmes 
that have been subsidized over the years. That helped to build up a strong 
professional pool of talent. And we continue to invest heavily in manpower 
development. If the people are here, then the firms will come here and expand 
in wealth management”. 621  This makes human capital development a key 
enabling instrument used by the MAS to establish the conditions necessary for 
the successful development of a wealth management industry.  
In short, financial policies in Singapore perform all three roles of 
market stabilization, enablement, and development. This means that the MAS 
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is tasked with formulating and implementing “both financial supervision and 
developmental initiatives”,622 with market stability and sector promotion seen 
as means to the ultimate objective of real economic growth and 
development.623 The MAS therefore has to ensure that promoting financial 
markets does not come at the risk of instability, while regulations should not 
be so onerous that innovation is stifled.624 The MAS’s regulatory policy is thus 
a “delicate balance” that allows neither promotion at the risk of instability nor 
over-regulation at the cost of innovation.625  
This need to “balance regulation and promotion” is necessary if 
Singapore is to continue gearing its financial regulations towards the country’s 
overall economic development.626 The MAS’s financial regulatory approach is 
also marked by a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness that has 
allowed Singapore to retain its competitive advantage as an IFC through the 
“dynamic adaptive maintenance of internationally competitive tax and 
regulatory cost regimes”.627 As such, the MAS recognizes a “need for the 
regulatory framework to be continually and expeditiously updated to keep 
pace with changes and developments in the industry”.628 
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Flexibility also exists at the level of the policy instrument, arising from 
the fact that Singapore’s success as an IFC depends on both market stability 
and the attractiveness of the republic as a destination for the location of 
financial firms. While the former requires high regulatory standards and 
stringent supervision, the latter suggests that lower regulatory barriers and 
taxes will attract more financial intermediation. This presents an ongoing 
dilemma and constant source of creative tension between the different aspects 
or components of financial policymaking, 629  often yielding instances of 
creative policy-making such as the creation of a tiered banking licensing 
regime and separating between banks’ ACU and DBU accounts to balance 
both regulatory and developmental goals.630  
The tiered bank licensing regime and separation between ACU and 
DBU accounts have allowed the MAS to encourage the entry of foreign banks 
while at the same time protect the interests of domestic banks. In this way, the 
MAS has been able to maintain a strong local core to Singapore’s banking 
system while at the same time introducing an element of competition and 
innovation. 631  Moreover, this dual-approach also suggests that it may not 
always be easy to clearly differentiate between different policy instruments, 
especially when a particular instrument is used to achieve both stabilizing and 
development-oriented purposes.  
                                                          
629 Bryant, “The Evolution of Singapore as a Financial Centre,” 358–359; Menon, Interview. 
630 Lessard, “Singapore as an International Financial Centre,” 201–202. 
631 Menon, Interview. 
217 
 
The MAS has also relied on less conventional policy instruments in 
carrying out its mandates. For instance, the reorganization of 1998 established 
the Financial Sector Promotion Department for the explicit purpose of 
promoting Singapore as an IFC as well as the Planning and Policy Co-
operation Unit that serves to “strengthen policy integration and strategic 
planning within MAS”.632 This corresponds to traditional scholarly concepts of 
constituent policy633 or “organization” style policy instruments.634 Incentives 
are also used to encourage good governance and regulatory compliance among 
financial institutions; this includes recognizing and encouraging self-
regulation.635  
In sum, financial policymaking in Singapore ensures the stability of 
financial markets, provides the enabling conditions for the emergence and 
development of specific financial market sectors, and drives the direct 
development of financial markets through incentives and provision of 
resources. The MAS has also on occasion reorganized itself in order to 
improve its capacity for developing Singapore’s status as an IFC. Singapore’s 
management of the financial sector thus involves a “wide array of 
interventionist mechanisms for both prudential and developmental purposes, 
including limited entry into the banking market, a substantial role for 
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government-controlled financial institutions, compulsory savings, and targeted 
loan support for strategic industries”.636  
This means that financial policymaking in Singapore is much broader 
and more diverse than that in Hong Kong and Shanghai, in terms of instrument 
type and choice. This reflects the interests of both state and industry actors, 
with policy mix design driven by strong state-industry relations. However, 
existing studies which discuss Singapore’s financial policy instruments, 
whether directly or indirectly, do not account for the role of industry actors in 
policy mix design. State-industry relations in Singapore are discussed at 
greater length in the next section on Singapore’s financial policy subsystem, 
while the influence of these relations over policy mix design and policy 
instrument choice is discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Financial Policy Subsystem 
Hamilton-Hart has noted that “Singapore’s governing elite occupies a 
mixed sphere that encompasses bureaucratic, political, and business actors”.637 
There is thus a high degree of personnel intermixing, with individuals 
frequently moving between private and public organizations and taking up 
positions in both sectors. This mix of state and private actors in Singapore’s 
governing elite and a consequent state-industry “co-creation” of financial 
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policies 638  constitutes a unique feature of Singapore’s financial policy 
subsystem, which stands in contrast to state-dominance over the financial 
policymaking process in both Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s financial policy 
subsystems.  
Where such inter-mixing of state and private actors in financial 
policymaking have resulted in regulatory capture in other contexts, this is 
avoided in Singapore through a set of informal governing institutions that 
“externalize many of the routines and norms of the formal government sector, 
such as the commitment to meritocracy, flexibility, performance-based 
indicators of achievement, and an entrenched acceptance of the government’s 
right to govern”.639 Such beliefs are also likely to impact financial mix design, 
along with concerns over development, through an ideational channel that is 
discussed further below.  
Individuals are selectively incorporated and socialized into the 
governing elite through their appointment to senior governing positions in 
statutory authorities such as the MAS, GLC’s like DBS and even the ruling 
political party.640 The appointment of key Singaporeans to the “nominating 
committees” of local banks, subject to MAS approval, also ensures that these 
banks “act in a manner consistent with the national interest”.641 This gives rise 
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to “norms of interaction” that institutionalize government-business 
interactions and ensure the private sector’s cooperation with regulatory 
authorities.642  
As such, Singapore’s financial policy governing elite comprises public 
and private actors who share common norms and beliefs, forming an advocacy 
coalition that is based on achieving mutually beneficial policy goals. This 
advocacy coalition thus influences policy mix design through an ideational 
channel that converts these common norms and beliefs into policy instrument 
choice.  Nonetheless, the MAS remains Singapore’s key financial 
policymaker.  
It also enjoys close linkages to the Singapore government, with Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam serving as 
its Chairman, Minister for Trade & Industry Lim Hng Kiang as Deputy 
Chairman and two other Cabinet Ministers among its Board Members.643 This 
places the MAS at the apex of Singapore’s financial policy subsystem and 
makes it a leading member of Singapore’s financial governing elite.  
This also means that private sector involvement in financial 
policymaking is guided or led by the MAS, particularly through the 
Authority’s “practice of organized, industry-wide consultation through many 
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committees and formal bodies”.644 As noted by MAS Managing Director Ravi 
Menon, “[e]very piece of new rule or regulation, almost but not all, almost all 
new rules or regulations go out for a proscribed period of public consultation. 
So we put out a document that sets out the policy, we invite feedback, and 
sometimes we have a second round or we have closed door group meetings. 
Then we come up with the final set that also goes for consultation, and before 
legislation”.645  
The rationales for public consultation, according to Mr Menon, are that 
the MAS does not “want unintended consequences. We don’t want policies 
that are impractical to implement or impose too high a compliance or business 
cost”. 646  The MAS’s consultative approach to financial regulation is 
recognized as one of its “Principles of Good Supervision”.647 Furthermore, 
industry and stakeholder consultation is a key aspect of the MAS’s practice of 
“smart regulation”.648 The engagement and inclusion of the private sector and 
other non-state stakeholders in financial policy is further enshrined in the 
MAS’s ‘tenets of effective regulation’ as “Tenet 2: Shared Responsibility”.649  
Beginning in 1985, the private sector has been formally included in the 
government’s policy formulation processes through their membership in 
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various committees. 650  Further formalisation of private sector consultation 
took place in 1998, with the incorporation of 5 private sector committees into 
the Financial Sector Review Group (FSRG) chaired by then-Deputy Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong. 651  These committees included the Finance and 
Banking Competitiveness Sub-Committee, Committee on Banking Disclosure, 
Corporate Finance Committee, Stock Exchange of Singapore Review 
Committee, and Committee of Governance of Exchanges.652  
The MAS further established two private sector advisory committees 
in 1998 to “institutionalise consultation with the financial industry”.653 The 
Financial Sector Advisory Council (FSAC) was set up to provide feedback on 
regulatory issues and “help MAS identify emerging trends and new market 
development opportunities for Singapore”, while the International Advisory 
Panel (IAP) advises the MAS on new trends in global financial markets, 
policy initiatives in other IFC’s, and international best practices in financial 
regulation and central banking.654  
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A Debt Capital Market Working Group comprising representatives 
from local and foreign financial institutions was also formed during this period 
to provide recommendations on developing Singapore’s debt markets, with 
most of the recommendations of the Group accepted by the MAS.655 Indeed, 
many of the policy changes enacted by the MAS in the late 1990’s were made 
under the advice of these industry committees, along with appointed 
management consultants.656 Specifically, Mckinsey and Arthur D. Little were 
engaged to provide inputs on the MAS’s financial sector development 
strategy,657 while the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) was involved in the 
SGX’s inception and subsequent development.658  
More recently, a Financial Advisory Industry Review Panel was 
established by the MAS on 2 April 2012 to review the financial advisory 
industry and make relevant recommendations; the panel included 
representatives from industry associations, consumer and investor bodies, 
academia, media, as well as other stakeholders.659 As part of its review, the 
panel has solicited consumer and industry feedback, with informal interactions 
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between the MAS and private financial sector actors taking place regularly.660 
The insurance industry has also provided feedback and influenced financial 
policy through its participation in the Committee for the Efficient Distribution 
of Life Insurance, Committee for Enhanced Standards for General Insurance 
and Participating Fund Review Workgroup in the early 2000s.661 
As a former senior regulatory official has noted, such consultative 
committees and industry working groups allow the private sector to “co-
create” regulations with the authorities. 662  An example cited was how an 
industry working group worked with the MAS to formulate the templates for 
reporting, under Pillar 3 (disclosure) of the Bassel 2 standards.663 However, 
most of these industry working groups are typically dismantled after the 
standards have been enforced. 664  The MAS also consults industry actors 
through yearly dialogues organized by ‘sell-side’ actors such as banks and 
fund managers, although a respondent has noted that most of the feedback 
given at these dialogues tend to reflect the interests of industry actors rather 
than concerns over national development.665 
Another important channel through which the MAS consults the 
private sector is through the publication of consultation papers on its website, 
which are accessible to the public. The MAS also disseminates such 
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consultation papers to relevant financial institutions in order to collect and 
assess their feedback prior to the promulgation of a new policy. In general, 
there are two rounds of consultation. The first round involves gathering 
feedback on the overall policy framework, followed by a second round of 
consultation on the text of legislation, which had been drafted based on the 
first round of consultations.666  
Aside from these formal channels of consultation, the MAS also 
engages and consults the private sector through less formal channels. Such 
informal consultation typically involves a wide variety of domestic and 
foreign banks and financial institutions.  In particular, the MAS engages 
industry actors in an “ongoing dialogue” at various levels of management and 
throughout the year.667 This means that informal consultation takes place on a 
continuous basis, with the private sector providing feedback to the MAS 
whenever they feel the need to do so.  
Through a “two-way consultation process”, both the MAS and private 
sector can initiate consultation.668 As a senior banker has noted, feedback on 
regulations is provided to the MAS “as and when needed”. 669  However, 
informal consultative processes typically involve issues pertaining to the 
MAS’s IFC development activities while consultation on prudential rules and 
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regulations are usually carried through formal processes.670 This is largely due 
to the fact that industry actors find it easier to participate in consultations on 
rules and regulations in response to a formal consultation document.671 
The MAS has more recently conducted dialogues with the General 
Insurance Association of Singapore, Life Insurance Association of Singapore, 
Singapore Reinsurers’ Association, Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Singapore and Singapore Actuarial Society in order to “better understand the 
risks and challenges facing the (insurance) industry” as well as to promote 
better supervisory outcomes and financial stability. 672 Hence, industry 
associations can also provide policy recommendations outside of the MAS’s 
consultation process, an example being the formation of a Taskforce by the 
Singapore Investment Banking Association (SIBA) to the potential derivatives 
market in 2005.673  
In sum, private sector consultation has generally been seen as 
“constructive”, allowing the MAS the keep its regulations relevant by 
allowing the industry to “take ownership of regulations”.674 Lee and Vertinsky 
have found that banking executives working in Singapore value their access to 
government financial policy decision-makers and their ability to communicate 
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with regulatory policy makers in the MAS. 675  The pervasiveness and 
effectiveness of private sector consultation is best encapsulated by the fact that 
most, if not all of the MAS’s regulations have been informed and improved by 
consultation. 676  This means that the private sector is highly involved in 
Singapore’s financial policymaking processes, through its role as a significant 
member of Singapore’s financial policy subsystem. 
In particular, local banks and foreign banks which have attained 
Qualifying Full Bank (QFB) status are more deeply embedded within 
Singapore’s financial policy subsystem, by virtue of their contribution to 
Singapore’s long-term financial sector stability and development. 677  Major 
QFB’s operating in Singapore include Citibank, HSBC, Standard Chartered, 
and Bank of China, among others. Standard Chartered has further embedded 
itself within Singapore’s financial policy subsystem by incorporating a wholly 
owned subsidiary that oversees the bank’s consumer banking retail and SME 
business in Singapore.678 
From a regulatory perspective, private-sector consultation and 
collection of feedback from various non-state stakeholders ensures the 
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relevance and effectiveness of MAS regulations.679 Industry actors have also 
noted that MAS consultations allow regulators to understand their businesses 
better, formulating regulations that allow banks to “serve our customers 
better”. 680  This serves to enforce the MAS’s development-focus, with 
regulations contributing to financial market growth.  
From a broader perspective, the MAS’s industry engagements have 
facilitated the formation of knowledge production networks among fund 
managers, analysts and brokers in Singapore’s fund management industry,681 
which provides expertise and knowledge to the financial policy governing 
elite. More importantly, the direct participation of private sector industry 
actors in the formulation of financial policies points towards the presence of a 
development-oriented advocacy coalition which comprises both state and 
industry actors and influences financial policy mix design by converting such 
developmental policy beliefs into instruments through an ideational channel.  
Other non-state actors involved in the financial subsystem include 
researchers and academics, through various financial research centres in 
Singapore’s universities, an MAS-sponsored professorship and Eminent 
Visitor Programme, as well as ad hoc MAS consultations with academics. One 
participant of such consultations with academics is that of Professor Annie 
                                                          
679 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Tenets of Effective Regulation, 26; Former Senior 
Regulatory Official, Interview. 
680 Senior Banker, Interview. 
681 Karen P.Y. Lai, “‘Imagineering’ Asian Emerging Markets: Financial Knowledge Networks 
in the Fund Management Industry,” Geoforum 37, no. 4 (July 2006): 627–42. 
229 
 
Koh from the Singapore Management University, who chairs the MAS’s 
Asian Bond Fund 2 Supervisory Committee and is tasked with developing the 
retail ETF market. Professor Koh has found her participation in financial 
sector policy largely positive, noting that academics provide useful knowledge 
that can inform and guide policy-making processes.682  
Furthermore, the state itself is not a monolithic unitary actor. While the 
MAS continues to play a key role as lead organization in spearheading 
Singapore’s IFC strategy, Singapore’s success as an IFC has “involved a 
whole swathe of policymakers working together, both from within and outside 
MAS”.683 State institutions such as statutory boards and government-linked 
companies (GLC’s) are often involved in financial policymaking, with the 
most important of these being the EDB and DBS respectively.684  
In particular, DBS has played an important role in financing the 
various financial institutions that operate in Singapore, having “granted loans, 
invested in shares of merchant banks, finance companies, discount houses, 
leasing, factoring and insurance companies”.685 DBS has also financed small 
local industries, most notably through the EDB-supported Local Enterprise 
Finance Scheme. 686  The CPF is another statutory board that is actively 
involved in financial policy by providing the government with a pool of funds 
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from its members’ savings as well as investing its surplus funds in long-term 
government securities.687 Both the GIC and CPF have been involved in the 
MAS’s strategy to develop the fund management and bond industries in the 
1990s.688  
As such, the government is “actively involved in the financial markets 
via its wholly- or partially-owned companies and the statutory boards”689 in 
developing Singapore as a successful IFC. This complex of statutory boards 
and GLC’s has also proven effective in developing specific financial markets. 
For instance, surplus funds held by statutory boards and GLC’s have been 
used to attract foreign fund managers, with the management of some of these 
funds being contracted out to these organizations. 690  This makes statutory 
boards such as the MAS and EDB and GLC’s such as DBS important policy 
arms of the government, although the MAS remains the lead agency in matters 
pertaining to financial sector development and regulation. 
Singapore’s financial subsystem also includes international actors such 
as international banks and financial institutions, foreign regulators from other 
jurisdictions, international organisations and foreign investors. In particular, 
the GFC of 2007 had prompted greater cross-border cooperation among 
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financial regulators in the form of supervisory colleges.691 The MAS also plays 
an active role in marketing Singapore as an IFC to international investors 
through its representative offices overseas, allowing it to communicate directly 
with the international financial community.692  
Furthermore, the MAS has been involved in the Standing Committees 
of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and has contributed to international 
standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSC), and 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 693  The MAS 
subsequently joined the FSB Steering Committee in 2012, chairing a 
workgroup on risk governance.694 In 2011, Deputy Prime Minster and MAS 
Chairman Tharman Shanmugaratnam was appointed chairman of the IMF’s 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), a key advisory body 
that sets the IMF’s policy direction.695  
The MAS also cooperates with its ASEAN  regulatory counterparts 
through various forums, such as the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum, chaired 
by MAS.696 In addition, the MAS also maintains high-level bilateral meetings 
with its foreign counterparts. 697  Furthermore, international decision-makers 
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tend to interact with the MAS whenever they arrive in Singapore 698 while 
international organizations such as the IMF and Bassel committee frequently 
deploy financial sector experts to examine Singapore’s financial stability and 
its compliance with international regulatory standards.699  
In sum, financial policy-making in Singapore relies on the collective 
efforts of a coalition of government agencies, private industry actors, and 
other interested non-state actors. While the government remains a powerful 
driving force in financial sector development, it shares financial policymaking 
duties with industry actors and other government-related organizations. This is 
achieved through a ‘governing elite’ made up of both state and private 
interests. Private sector actors also participate in the financial policy process 
through the MAS’s extensive industry consultations.  
Singapore’s highly open markets and internationalized financial sector 
further invite the participation of a wide array of international actors in the 
financial policy subsystem. While some of these actors, such as international 
standards-setting bodies and multilateral organizations, exercise some 
influence over domestic financial policy-making, other actors such as 
international banks and foreign regulators bear the impact of the Singapore 
government’s financial policies.  
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However, it should be noted that Singapore’s financial policy 
subsystem remains state-led, particularly by the MAS, with private sector 
industry actors allowed to substantially influence financial policies under the 
MAS’s formal and informal consultative processes. While other non-state and 
international actors are also involved in the policy process, they are not as 
influential as the state or industry. This is due to the significance of industry 
interests to Singapore’s overall economic and financial development. While 
such non-state and international actors act as a source of knowledge and 
advice, they possess less influence over policy when compared to industry 
actors.  
Although the financial policy subsystems of Hong Kong and Shanghai 
similarly include industry, non-state and international actors, the participation 
of these actors in the financial policy processes of these two IFC’s is limited 
and superficial when compared to the state-industry co-creation of financial 
policies and active participation of non-state actors in financial policy 
processes which takes place in Singapore.  
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, Singapore’s development as an IFC has 
been carried out under strong state leadership, complemented by heavy 
industry involvement as well as inputs from other non-state actors. This state-
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led model of financial governance has been in place since Singapore’s post-
independence drive to develop a financial centre in the late 1960s. This is in 
contrast to the cases of Hong Kong and Shanghai, where financial 
policymaking remains very much within the control of the state and non-state 
participation is limited.  
As a consequence, Singapore’s financial policy subsystem features a 
strong mix of state, industry, and other non-state actors, with all three sets of 
actors actively involved in financial policymaking, allowing for a state-
industry ‘co-creation’ of financial policies. In particular, industry and non-
state actors are involved in Singapore’s financial policy process through the 
MAS’s extensive consultative processes and the participation of select 
industry and non-state actors in Singapore’s governing elite.  
Given a strong focus on financial market development, Singapore’s 
financial policy subsystem features the presence of a development-oriented 
advocacy coalition comprising state and industry actors. This coalition 
influences financial policy mix design through an ideational channel that 
converts developmental policy beliefs into policy instrument choice. Hence, 
enabling and developmental financial policy instruments are chosen to satisfy 
both the MAS’s goal of IFC development and the interests of industry actors 
seeking to establish a business-friendly environment. 
However, financial system stability remains crucial to Singapore’s 
continued success as an IFC. Both the MAS and industry actors thus remain 
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focused on stabilizing goals that ensure a stable business environment, aside 
from the aforementioned focus on development. This means that the MAS’s 
financial policy mix comprises a judicious mix of stabilizing, enabling, and 
developmental instruments. Importantly, this suggests the lack of a strong 
instruments constituency and a weak instrumental channel through which 
policymakers may influence policy mix design.  
Unlike Hong Kong, there is no clear preference for a particular type of 
instrument. Rather, instrument choice is predicated upon the attainment of 
developmental and stabilizing policy outputs. As such, policy instrument 
choice is related to the policy beliefs of Singapore’s developmental advocacy 
coalition, with dominant subsystem actors within this coalition influencing 








Chapter 6: Shanghai 
Introduction 
Shanghai’s rapid rise over the past decade has made it the “domestic 
financial hub of mainland China” and a centre for a diverse variety of Chinese 
financial activities.700 It is also slated to become a full IFC by 2020701 and aims 
to become a global centre for Yuan trading by 2015.702 Given its historical role 
as the key site for financial policy experimentation in China, Shanghai has 
played a “pioneering role in the market development process in the country as 
a whole”.703  
Importantly, Shanghai’s development as an IFC is a state-driven 
process that is inextricably linked to overall national economic development, 
with its emergence and development as an IFC part of a “state strategy” aimed 
at promoting China’s role in global financial markets 704  and the state 
“determining the timing, pace and economic and spatial configuration of 
Shanghai’s development”.705 This makes financial policymaking in Shanghai 
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highly state-centred, carried out under the aegis and guidance of both the 
central and municipal governments.706   
State monopoly over financial policymaking is complemented by the 
dominance of state-owned banks and financial institutions in Shanghai’s 
financial markets. This means that Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem is 
effectively state-dominated, with government agencies from both central and 
local levels and state-owned financial institutions forming an advocacy 
coalition around state ideologies and developmental policy beliefs. Non-state 
actors such as foreign financial institutions and independent experts play 
limited roles in financial policymaking.  
Importantly, this state-dominated and development-oriented advocacy 
coalition influences policy mix design through a development-oriented 
ideational channel that converts state developmental policy beliefs into 
Shanghai’s financial policy instrument mix.  As a consequence, Shanghai’s 
financial policy mix largely comprises enabling and developmental financial 
policy instruments that are geared towards developmental policy outputs. This 
reflects the dominance of state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem 
and the state’s overarching focus on financial sector development. This 
chapter discusses Shanghai’s development as an IFC, focusing on its 
comparative advantages, model of financial governance, regulatory regime, 
financial policy mix, and financial policy subsystem.  
                                                          
706 Xiangming Chen, ed., Shanghai Rising: State Power and Local Transformations in a 




Given its historical position as a centre for trading and financial 
activities, Shanghai’s role as an IFC is not new. In fact, it has been described 
as the “birthplace of China’s modern financial industry”.707 The origins of 
Shanghai’s financial sector has been traced to the mid-Ming Dynasty era 
(1368-1664 C.E.), when money houses had first been set up to support 
Shanghai’s role as a trading centre in the booming Yangtze River Delta 
area.708  
While Shanghai’s financial industry experienced strong growth 
through the 19th century, it was only between the late 1920s and early 1930s 
that Shanghai truly began to emerge as a financial centre.709 Owing to its 
emergence and subsequent development, Jao notes that mid-1930s Shanghai 
already had the makings of an IFC, such as markets for securities, gold, 
foreign exchange, silver bullion, internal remittances and inter-bank 
financing.710  
Shanghai would also reach its peak as a prominent Asian IFC during 
this period. By the mid-1930’s, Shanghai had become a banking centre for 
both Chinese banks and foreign banks.711 However, the subsequent onset of 
the Japanese occupation from 1937 to 1945 proved disruptive to the 
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development of Shanghai’s financial markets. 712  Neither the end of the 
Japanese occupation nor the commencement of Shanghai’s rule by the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) would stem the outflow of financial 
institutions into Hong Kong.713  
This decline of Shanghai’s financial sector was exacerbated by a spate 
of “financial repression” by the Chinese government; this involved driving out 
foreign financial institutions and banks, nationalizing private Chinese banks 
and the closure of all financial markets.714 As McCauley and Chan have noted, 
“policy drove practically all international banks out of Shanghai in the years 
after the founding of the People’s Republic”.715 It was only with the economic 
reforms of the late 1970s that Shanghai re-emerged as an IFC. 
In particular, China’s 1979 economic reforms sparked off a shift 
towards a market economy model, featuring “an open-door policy toward 
trade, financial flows and foreign investments”.716 Yet it was only in 1984 that 
Shanghai was designated an “open-port city” to attract foreign investment and 
technology transfers.717 A proliferation of local financial institutions also came 
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to characterize China’s financial system in the 1980s.718 Importantly, these 
local financial institutions served developmental purposes, being “important 
instruments for local governments in promoting local economic 
development”.719  
Shanghai further gained political clout with the transfer of prominent 
officials from Beijing to Shanghai, including Jiang Zemin in 1985 and Zhu 
Rongji in 1987. 720  Shanghai’s new leaders lobbied aggressively and 
successfully for Shanghai to obtain a financial contract system similar to those 
enjoyed by Guangdong and Fujian, effectively allowing the Shanghai 
government to keep all revenues above an agreed amount.721 This would prove 
to be significant both for Shanghai’s development as an IFC and for the 
economic policy autonomy that the Shanghai municipal government currently 
enjoys.  
While the initial emergence of Shanghai as an IFC was a natural 
offshoot of the city’s role as a major trading hub, its post-reform re-emergence 
as an IFC in the late 20th century was in contrast driven by deliberate strategic 
planning by the state. According to Ji, Shanghai’s redevelopment as an IFC 
was a “major strategic decision made by the CPC Central Committee and the 
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State Council”. 722  This state strategy was carried out in three stages: (i) 
China’s conversion to an open market economy from 1984 to 1992 
(“exploring the state strategy”), (ii) the development of Shanghai into China’s 
domestic financial centre from 1992 to 2002 (“laying a foundation for the state 
strategy”), and after 2002, (iii) its emergence as a successful IFC 
(“implementing the state strategy”).723 
Shanghai’s future as an IFC was first mooted in the early 1990s, with 
China’s reformist leader Deng Xiaoping stating in 1991 that the government 
needed to develop Shanghai into an IFC in order to boost China’s status in 
international financial markets.724 This was followed by a “slew of preferential 
policies” including approval for the establishment of a Pudong New Area, 
permission to set up new service industries, attract foreign banks and establish 
a free trade zone in Shanghai.725  
 As part of the central government’s “Shanghai-leaning” policies, major 
exchanges were established in Shanghai.726These included the establishment of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 1990, the China Foreign Exchange 
Trade System (CFETS) in 1994, National Interbank Funding Centre (NIFC) 
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and National Bond Trading Centre in 1997, Shanghai Futures Exchange in 
1999, Shanghai Gold Exchange in 2002, Note Market Service Centre in 2003, 
Shanghai Petroleum Futures Market and China Financial Futures Exchange in 
2006, Shanghai Financial Arbitration Court in 2007, and Shanghai Clearing 
House in 2009.727  
The central government’s intentions for Shanghai were subsequently 
laid out as a formal policy objective in the 14th Party Congress of the CPC in 
1992, when then-President Jiang Zemin expressed the government’s desire to 
“make Shanghai one of the international economic, financial and trade centres 
as soon as possible and to bring about a new leap in economic development in 
the Yangtze River Delta and the whole Yangtze River basin”.728 This was to be 
achieved by opening up China’s markets to foreign investments, providing 
foreign investors with adequate legal protection, and maintaining an 
environment that is conducive for investments.729  
These plans were subsequently followed by the implementation of 18 
“super-special” policies aimed at enhancing Pudong’s development, including 
permission for foreign banks in Pudong to conduct local currency business, 
granting all Pudong-area projects the status of “priority national projects”, and 
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allocating 700 million Yuan of loans annually to the Pudong government.730 
The central government under the leadership of Jiang Zemin also channelled a 
large amount of grants and loans into Shanghai, further stimulating the influx 
of FDI’s into the city.731 
These initiatives were complemented by the official establishment of 
the Pudong New Area in 1993 732  and the introduction of accompanying 
incentives geared towards attracting foreign banks and financial institutions, 
promoting offshore banking businesses and increasing trade in currencies and 
B shares within the New Area.733 Pudong’s Lujiazui district was subsequently 
developed into Shanghai’s key financial district, with foreign banks and 
insurance companies allowed to set up representative offices, branches and 
sub-branches in the district.734  
Importantly, the central government granted the Shanghai municipal 
government greater autonomy in enacting policies and regulations promoting 
trade, finance and industry within the Pudong New Area.735 The development 
of the Pudong New Area and the Lujiazui financial district attracted a “mad 
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rush of foreign investment into the city”, with many major international 
financial institutions such as Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and 
Morgan Stanley setting up or expanding operations in Shanghai.736 
After the AFC, the Chinese government sought to centralize its 
regulation and control of the financial system and “ensure vertical leadership 
of the financial system” by setting up the Central Financial Work Commission 
(CFWC) in 1998.737 This was accompanied by the establishment of national 
regulatory authorities for the banking, securities and insurance sectors. 
However, the CFWC was only able to supervise and control national financial 
institutions, with provincial, municipal and local banks as well as other 
financial institutions falling outside of its influence.738 Given the inefficiency 
of such centralized regulation, the task of financial regulation and supervision 
fell to local governments, with cooperation and coordination between central 
regulators and local government bodies taking place at the local level.739  
Local governments reinstated their control and influence over their 
financial sectors with the formation of municipal financial work bodies and 
“Financial Safety Zones” that served the functions of “supervising local 
financial institutions, linking up [goutong] with central government regulatory, 
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contributing to the reduction of non-performing loans, guarding against 
financial risks, fighting financial crime, preventing asset stripping and capital 
flight”.740 From the mid-1990s, the Shanghai municipal government stepped 
up its efforts at attracting domestic and foreign financial companies and 
encouraging them to set up their head offices in Shanghai.741  
The concentration of local governmental influence over Shanghai’s 
financial sector was further entrenched with the formation of the Shanghai 
Municipal Financial Work Party Committee (FWPC) in 2000. The FWPC acts 
directly under the direct purview of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee, 
meaning that the CFWC had “no organizational hierarchical control over the 
Shanghai FWPC but merely exercised general policy guidance [zhidao] 
through issuing documents and holding occasional joint work conferences”.742  
Given its inefficacy in managing local financial institutions, the CFWC 
was dissolved in 2002, with most of its functions and responsibilities 
transferred to national regulatory bodies. The Shanghai Municipal Financial 
Service Office (FSO) was subsequently set up in the same year as an 
administrative body overseeing the regulation and development of Shanghai’s 
financial sector, to compliment the FWPC’s role as a political body. However, 
the distribution of functions and responsibilities between the two remains 
unclear.    
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Even as Shanghai’s local government consolidated control and 
management of its financial sector, the central government has managed to 
retain a significant measure of influence. This was achieved through the 
establishment of the CSRC Shanghai Bureau in 1993, the CIRC Shanghai 
Bureau in 2000, the CBRC Shanghai Bureau in 2003, and the PBOC Shanghai 
Head Office in 2005.743 The establishment of these state organization branches 
in Shanghai have allowed the central government to perform central banking, 
regulatory and supervisory functions in the municipality.  
However, this proliferation of state and local government organizations 
for financial sector management and development has not resulted in 
conflicting state-local relations. Rather, the FSO has worked closely with 
central regulatory institutions in the implementation of laws, rules, and 
policies; it has also established regular “3+2” meetings between the FSO, 
PBOC Shanghai Head Office, and the three state financial regulatory 
authorities.744 
With China becoming a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001, Shanghai became an “exemplar of financial reform and 
opening-up”, fostering international cooperation in its financial markets and 
attracting the establishment of 326 foreign-funded and Sino-foreign joint-
venture financial institutions by 2005. 745  As such, Shanghai’s rise to 
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prominence as an IFC and its rapid internationalization in the 2000s was 
driven by a sharp increase in number of foreign financial institutions that 
coincided with the opening up of China’s financial markets.  
A government pilot program that sought to reform the foreign 
exchange and offshore banking sectors further attracted foreign financial 
institutions. 746  The entry of foreign financial institutions did not simply 
involve the setting up of joint ventures or representative offices; foreign 
financial institutions also acquired stakes in Chinese financial institutions.747 
The introduction of the Qualified Foreign Institution Investor (QFII) scheme 
in 2003 and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme in 
2006 further encouraged the inflow of foreign funds and the expansion of 
Yuan-denominated trading activities, liberalizing trade on the SSE.748 
Even as Shanghai’s financial sector became increasingly competitive 
and internationalized, the central government continued to play an active role 
in developing Shanghai as an IFC. The government’s 11th Five Year Plan in 
2006 aimed to build Shanghai into a successful IFC by 2010 through the 
establishment of a financial market system, strengthening of financial 
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institutions, tightening of regulations, introduction of reforms and innovations, 
and maintenance of a favourable financial environment.749 
 On the back of its strong financial sector growth, Shanghai’s total 
economic output surpassed that of Singapore in 2008 and Hong Kong in 
2009.750 However, the onset of the 2008 GFC would result in a decline China’s 
GDP growth, causing massive losses on the Shanghai stock exchange, and 
resulting in a drastic loss of value among Chinese banks and financial 
institutions.751 Nonetheless, Shanghai’s financial sector has since recovered 
from the GFC and resumed its upward trajectory with favourable policy 
support from the government.  
Further endorsement from the central government arose in March 
2009, when the Chinese State Council announced plans to turn Shanghai into a 
major IFC on par with London, Hong Kong, and Singapore by 2020.752 In 
particular, the 2020 plan aimed to develop in Shanghai: a multi-functional and 
internationalized financial market system, internationally competitive financial 
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institutions and financial professionals, and a compatible system of taxation, 
credit, regulation and law.753  
This was the first time that Shanghai received explicit national-level 
support for its role and development as China’s leading IFC.754 The Shanghai 
2020 plans were accompanied by policy initiatives such as tax incentives, 
measures promoting market liberalization, and the gradual convertibility of the 
RMB. 755  Significantly, Shanghai received permission from the central 
government in April 2009 to use RMB in overseas trade settlements.756 This 
was in line with the government’s goal of RMB full convertibility by 2020, as 
encapsulated in the Shanghai 2020 plan.  
The central government’s plans for Shanghai’s development as an IFC 
were complemented by the key role of the municipal government in 
implementing and driving financial sector development. Housing and 
healthcare benefits were introduced by Shanghai city officials to attract 
financial sector professionals.757 Liu has also noted that China’s central and 
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local governments share the same goals of turning Shanghai into Asia’s 
leading IFC, surpassing even Hong Kong.758  
The “Regulations on Promoting the Development of an International 
Financial Centre in the Shanghai Municipality” were subsequently approved 
and enacted during the 12th session of the 13th Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Congress Standing Committee on 25 June 2009.759 These regulations aimed to 
guide the implementation of the national strategy of establishing Shanghai as 
an IFC,760 signifying a progression of this strategy from the policy level to the 
legislative level.761  
In “The Opinions on Accelerating Shanghai's developing its Modern 
Service and Advanced Manufacturing Industries, and its development into an 
International Financial Centre and an International Shipping Centre” that was 
unveiled by the State Council on 25 March 2009, several governmental 
measures were detailed for the purpose of developing Shanghai as an IFC. 
These include expanding the depth and breadth of Shanghai’s financial 
markets, encouraging greater participation by foreign investors, developing 
financial institutions, ensuring efficient provision of financial services, 
creating major financial hubs, fostering greater financial innovation, and 
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building up a sound legal and regulatory infrastructure to ensure the stability 
of the financial sector.762 
While the regulations placed the Shanghai municipal government in 
charge of financial industry development, this was to be carried out under the 
“unified arrangement of the State”.763 The Shanghai municipal government 
was also tasked with fostering greater cooperation with Hong Kong SAR and 
other cities from the Yangtze River Delta area and fostering stronger exchange 
with other major IFC’s, in accordance to the “strategic positioning and labor 
division determined by the State”.764 A “2010 Blueprint” for financial sector 
development was subsequently released, explicitly stating the municipal 
government’s goal of turning Shanghai into a leading IFC for the Asia Pacific 
region.765 
Importantly, the 12th Five-Year Plan in 2011 enunciated the 
government’s commitment to accelerating the development of Shanghai as an 
IFC and enhancing Shanghai-Hong Kong cooperation.766 The Fourth National 
Financial Work Conference held in Beijing in 2012 also emphasized the 
speeding up of Shanghai’s development as an IFC, as part of the eight 
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measures identified for financial reform over the next five years.767 In the same 
year, plans were announced by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) to make Shanghai a “global center of renminbi product 
innovation, trading, clearing and pricing” by 2015.768 This was in line with 
plans to make Shanghai an “international financial centre in tandem with the 
national economic strength and the international status of the renminbi”.769  
These plans were further solidified with the launch of the Shanghai 
free trade zone on 29 September 2013, an initiative that allows the Chinese 
government to test significant financial and economic reforms such as 
loosening restrictions on foreign investments and introducing full RMB 
convertibility.770 The FTZ is likely to enhance Shanghai’s growth as an IFC by 
attracting greater foreign investment. Furthermore, given that currency 
convertibility is a significant advantage enjoyed by both Hong Kong and 
Singapore, RMB convertibility is an important step in cementing Shanghai’s 
position as a leading IFC.  
While Shanghai’s financial sector has gradually liberalized in line with 
its ambition to become a leading IFC and its municipal government has 
obtained significant autonomy to do so, Shanghai’s financial sector growth is 
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still controlled or at times constrained by the control wielded by the central 
government and regulators over the introduction of new financial products and 
exchanges. 771  Intuitively, this suggests that the Shanghai government is in 
charge of formulation and implementation of financial policies, while the 
Central Government decides on the overall IFC development strategy. This is 
further discussed in the sections on financial governance and policy 
subsystem. 
 
Determinants of Competitive Advantage 
Laurenceson and Tang have identified Shanghai’s high rate of 
economic growth, international orientation, strategic access to key markets, 
low business input costs, as well as its rapidly improving physical and human 
capital stocks as the city’s strengths as an IFC.772 Many of these strengths stem 
from Shanghai’s pre-existing advantages. These include a “financial culture” 
that emerged from the long history of its financial markets, a strategic 
geographical location in the Yangtze River Delta region, favourable time-
zone, economic strength, availability of human capital, as well as the diversity 
and maturity of its financial markets.773 Similar to Hong Kong and Singapore, 
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Shanghai’s strategic location has allowed it to interact and cooperate directly 
with foreign investors and international financial institutions.774 
According to Zhang, Shanghai’s advantages include its strategic 
location, availability of skilled workers and national policies favourable to its 
development. 775  Representing a unique advantage enjoyed by Shanghai, 
favourable national policies arise from Shanghai’s economic and political 
proximity to China. While Hong Kong is also geographically and 
economically close to China, its position as an SAR excludes it from the 
political proximity and Party linkages enjoyed by Shanghai. Shanghai’s role as 
an onshore IFC also places it even closer to Chinese markets than Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, the Chinese central government views Shanghai as it’s 
“trump card” in the global economy and has thus provided Shanghai with 
incentives and resources that far exceed those offered to other SEZ’s.776 As 
such, Shanghai’s proximity to the rapidly expanding Chinese economy and the 
availability of strong political support from the central government represents 
a key competitive advantage for the Chinese IFC,777 providing a measure of 
policy and political stability.   
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Political support from the central government is aided by the presence 
of former Shanghai leaders (known as the “Shanghai Clique”) in key state 
institutions such as the Politburo.778 Specifically, Shanghai’s financial sector 
benefits from the “favourable policies” enjoyed by the Pudong New Area as 
well as other “Shanghai-leaning” policies promulgated by the central 
government.779 A more recent instance of such strong state political support 
can be found in Premier Li Keqiang’s backing of the recently-established 
Shanghai Free Trade Zone despite opposition from various financial 
regulators.780 
This strong role of the state gives rise to political stability, efficiency, 
and predictable planned development, advantages enjoyed by Singapore as 
well.781  It is important to note that this “strong state” factor underpinning 
Shanghai’s financial success includes both the central and municipal 
governments. As later sections will show, municipal government agencies 
play a significant role in regulating and developing Shanghai’s financial 
sector, working under the purview of and in tandem with central government 
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agencies. Shanghai’s status as an IFC is also aided by its strong and well-
diversified real economy,782 which provides an additional engine to the growth 
of the financial sector.  
Two distinct sets of competitive advantages can thus be discerned, 
separated by China’s 1979 economic reforms. The first set comprises pre-
existing advantages such as strategic location and time-zone, availability of 
human capital, and an existing financial sector; these existed before the 1979 
reforms and can be seen as relatively ‘natural-occurring’. These advantages 
were related to Shanghai’s initial role as a trade entrepot.  
Shanghai’s second set of competitive advantages includes its 
participation in a rapidly expanding Chinese economy and strong political 
support from the central government in terms of favourable policies. This 
second set of advantages is essentially state-driven and the result of deliberate 
policy design. However, the existing literature does not distinguish between 
the ‘natural-occurring’ and ‘state-driven’ competitive advantages that have 
driven Shanghai’s development as an IFC. This has significant implications 
for the study of IFC-development, since Shanghai has shown how IFC-
development involves policies that enhance existing advantages and policies 
that create new advantages.  
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While these key factors have driven Shanghai’s rise to prominence, 
several competitive disadvantages continue to hinder the city’s development. 
Firstly, China’s inconvertible RMB continues to act as a stumbling block to 
Shanghai’s development and prospects as an IFC. 783  As Tong has noted, 
Shanghai’s future as a leading IFC hinges on the convertibility of the RMB, 
with partial or no RMB convertibility restricting Shanghai’s role to domestic 
financial centre rather than a full-fledged IFC.784 Furthermore, Shanghai’s lack 
of capital mobility and RMB convertibility stands in stark contrast to the full 
currency convertibility and capital mobility that underpin Hong Kong’s 
success as an IFC.785  
Jao further notes that Shanghai continues to lag behind Hong Kong in 
terms of its inability to grant “national treatment” to foreign banks and 
financial institutions, the highly interventionist and restrictive nature of its 
financial governance mode, weak prudential supervision, complex and 
onerous tax system, and its ineffective legal system. 786  Due to such 
shortcomings, Shanghai is far less attractive as a location for regional 
headquarters when compared to Hong Kong. 787  However, the recent 
establishment of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone seeks to ameliorate some these 
weaknesses, by allowing the government to experiment with and progressively 
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introduce full RMB convertibility, liberalize interest rates and allow greater 
participation of foreign financial institutions within the area.  
It has also been noted that Shanghai lacks the “software” of a 
successful IFC, such as strong rule of law, good accounting systems, financial 
sector talent, an attractive tax system, access to accurate information, market-
oriented corporate incentives, and an English-speaking environment.788 This 
lack of the necessary legal, regulatory, and human capital-related 
infrastructure reflects an under-representation of stabilizing policy instruments 
that would have aided in the establishment of such infrastructure. Instead, 
China’s development-focused government relies on developmental and 
enabling instruments to stimulate financial sector development. This is 
discussed in a later section on Shanghai’s financial policy mix.  
Furthermore, Shanghai also lacks the “regulatory flexibility” that Hong 
Kong and Singapore possess. 789  Regulatory flexibility refers to the 
“streamlined, nimble systems of governance” that allow Hong Kong and 
Singapore to promote financial innovation and responsiveness to change 
through a transparent and investor friendly regulatory framework.790 However, 
Lai has noted that local regulatory authorities in Shanghai possess significant 
autonomy to interpret and implement regulations formulated at the national 
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level.791 While this denotes some degree of regulatory flexibility, the central 
government remains able to exercise its authority over regulatory policy in 
Shanghai via indirect channels such as the Party cadre system or informal 
influence.  
Shanghai’s future as an IFC thus hinges on the development of these 
‘software’ factors, albeit with much resistance, given that the development of 
these factors may require a reduction in the Party’s power and influence over 
Shanghai’s financial markets. 792  In contrast, such “software” is readily 
available in Hong Kong and Singapore and has become entrenched as part of 
these two IFC’s key competitive advantages, particularly the presence of 
robust and reliable legal and regulatory infrastructures in both IFC’s.793 In 
response to these disadvantages, the Chinese government’s Fourth National 
Financial Work Conference in 2012 has identified improving corporate 
governance, reinforcing financial infrastructure, and strengthening financial 
regulation and supervision as key areas of financial reform for the next five 
years.794  
Shanghai’s emergence and development as an IFC is likely to impact 
regional and international financial markets, providing both challenges and 
potential for cooperation to other IFC’s. Shanghai’s closest competitors are 
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Hong Kong and Singapore, both leading Asian IFC’s serving the East Asian 
and South East Asian regions. Shanghai’s rise as an IFC poses direct 
challenges to Hong Kong by attracting project financing, syndication loans, 
potential stock listings and debt issues away from the SAR.795  
Specifically, Shanghai’s proximity to the booming Chinese industries 
and its increasingly internationalized listings will result in the SSE becoming a 
viable alternative to the HKEx796 while Shanghai’s burgeoning bond market 
poses a further threat to Hong Kong’s attractiveness to Chinese fixed-income 
investors. 797  In contrast, Singapore’s comparative advantage in serving the 
South East Asian region shields the republic from competitive pressures 
arising from Shanghai’s rise to prominence.798 
However, opportunities for cooperation are also abundant. The 
establishment of the Mainland Market Data Collaboration Programme 
between the HKEx Information Services Limited and SSE Infonet Limited in 
2008 and the signing of the Closer Cooperation Agreement the HKEx and SSE 
in 2009 have ensured greater cooperation and coordination between Shanghai 
and Hong Kong.799 Furthermore, cooperation between the two IFC’s has been 
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ongoing at various levels between monetary and regulatory authorities, 
financial markets and institutions, and professional bodies.800 
This reflects significant complementarity between the two competing 
centres, 801  given that Shanghai provides investors with strong access to 
China’s domestic markets while Hong Kong offers good international 
exposure and diversity. Jao notes that Hong Kong and Shanghai are aligned in 
a relationship of “functional complementarity”.802 Given its strengths in the 
domestic market and the inconvertibility of the RMB, Shanghai can be 
positioned as China’s National Financial Centre and RMB Centre while Hong 
Kong continues its current role as a full-fledged IFC and hard currency (HKD) 
centre.803  
Similarly, Lai positions Shanghai as a commercial centre operating 
within China’s “financial centre network” that also includes Beijing as the 
political centre and Hong Kong as offshore financial centre.804 This suggests 
that Shanghai and Hong Kong occupy “differentiated markets” and therefore 
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perform complementary roles amidst increasing interdependency and 
functional coordination.805  
As these recent studies have shown, the relationship between Shanghai 
and Hong Kong is not necessarily characterized by zero-sum rivalry. Rather, 
both IFC’s are enmeshed in a complex web of interdependency that 
necessitates cooperation and coordination amidst the ongoing competition for 
top spot in China’s (and Asia’s) IFC pecking order. With its emergence as a 
burgeoning offshore RMB trading centre, Singapore has too been drawn into 
the ambit of Chinese IFC competition. However, Singapore is less affected by 
Shanghai’s growing strength as the republic retains comparative advantages in 
the South East Asian region. 
In sum, Shanghai’s key comparative advantages as an IFC stem from 
its proximity to China’s burgeoning national economy as well as strong 
support from the central government. Support from the central government 
also means access to economic and political resources, as is evident from the 
recent establishment of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Nonetheless, Shanghai 
is comparatively disadvantaged due to its weak rule of law and lack of the 
necessary ‘software’ that typically drive other successful IFC’s such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  
 
                                                          
805 Ibid., 1277–1278. 
263 
 
Financial Governance  
Shanghai’s development and continued success as an IFC is driven by 
the guiding hand of a strong state. From the beginning, Shanghai’s 
development as an IFC has been seen by the government as a means of 
promoting national economic development. As Jarvis has noted, “Shanghai’s 
financial sector development is not its own but reflects a national development 
strategy substantially controlled by Beijing”.806 This also means that “financial 
policies must be subsumed under economic policies”.807 In his study of the 
Chinese securities market, Karmel notes that the Chinese government employs 
a financial governance mode of “state-managed capitalism”.808 
However, the Chinese state is far from a monolithic unified entity. 
Rather, both the central and local governments, as well as a slew of state-
owned enterprises and other state-related institutions, are heavily involved in 
Shanghai’s financial sector development. This bears some similarity to the 
case of Singapore, particularly in terms of the use of specialized state agencies 
and government flexibility in identifying and exploiting new opportunities in 
both cases.809 
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As the municipality’s main policy implementer, the Shanghai 
municipal government is influential and powerful in directing financial policy 
and economic governance in Shanghai,810 occasionally even influencing the 
formulation of central government policies.811 Strategic decisions involving 
the financial sector are generally made by the Municipal CCP committee or 
it’s Standing Committee. By virtue of their membership in the Standing 
Committee and their positions within the Core Party Group of the municipal 
government, the Shanghai Mayor and Vice-Major in charge of financial sector 
policy are effectively the key decision-makers in Shanghai’s financial 
policymaking process.812 Furthermore, Shanghai Mayors tend to possess high 
levels of influence in the central government, with several former individuals 
moving on to key Party positions after their tenures as Shanghai Mayor.813 
Aside from the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, another important figure in 
Shanghai’s financial policymaking process is a Deputy Chief of Staff within 
the General Office of the Municipal Government who is tasked with 
overseeing the financial sector and who serves a concurrent appointment as 
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head of Municipal Financial Services Offices (FSO).814 Another key financial 
policymaker is the Secretary of the Shanghai Financial Work Party Committee 
(FWPC) who also serves as Deputy Director of the FSO, while the Director of 
the FSO serves as Deputy Secretary of the FWPC.815 This inverse ranking 
between the FWPC and FSO was introduced in 2002 and allows clearer 
division of responsibilities and functions between the Party Secretary and 
Administrative Head for financial work bodies.816 
Formed in 2000, the FWPC acts directly under the purview of the 
Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee. 817  The FWPC provides municipal 
political leaders with a means through which they can direct and oversee 
Shanghai’s financial industry, particularly through deciding the appointment 
of senior executives and top managers of local financial institutions in 
Shanghai.818 Even in privately-held financial institutions, the FWPC is able to 
influence executive appointments through the CCP cadre membership 
system.819 
Local financial institutions are also controlled by local governments 
through shares held by government trust and investment or asset management 
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companies.820 In other words, the FWPC is also able to indirectly exert its 
influence over Shanghai’s financial markets by holding shares in major local 
financial institutions. This allows the local government to use local financial 
institutions “as a policy tool ... to support economic growth”,821 making the 
FWPC a “major political player in Shanghai’s financial business”.822  
Given the secretive nature of the FWPC and its inaccessibility to 
foreign investors and other non-Party actors, the Municipal FSO was 
established in 2002 and was tasked with enforcing national regulations, 
minimizing systemic risks, planning Shanghai’s medium to long term 
development as an IFC, and coordinating the allocation of financial 
resources.823 However, the FSO was from the start led by officials who were 
involved in the FWPC, leading to views that the FSO was merely “an 
organizational extension and ... state facade organization of the FWPC”.824 
This means that both the FWPC and FSO are organizations or channels 
through which the Shanghai municipal government facilitates and directs 
financial sector development.  
Given the role of the Shanghai municipal government in financial 
sector development, Heilmann has noted that communication and coordination 
between financial policymakers in Shanghai and their counterparts in the 
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central government remains weak, with exchanges between Shanghai’s 
financial work bodies and central regulatory commissions as well as Shanghai 
branches of the central bank carried out through informal personal 
connections.825 As such, central government bodies are seen as “outsiders” to 
Shanghai’s financial sector policy-making process, resulting in “grave 
deficiencies” arising from the “lack of effective coordination between central 
government regulators and municipal financial administrators”.826 
However, such a view neglects the indirect channels through which the 
central government is able to influence or direct Shanghai’s economic and 
financial development. For instance, China’s ‘policy banks’, namely the China 
Development Bank, the Import and Export Bank of China, and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China”, established branches in Shanghai 
during the mid-1990s and have since become “a leading force in the economic 
development of Shanghai”.827  
State-owned commercial banks play a similar role, with their Shanghai 
branches becoming “a leading force in promoting Shanghai’s economic 
development with their abundant resources, perfect functions, superior 
services, and advanced technology”.828 Through these state-owned banks, the 
central government is able to determine Shanghai’s financial sector growth 
and development.  
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Importantly, Shanghai’s status as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 
allows the melding of central and local government interests and influence in 
the city’s development as an IFC. This reflects an interactive and mutually 
constitutive relationship between the central and local governments. 829 
Beginning with the economic reforms of Deng Xiaopeng, China’s SEZ model 
has been used as a strategy for economic development, allowing a constructive 
combination of top-down Party-driven central government control with 
bottom-up local influence from local leaders and administrators.830  
Liu has noted that the Chinese government often treats these SEZ’s as 
‘experiments’ in market liberalization and development, applying 
combinations of capitalist and socialist economic governance principles within 
SEZ’s.831 Such a hybrid model of economic governance is particularly evident 
in Shanghai. For instance, the Pudong New Area’s more liberal “small 
government” style of economic governance was established as an experiment 
in economic policy reform and liberalization. 832  However, the literature 
provides little insight into the political machinations of such SEZ’s. In 
particular, little has been said about the amount of influence and exact roles of 
central and local governments within SEZ’s.  
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In sum, Shanghai’s model of financial governance is highly state-
centred. Through various government agencies and state-owned financial 
institutions, both the central and municipal governments are heavily involved 
in the governance and development of Shanghai’s financial sector. This is 
largely due to the importance of Shanghai’s financial sector development in 
contributing to economic development at the national level. The next section 
provides a brief overview of the regulatory regime in Shanghai, discussing the 




Shanghai’s regulatory regime is made up of two levels: national and 
municipal. At the national level, China’s financial regulatory framework 
operates on the “One-Bank, Three-Commissions” model, with the PBC 
playing a central leading role as the nation’s central bank and the three 
commissions (the CBRC, CSRC, and CIRC) overseeing and regulating their 
respective financial sectors.833  
All four organizations report directly to the State Council, which is in 
charge of formulating regulatory and monetary policies as well as 
implementing financial reform strategies. 834  The PBC, CBRC, CSRC, and 
                                                          




CIRC have all established branches in Shanghai and play significant roles in 
regulating the respective financial sectors in Shanghai through these branches.  
At the municipal level, the FSO is tasked with the implementation of 
financial regulations, laws, policies and guidelines, in cooperation with central 
regulatory authorities.835 Importantly, the FSO “play(s) a key inside role in the 
local financial sector” that involves supervising local financial institutions and 
maintaining financial system stability. 836  Given the various central and 
municipal government regulatory agencies present, financial policymaking in 
Shanghai is bifurcated along central-municipal lines. While central level 
regulatory agencies generally formulate financial policies, municipal level 
agencies are tasked with implementing these policies.  
Financial policymaking is further imbued with an additional level of 
complexity in Shanghai’s securities market. The Shanghai Securities 
Regulatory Bureau (SSRB) is the key regulatory agency of Shanghai’s 
securities markets, operating as the Shanghai branch of the CSRC. 837 
However, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) also plays a role in regulating 
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and supervising the securities market, operating a “self-regulatory framework 
with a focus on supervision of listed companies, SSE members and the 
securities market”. 838  Nonetheless, the SSE remains governed under the 
purview of the CSRC.839  
The complementary roles played by the SSRB and SSE in Shanghai’s 
securities regulation is highlighted by the fact that firms issuing and listing 
securities in Shanghai are required to submit applications to both the SSRB 
and SSE.840 At the national level, the Securities Association of China (SAC) 
facilitates self-regulation of the securities industry under the guidance and 
supervision of the CSRC and Ministry of Civil Affairs of China.841 In other 
words, the governance and regulation of Shanghai’s securities markets is 
highly complex and involves the CSRC, SSRB, SSE, and SAC.  
Importantly, the separation of central and local regulatory authority in 
Shanghai has resulted in a “lack of specificity” that allows local branches of 
national regulatory authorities to adapt laws and regulations to local needs.842 
As such, local regulatory authorities in Shanghai possess significant autonomy 
to interpret and implement laws formulated at the national level.843 However, 
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such a ‘lack of specificity’ has its drawbacks as well. Jurisdictional overlaps 
among regulatory agencies and continuously evolving mandates have also 
resulted in “regulatory confusion” or even obfuscation844. 
Having provided a brief overview of Shanghai’s regulatory regime, the 
next section discusses Shanghai’s financial policy mix.  
 
Financial Policy Mix 
With China’s burgeoning trade and high savings rate, the financial 
sector has been seen as a key means through which the central government can 
exercise national economic governance or control. 845  The development of 
Shanghai as an IFC constitutes a key part of the Chinese central government’s 
“state strategy” of enhancing the role of China’s financial sector as a key 
driver of economic growth and revenue.846 This means a dominant and varied 
role of the state in driving Shanghai’s development as an IFC that involves 
distributing financial policy roles across central and municipal government 
agencies.  
Such a distribution of financial policy roles is reflected in Shanghai’s 
focus on financial innovation and new markets while Beijing plays a larger 
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845 上海市《迈向 21世紀的上海》課题领导小组编 Shanghai City <Shanghai in the 21st 
Century> Discussion Group Editorial Group, 迈向 21世紀的上海 Mai xiang 21 shi ji de 
Shanghai, 221. 
846 Xiao, 金融战略与财经论衡 : 迈向国际金融中心的上海之路 Financial Strategy and 
Economic Forum: Shanghai Road to International Financial Centre, 158. 
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role in financial regulation and macro-policy.847 As such, Shanghai is “tasked 
with testing new products, developing new markets and financial 
innovation”. 848  This suggests a heavy reliance on development-oriented 
financial policy instruments that stimulate such development of new markets 
and products. This section discusses Shanghai’s heavily development-oriented 
financial policy mix and the role of the state in designing and implementing 
such a policy mix.  
As Wei and Leung have noted, the Chinese state is involved in 
Shanghai’s development as “a planner, a reformer, and a 
developer/entrepreneur”, 849  with the local state acting specifically as 
“developer and financier”.850 Financial sector development is thus not an end 
in itself, but a means through which overall economic development and 
governance can be achieved or enhanced. The attainment of this development-
oriented financial sector growth is greatly aided by the use of financial policy 
instruments aimed at promoting financial sector development.  
At the most basic level, developmental financial policy instruments 
have been used to generate revenue for the state directly. As Gordon and Li 
have noted, the Chinese government behaves as a “discriminating 
monopolist”, in selecting regulations that maximize its revenue income from 
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both foreign and domestic investors.851 This is most clearly reflected in the 
Shanghai government’s bank finance policies during the 1980s, which had 
discriminated against private enterprises in an effort to accrue revenues to the 
state.852 
This means that financial policies and regulations have been used by 
the Shanghai government to extract rents, representing a direct but crude way 
in which financial policies can be used to attain developmental goals of 
increasing revenue and extracting rents. This developmental aspect of 
financial policy differs from that in Hong Kong and Singapore. While 
developmental financial policy instruments in Hong Kong and Singapore 
serve to develop specific financial markets or sectors by attracting investments 
and channelling resources to these sectors, Shanghai’s extractive financial 
regulations serve to directly obtain government revenues with less focus on 
developing markets per se.  
Given Shanghai’s relatively weak legal and regulatory infrastructure, 
there is little evidence of financial regulation playing a stabilizing function in 
the municipality. As noted in an earlier section, the lack of a robust and 
transparent regulatory framework is a comparative disadvantage or weakness 
that continues to hamper Shanghai’s prospects as an IFC. However, this is 
likely to change as Shanghai improves its regulatory infrastructure and seeks 
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to comply with international standards in order to attract more foreign 
investment and enhance its development as an IFC.  
As noted by Mr Andrew Sheng, who has served on Shanghai’s 
International Financial Advisory Council, financial regulations in Shanghai 
are moving towards international standards, particularly in the areas of 
clearing and payments system and logistical issues. 853  The PBC Shanghai 
Head Office has also started pilot programs in financial consumer 
protection. 854  This means that the Shanghai government is beginning to 
include stabilizing financial policy instruments such as establishing an 
efficient and transparent clearing and payments system in its financial policy 
mix.  
Nonetheless, financial policies in Shanghai remain heavily skewed 
towards enablement and development, with Shanghai’s development as an IFC 
replete with examples of the government’s use of development-oriented 
financial policies. For instance, regulatory authorities directed enterprise bond 
issuances in 1991 towards industries in foreign trade, textiles, and electronics, 
in a bid to develop and expand these industries.855 The direct channelling of 
funds to these favoured industries through bond issuances is a clear example 
of the Shanghai government’s developmental policy instruments.  
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The developmental role of financial policy in Shanghai is also well-
understood and practiced by its regulatory agencies. For instance, the CSRC is 
tasked with both ‘developing’ and ‘regulating’ China’s capital markets and is 
“expected to do both well”. 856  Aside from regulating Shanghai’s financial 
sector, the FSO is also tasked with promoting financial development as well as 
financial sector reform and innovation, albeit in accordance with national 
developmental plans and financial policies.857 In particular, the FSO promotes 
the financial services sector to serve local economic and social development 
goals.858  
The FSO is further responsible for restructuring municipal assets held 
in financial companies; this includes initiating mergers among financial 
companies under the control of the Shanghai government to improve the 
competitiveness of these financial companies and Shanghai’s financial sector 
in general.859 Similar to the state-engineered consolidation of local banks in 
1980s Singapore, such mergers can be seen as an important developmental 
instrument used by the FSO in developing and increasing the competitiveness 
of Shanghai’s financial sector. Furthermore, the FSO provides administrative 
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support to Non-Shanghainese financial companies, encouraging them to set up 
their headquarters in Shanghai.860  
Importantly, the FSO is able to regulate and promote Shanghai’s 
financial sector to both Chinese and foreign financial institutions as a non-
Party institution, although foreign financial institutions generally prefer to deal 
with the national regulatory bodies.861 In 2003, central government banking 
regulators played a major role in supporting the Shanghai’s efforts at 
encouraging Citigroup to invest in Pudong Development Bank and HSBC in 
the Bank of Shanghai.862  
The two foreign banks eventually agreed to the deals after they were 
allowed to issue dual currency credit cards in Shanghai, a service that was 
hitherto not available in China and hence required special permission from 
national banking regulators. 863  The PBC has also sought to promote 
Shanghai’s development as an IFC through its various initiatives aimed at 
attracting foreign financial institutions and increasing cross border RMB 
business. 864  As such, central government agencies retain a significant 
interventionist role in promoting Shanghai’s financial industries. 
In sum, Shanghai’s financial policy mix is comprised largely of 
developmental and enabling financial policy instruments. These instruments 
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allow direct government intervention in the promotion and development of 
Shanghai’s financial sector. Developmental instruments also allow the 
government to extract revenues through the use of financial regulations. 
However, both central and municipal governments have recently placed more 
attention on stabilizing financial policy instruments, in a bid to improve 
investor confidence in Shanghai and hence contribute to Shanghai’s 
development as an IFC.  
 
Financial Policy Subsystem 
In contrast to both Hong Kong and Singapore, Shanghai’s financial 
policy subsystem is heavily dominated by state actors from both the central 
and municipal governments and features very limited participation by non-
state and industry actors. Combined with its focus on national economic 
development, this state dominance has resulted in the formation of an 
advocacy coalition comprising state and state-related actors, reflecting 
developmental policy beliefs. This has allowed state actors acting through this 
coalition to influence policy mix through an ideational channel that converts 
such developmental beliefs into a preference for enabling and developmental 
financial policy instruments.  
Financial policymaking in Shanghai involves both central and 
municipal level government actors. As mentioned earlier, the Shanghai 
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municipal government has maintained a significant level of autonomy in 
economic and financial policymaking,865 making it a dominant policy actor in 
Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem. In particular, the highly influential 
Shanghai municipal government has driven Shanghai’s development as an IFC 
through two main organizations: the FWPC and FSO. Both organizations and 
their roles have been discussed in earlier sections.   
While Shanghai’s municipal government retains significant autonomy 
in governing the city’s financial sector, the central government has also been 
able to exert a significant amount of influence by establishing branches of key 
state financial institutions in the city. For instance, the PBC had set up its 
headquarters in Shanghai in 2005, establishing a “significant interactive 
relationship” between the central and municipal governments.866 The PBC has 
since established itself as a significant policy actor in Shanghai’s financial 
policy subsystem through its Shanghai Head Office.867  
The establishment of the CSRC Shanghai Bureau in 1993, the CIRC 
Shanghai Bureau in 2000, and the CBRC Shanghai Bureau in 2003868 also 
means that state regulatory authorities continue to play a key role in the 
promulgation and implementation of rules and regulations governing 
Shanghai’s financial sector. Aside from local branches of central government 
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agencies, the central government also influences financial sector development 
in Shanghai by enacting preferential policies and channelling resources 
towards the municipality’s development.869  
However, the simultaneous presence of central and municipal 
government agencies has also been seen as a source of regulatory uncertainty, 
given competing political interests and jurisdictional overlaps among agencies 
from both levels.870 In particular, the central government’s more protectionist 
‘centralizing tendencies’ has been seen as an important cause of the 
aforementioned deficiencies in Shanghai’s ‘software’ or “soft-institutional 
capacities”. 871   Nonetheless, these differences between the central and 
municipal governments may easily be overstated, given that the central 
government retains control and influence over municipal government officials 
through the Party cadre system.872 
Another channel through which the central government influences and 
supports Shanghai’s development as an IFC is through its state-owned banks 
and other financial institutions, which have established a strong presence in 
Shanghai. China’s three policy banks, namely the China Development Bank, 
the Import and Export Bank of China, and the Agricultural Development Bank 
of China, have been operating branches in Shanghai since the mid 1990’s. 
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State-owned commercial banks have also been used as “mechanisms” of 
economic governance and control in Shanghai by the central government,873 
especially through their provision of special development loans.874 
More importantly, state-owned banks and financial institutions are able 
to dominate Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem by virtue of their strong 
political connections.875 Such political connections act as an effective barrier 
to entry, given the unwillingness of local financial institutions to face the 
political consequences of competing directly with well-connected state-owned 
firms.876 Furthermore, firms in China generally require political connections in 
order to gain access to loans and capital.877  Aside from the “big four” state-
owned banks that include the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
and the policy banks identified above, other smaller commercial banks are also 
strongly involved in Shanghai’s development as an IFC.  
For instance, a key goal of the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank is 
to build itself into a “financial flagship that fits the needs of Shanghai 
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international financial center”,878 having from its inception “actively supported 
and promoted Shanghai’s economic revitalization and development of the 
domestic economy”. 879  While the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank is 
technically a joint-stock commercial bank, 8 of its 11 Board Directors are CCP 
Party members.880 Majority owned by the Shanghai Municipal Government, 
the Bank of Shanghai also serves to “support the development of Shanghai 
into an international financial center”.881 Whether through direct government 
ownership or Party linkages, commercial banks in Shanghai are an important 
part of the municipality’s financial policymaking process.   
The state’s influence on Shanghai’s financial markets also extends 
beyond the banking sector, with listings on Shanghai’s stock market 
dominated by state-owned companies. 882  Given that the government is 
involved in Shanghai’s financial markets through its agencies, authorities and 
state-owned banks, state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem play 
both the roles of regulator and market participant, effectively dominating the 
subsystem. 
Given that state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem come 
from both the central and municipal level, a cooperative set of relations have 
emerged between state and local government bodies that are geared towards 
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the shared goal of developing Shanghai into a successful IFC. The concept of 
a “Financial Safety Zone” was introduced in the early 2000’s, providing a 
platform for “intensive and regular cooperation between central regulators and 
local government bodies”.883  
The key duties of the FSO also require it “to cooperate with the central 
supervisory institutes of the central government in implementing national 
finance-related guidelines, policies, laws and regulations” and “be responsible 
for the contact between the local government and the financial institutes of the 
central government and their financial agencies in Shanghai”.884 In this regard, 
the FSO has established regular “3+2” meetings between the FSO, PBOC 
Shanghai Head Office, and the three state financial regulatory authorities.885  
While non-state actors are also involved in Shanghai’s financial policy 
subsystem, their influence over financial policymaking is typically limited. 
Examples of major non-state actors include the Shanghai Banking Association 
(SBA), a professional, non-profit trade association that represents the interests 
of Shanghai’s banks and financial institutions; members include commercial 
banks, policy banks, foreign-funded banks, asset management companies, and 
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representative offices of foreign financial institutions. 886  The Securities 
Association of China (SAC) performs a similar role for the securities industry 
at the national level, complimenting the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The 
interests of the asset management industry are represented by the Asset 
Management Association of China (AMAC).  
The Shanghai government has also established an International 
Financial Advisory Committee that advises the Shanghai mayor on Shanghai’s 
development as an IFC, based on the input of mostly foreign committee 
members, which has included the City of London’s Policy Chairman.887 The 
Mayor is further advised by an International Business Leaders Advisory 
Council comprising enterprisers from major transnational corporations. 
Through this Council, business leaders such as Junichi Ujiie, Senior Adviser 
to the Board of Directors of Nomura Holdings, Inc and Michael Diekmann, 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Allianz S.E., have suggested increasing 
the participation of foreign financial institutions and liberalization of the RMB 
in order to boost Shanghai’s development as an IFC.888 
At the central level, the CBRC has established a similar international 
advisory committee. Such international consultation allows China to learn 
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from international experience and collect policy advice from international 
experts; it also allows China to anticipate and understand the response of 
international and foreign actors to its financial policies.889 Yet despite such 
efforts at incorporating the views of domestic and international non-state 
actors in Shanghai’s financial policymaking process, the continued dominance 
of state owned banks and financial institutions suggest an overwhelmingly 
state-dominated financial policy subsystem in Shanghai.  
Importantly, foreign banks and financial institutions are severely 
under-represented in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem. This is due to 
government restrictions on foreign bank participation and the scope of their 
financial activities in Shanghai.890 While it has been noted that foreign banks 
hold the most potential of challenging Chinese state-owned financial 
institutions by virtue of their immunity from the political consequences of 
doing so,891 they have shown neither interest nor capacity to increase their 
influence over financial policymaking in Shanghai, choosing instead to further 
their business interests within Shanghai’s existing financial policy subsystem 
configuration.  
While the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone provides much 
promise for greater foreign bank participation in its financial markets, the only 
foreign banks which have started operating in the zone are Citigroup and 
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DBS.892 In contrast to the large number of foreign financial institutions in 
Hong Kong and Singapore and the strong influence of these institutions in 
Singapore’s financial policy processes, Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem 
features foreign financial institutions to a much lesser extent. In contrast to the 
ability of banks in Singapore to inform or influence financial policy, foreign 




This chapter has discussed and explored Shanghai’s development as an 
IFC, placing particular focus on its historical development, comparative 
advantages, financial governance model, regulatory regime, the financial 
policy mix it has used for IFC development, and the financial policy 
subsystem within which financial policies are formulated and implemented. 
These discussions have shown that Shanghai’s development as an IFC has 
largely been a state-dominated process. This differs markedly from Hong 
Kong’s laissez faire financial governance approach and Singapore’s extensive 
inclusion of industry actors in its financial policy process. 
Financial policies are generally formulated by central government 
agencies such as the PBC, CBRC, CSRC, and CIRC while the implementation 
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of these policies is carried out by municipal level government agencies such as 
the FSO and the Shanghai branches of the four central government regulators. 
The central government also exerts a significant influence on Shanghai’s 
development as an IFC through its policy banks and state-owned enterprises. 
While the recently established Shanghai Free Trade Zone promises to 
liberalize foreign entry requirements, only two foreign banks have been 
awarded licenses to establish branches in the area, namely DBS and Citibank. 
State-owned banks continue to dominate the Free Trade Zone.  
While future developments are likely to involve the entry of more 
foreign financial institutions, Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem is likely 
to remain state-dominated and development-focused. This also means that 
state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem make up a development-
oriented advocacy coalition that affects policy mix design by expressing 
developmental policy beliefs through an ideational channel. As a consequence, 
Shanghai’s financial policy mix is largely comprised of enabling and 
developmental policy instruments.  
While this necessarily provides a developmental slant to Shanghai’s 
development as an IFC, fledgling steps have been made to introduce more 
stabilizing policy instruments to the mix, in a bid to improve Shanghai’s legal 
and regulatory infrastructure. However, the impacts of such efforts remain to 
be seen and Shanghai’s financial policy mix will largely retain its 
development-orientation for the foreseeable future.  
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Chapter 7: Comparisons and Analysis 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the three cases of 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai, based on data gathered in the process 
of field research and existing studies on the three IFC’s, which were 
summarized and discussed in the case chapters 4, 5 and 6. In line with the 
descriptive sections of these three case chapters, this chapter compares the 
three IFC’s across the areas of comparative advantages, financial governance 
models, regulatory agencies, financial policy instrument mixes, and financial 
policy subsystems.  
 Table 7.1 below presents a summary of comparisons for the three 
cases, in the form of a matrix, based on more detailed comparisons which are 
discussed further below. Table 7.1 also includes the case of London and New 
York, which are representative of IFC’s in Western developed economies and 
hence taken as analytical benchmarks. As discussed below, London and New 
York represent the traditional model of IFC development that is dominant in 
the existing financial policy and IFC literatures. The inclusion of the two 
Western IFC’s further serves to highlight the unique political economic 
contexts within which financial policymakers in Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai operate.  
As shown in table 7.1, the two axes of the matrix generally describe 
the roles of the state and industry in financial policy, with state involvement 
measured by low versus high state intervention in financial markets while the 
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role of industry actors is defined by whether they are influential in financial 
policy or not. These two axes provide an operationalizable way of measuring 
and describing policy subsystem configurations in the three cases and 
categorizing the types of financial policy mixes that arise from different 
subsystem configurations.  
Table 7.1 Summary of Comparative Analysis 
 Low State Intervention High State Intervention 
Industry Actors 
Influential  in Financial 
Policy 
New York/London? 












Industry Actors not 
Influential in Financial 
Policy 















Given the government’s commitment to a laissez faire approach of 
non-interventionist financial governance and the lack of industry influence on 
financial policy-making, Hong Kong’s financial policy mix is comprised 
largely of stabilizing financial policy instruments. This means that the HKMA 
is mainly focused on maintaining financial market stability and investor 
protection, with the industry driving financial sector growth in the general 
absence of direct developmental policies or incentives from the government. 
This reflects the SAR’s commitment to a ‘big markets, small government’ 
doctrine of financial governance.  
In contrast, Singapore’s financial policy subsystem is marked by strong 
state intervention along with heavy involvement of industry actors in financial 
policymaking. While financial sector development has been a state-led 
endeavour that began with Singapore’s independence in the late 1960s, 
industry actors have also been able to influence financial policies through the 
MAS’s consultative or advisory committees as well as through their 
membership in Singapore’s governing elite.  
Importantly, this co-dominance of state and industry actors in 
Singapore’s financial policy subsystem means a “co-creation” of financial 
policies,893 with the consequence being the design of a financial policy mix 
comprising a full spectrum of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental policy 
instruments. This dual focus on market stabilization and development reflects 
                                                          
893 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 
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the government’s prudential and developmental concerns, as well as private 
sector input in terms of recommending policies that contribute to industry 
interests.  
While Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem similarly exhibits strong 
state intervention, industry actors in the municipality possess little or no 
influence over financial policymaking. Given this dominance of state actors 
and the government’s overarching focus on financial sector growth and 
national economic development, Shanghai’s financial policy mix largely 
comprises enabling and developmental policy instruments. Instances where 
stabilizing policy instruments have been implemented, such as the recent FTZ, 
are also based on a desire to stimulate financial sector development, in this 
case attracting foreign investors and financial institutions through improving 
regulatory stability.   
Lastly, low state intervention and strong industry influence on policy 
making may describe the financial policy subsystem of traditional Western 
IFC’s such as New York and London. In these IFC’s, a fundamental belief in 
the free market entails a financial policy mix that is largely comprised of 
stabilizing policy instruments. However, industry actors such as banks and 
financial conglomerates are highly influential and hence able to introduce 
policy instruments that favour their own interests into the financial policy mix. 
These instruments may not necessarily be geared towards development and 
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may instead address only the narrow interests of industry actors. However, 
these IFC’s remain outside the scope of this thesis.  
Having provided a summary of the comparative analysis of the three 
cases, the following sections provide comparative analyses of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Shanghai across the areas of comparative advantages, financial 
governance, regulatory agencies, financial policy mixes, and financial policy 
subsystem configurations. These areas of comparison represent the variables 
which underpin the comparative analysis provided in Table 7.1. This is 
followed by the application the nested instrumental approach to the three 
cases, which allows this thesis to structure the existing case material around 
the framework of the nested instrumental approach.  
 
Comparative Advantages 
The three IFC’s occupy different niches in the global financial 
markets. Hong Kong is well-established as a loan syndication centre and a 
gateway into China through its role as leading offshore RMB centre. 
Conversely, Singapore has established itself as a leading centre for wealth 
management and foreign exchange; it has also recently sought to establish 
itself as an offshore RMB centre and a commodities hub. Lastly, Shanghai has 
attained pre-eminence as China’s national financial centre, serving domestic 
business and trading interests. With the recent establishment of a Shanghai 
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free trade zone and complementary moves to attract foreign financial 
institutions into the municipality, Shanghai is also seeking to establish itself as 
a full-fledged IFC rivalling Hong Kong.  
The different roles played by the three IFC’s stem from differences in 
their comparative advantages. While all three IFC’s share similar ‘natural’ or 
‘external’ advantages arising from favourable geographical locations and time 
zones as well as similar histories as colonial port cities, differences in the 
political systems and developmental strategies or policies across the three 
IFC’s mean that each IFC is characterized by its own unique set of ‘internal’ 
comparative advantages. Before delving into the three IFC’s policy 
subsystems and policy mixes, it is useful to first compare and contrast these 
advantages which, have characterized IFC success and continue to influence 
financial policymaking in the three cases.  
The respective comparative advantages enjoyed by Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Shanghai are listed in Table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2 Comparative Advantages  
 Hong Kong Singapore Shanghai 
Robust Regulatory Infrastructure X X  
Rule of Law X X  
Political and Economic Stability X X  
Sovereign independent state  X  
Deep Talent Pool X X  
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Proximity to China X  X 
English as working language X X  
Support from Chinese government   X 
Strength of domestic economy  X X X 
 
As Table 7.2 shows, Hong Kong and Singapore share many similar 
comparative advantages. Both have established robust and trusted regulatory 
systems along with a strong commitment to the rule of law, based on similar 
common law systems derived from their respective British colonial histories. 
Furthermore, both cities are known for their high levels of political and 
economic stability. In both cases, such stability is underscored by the 
longevity and autonomy of the governing regime.  
Given its lack of universal suffrage, the Hong Kong government is 
effectively appointed by the Chinese government and a core group of local 
elites and granted economic policy autonomy by the Chinese government. 
While elections are held as part of Singapore’s parliamentary system, the 
ruling People’s Action Party has been in power since independence. Through 
its dominance over parliament as majority ruling party, the Party possesses 
significant policy autonomy. This means a firm establishment of the 
government as a significant and enduring subsystem actor in both cases, as 
will be discussed in a later section. Lastly, both Hong Kong and Singapore 
boast of a deep pool of financial sector talent and the use of English as an 
official working language.  
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However, the two IFC’s differ on one significant score. Given its 
geographic location and its position as a Chinese SAR, Hong Kong enjoys 
close geographical and political proximity to China. Not only does this 
proximity make Hong Kong the gateway into China’s burgeoning markets, it 
has also contributed to Beijing’s decision to grant Hong Kong a head start in 
its development as leading RMB offshore centre.  
In contrast, Singapore is an independent sovereign state with a 
comfortable distance from China, granting it ‘safe haven’ status and allowing 
it to become established as a successful wealth management centre. 894  As 
noted by a fund manager, Hong Kong’s proximity to China and its potential 
vulnerability to Chinese interference tend to deter fund managers.895 Given its 
political distance from China, Singapore does not face this problem.  
More importantly, Singapore’s independence allows it to formulate its 
own foreign policies. This has resulted in close ties with China and other 
Southeast Asian nations, allowing Singapore to establish itself as an offshore 
RMB centre and gateway into emerging Southeast Asia. Furthermore, 
Singapore’s position as a sovereign city-state has resulted in the infusion of its 
financial policies with national economic development goals. This feeds into 
the Singapore government’s proactive and industry-inclusive approach to 
financial sector development, which are discussed in later sections.  
                                                          
894 Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013. 
895 Fund Manager with a US Asset Management Firm, Interview. 
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In contrast to Hong Kong and Singapore, Shanghai is comparatively 
disadvantaged in terms of its weak rule of law and less established regulatory 
infrastructure. However, Shanghai possesses a key advantage in terms of its 
proximity to and strong support from the Chinese central government. As a 
municipality located within China, Shanghai is firmly placed within China’s 
political regime and economic development. This means that Shanghai’s 
proximity to China both economically and politically surpass that of Hong 
Kong.  
Indeed, Shanghai enjoys strong political support from Beijing. This is 
evidenced in the State Council’s longstanding commitment to establish 
Shanghai as a full-fledged IFC by 2020 as well as Premier Li Keqiang’s recent 
drive to establish a Shanghai free trade zone. While both Hong Kong and 
Shanghai are Chinese IFC’s, Shanghai represents a “domestic market engine” 
focused largely on its internal market while Hong Kong is an “international 
market engine” by virtue of its convertible currency and highly liberalized 
financial markets.896 
Lastly, all three IFC’s enjoy high rates of domestic economic growth. 
It is important to note that these differences in comparative advantages arise 
from differences in each IFC’s model of financial governance and regulatory 
agencies. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                          
896 Tsang, Interview. 
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Financial Governance and Regulatory Agencies 
While financial governance in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai 
represent three distinct models that involve varying extents of state 
intervention, differences between the how the regulatory agencies of the three 
are set up tend to be less stark. Table 7.3 details the financial governance 
models and regulatory agencies of the three IFC’s.   
Table 7.3 Financial Governance Models and Regulatory Agencies 




































Hong Kong’s “big market, small government” approach to financial 
governance involves minimal government intervention, with any intervention 
limited to instances of necessity such as crises or market failures. In contrast, 
Singapore’s model of financial governance exhibits strong state leadership 
with heavy involvement of the private sector through a ‘governing elite’ 
comprising both government and industry leaders as well as the MAS’s 
various channels of industry consultation. This allows for a “co-creation” of 
financial policies in Singapore.897  
Differences between Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial 
governance models stem from differences in their philosophies of (public) 
management. 898  Historically, Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach was 
established by the British government, who was seeking an indirect way of 
benefiting its own companies.899 In contrast, the independent Singapore state 
was concerned with ensuring that economic gains accrue to the state.900 This 
means that private entrepreneurs tend to accumulate windfall profits in Hong 
Kong, while such profits accrue to the state in Singapore.901 However, this also 
means that the Singaporean government possesses much more resources than 
the Hong Kong government.902  
                                                          
897 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 







Furthermore, Singapore and Hong Kong are characterised by their 
different underlying “political engines”.903 While the Singaporean government 
has played the role of a “leader” with its strong central state institutions, the 
Hong Kong government was a “facilitator” that enabled a strong society to 
adjust and adapt with little government intervention.904 Given that Singapore 
lacks many of the natural advantages which Hong Kong enjoys, it also had to 
develop artificial advantages through heavy government interventions in order 
to thrive as an IFC.905 
Lastly, Shanghai’s financial sector is governed by the heavy hand of 
the state, with the involvement of both central and local governments. While 
the Shanghai municipal government is highly autonomous in economic and 
financial policymaking, it also receives strong support from the Chinese 
central government, which has expressed its drive to develop Shanghai as an 
IFC. However given its position as a Chinese municipality and its political 
proximity to Beijing, Shanghai may also need to on occasion “submit to the 
will of the state”.906  Furthermore, Shanghai’s financial markets are largely 
dominated by state-owned banks that are politically well-connected907. This 
means state-dominance in both financial policymaking and financial market 
participation.  
                                                          
903 Louis W. Pauly, Hong Kong’s International Financial Centre:  Retrospect and Prospect 
(Hong Kong: Savantas Policy Institute, February 5, 2011), 32. 
904 Ibid. 
905 Topping, Interview. 
906 Independent Expert, Interview. 
907 Chong, Interview. 
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In sum, financial governance across the three cases involves varying 
degrees of state intervention. Specifically, Hong Kong’s model of financial 
governance requires minimal government intervention, with the state merely 
facilitating or supporting financial sector development. In contrast, the 
Singapore state plays a more significant role, in leading financial sector 
development through the extensive involvement of private sector industry 
actors in its financial policy processes. Shanghai’s model of financial 
governance involves an even greater extent of state intervention, with the state 
effectively dominating the financial sector through both government agencies 
and state-owned enterprises.  
Differences in the set-up and operations of regulatory agencies across 
the three cases are more subtle. While Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial 
sector regulatory activities are each carried out by a single chief regulatory 
agency, the HKMA and MAS respectively, the two agencies differ in terms of 
policy instrument preferences, as discussed in the next section. However and 
as Chapter 6 as shown, Shanghai’s financial sector regulation involves a 
plethora of regulatory agencies associated with central and local levels of 
government.  
Differences in financial governance models and regulatory agencies 
are reflected in differences in financial policy mixes and policy subsystem 
configurations across the three IFC’s. The different financial policy mixes 
used by the governments the three IFC are discussed in the next section. 
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Financial Policy Mix 
Due to the varying extents of state intervention in financial sector 
development, as reflected in their differing financial governance models and 
subsystem configurations, the financial policy mixes of the three IFC’s differ 
in composition and design across the three cases. Based on the instrument 
preferences and interests of dominant subsystem actors, the three IFC’s feature 
financial policy mixes that differ in their weightage of stabilizing, enabling, 
and developmental policy instruments. The three types of instruments have 
been discussed at length in Chapter 3.  
Specifically, stabilizing instruments ensure financial sector stability 
and investor protection while enabling instruments allow for the establishment 
or implementation of market conditions favourable for the development and 
operation of financial institutions. Developmental instruments allow 
policymakers to directly channel resources towards specifics financial sectors 
or markets deemed beneficial to economic development.  
More importantly, each IFC’s financial policy mix is characterized by 
a dominant type or class of policy instruments that reflects the interests and 
instrument preferences of dominant subsystem actors. This means that while a 
policy mix may feature instances of all three types of instruments in varying 
weightage, whether a policy mix is geared towards financial market 
stabilization, enablement or development depends on the mix’s dominant or 
major instrument type(s).  
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This allows for a general characterization of each financial policy mix 
as stabilizing, enabling, developmental, or various combinations of the three, 
in accordance to the type(s) of financial policy instrument dominant within 
each mix. Table 7.4 provides such a characterization of the financial policy 
mixes in the three cases.  




Stabilizing,  X X  
Enabling,   X X 
Developmental   X X 
 
Given Hong Kong’s laissez faire approach to financial governance, 
government intervention is limited, with the HKMA relying largely on 
stabilizing financial policies to maintain market stability and protect investors 
and depositors. While enabling financial policies have occasionally been used 
to encourage the formation of new markets, offshore RMB businesses being 
the most recent case in point, the HKMA’s financial policy mix remains 
largely comprised of stabilizing policy instruments that enhance Hong Kong’s 
key advantages of stability and reliability. These instruments include 




In contrast, Singapore’s financial policy mix comprises all three types 
of financial policy instruments. Like Hong Kong, Singapore is renowned for 
its transparent and reliable regulatory infrastructure as well as its strong rule of 
law. These are maintained through the MAS’s stabilizing policy instruments 
that involve strict regulation and supervision of financial institutions. 
However, Singapore’s financial sector also contributes significantly to its GDP 
and economic growth.  
The government has thus employed enabling and development policy 
instruments in order to develop and sustain its financial sector. These include 
establishing the necessary conditions and incentives for new growth markets 
such as wealth management to emerge908 as well as providing direct incentives 
to existing financial institutions. As noted by MAS Managing Director Mr 
Ravi Menon, tax incentives to financial institutions are an important part of 
the MAS’s policy toolkit.909  
However, differences between Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial 
policy mixes can sometimes be nuanced and subtle. This is particularly so 
when similar policy instruments are used for different purposes. A key policy 
instrument used by both Hong Kong and Singapore for the purpose of IFC 
development is the establishment of tiered bank licensing systems. Hong Kong 
had established its tiered bank licensing system in response to an increase in 
the number of unlicensed DTC’s, with the aim of ensuring financial market 
                                                          
908 Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013. 
909 Menon, Interview. 
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stability and investor protection through the licensing and regulation of these 
DTC’s.  
In contrast, the Singapore government established its tiered bank 
licensing system in order to attract foreign banks and at the same time protect 
or even advance the interests of domestic banks. As such, the tiered bank 
licensing system is used by the HKMA as a stabilizing policy instrument while 
Singapore’s tiered banking system is used as an enabling and developmental 
policy instrument by the MAS.   
Lastly, Shanghai’s financial policy mix is largely comprised of 
enabling and developmental policy instruments. Given Shanghai’s role as a 
key driver of China’s economic growth, both the Shanghai municipal 
government and Chinese central government have used developmental 
policies in order to direct financial sector development towards generating 
revenues. Furthermore, enabling policies have also been enacted to promote 
the development of specific markets, in a bid to drive Shanghai’s overall 
development as an IFC.  
The recent establishment of the Shanghai FTZ and liberalization of 
regulations and entry restrictions for foreign financial institutions are clear 
examples of enabling policy instruments. However, stabilizing policy 
instruments do not factor heavily in Shanghai’s financial policy mix. This has 
resulted in Shanghai’s perceived weaknesses in its regulatory infrastructure 
and weak rule of law. Nonetheless, the Shanghai government has recently 
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announced its intentions to improve Shanghai’s legal and regulatory 
infrastructure.  
Importantly, differences in financial policy mix stem from different 
policy subsystem configurations across the three cases. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, dominant subsystem actors tend to influence and affect policy mix 
design through instrumental and ideational channels, by virtue of their 
membership in instruments constituencies and advocacy coalitions 
respectively. While this causal linkage between subsystem configuration and 
policy mix design is discussed in a later section that applies the Nested 
Instrumental Approach to the three cases, the next section provides a 
comparative analysis of the policy subsystem configurations within each IFC.  
 
Financial Policy Subsystem 
Policy subsystems can be characterized by their level of complexity. 
Complex subsystems typically comprise a large set of actors with their 
membership in the subsystem fluid and changing, with such high turnovers of 
subsystem actors reflective of their limited influence over policy. In contrast, a 
simple subsystem is characterized by the enduring presence of a small but 
often influential group of dominant actors. Furthermore, as Chapters 2 and 3 
have shown, dominant actors in a subsystem often exercise their influence 
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over policy through their membership in advocacy coalitions or instruments 
constituencies.  
This section comparatively analyses the financial policy subsystems of 
the three IFC’s, paying particular attention to subsystem complexity and the 
presence of advocacy coalitions and instruments constituencies. Table 7.5 
below provides an overview of the financial policy subsystems in the three 
cases.  
Table 7.5 Financial Policy Subsystems  
 
Dimensions  
Hong Kong Singapore Shanghai 
Number of 
Members 




















Given its commitment to a laissez faire model of financial governance 
and limited government intervention in markets, Hong Kong’s financial policy 
subsystem displays a high degree of complexity. This is reflected in its large 
number of subsystem actors. Furthermore, homogeneity of subsystem 
membership is low, with subsystem actors including a wide array of state, 
private sector and other non-state actors. Yet paradoxically, financial 
policymaking in Hong Kong is dominated by the HKMA. This means that 
industry and non-state actors possess little influence over financial policies, 
with their presence in Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem dependent 
upon the availability of business opportunities.     
As interviews have shown, industry consultation in Hong Kong is 
largely a one-way process, with private sector industry actors possessing little 
influence over financial policymaking.910 This points towards the presence of a 
highly centralized and state-dominated policy process as well as the insulation 
of policymakers from political and societal forces.911 Nonetheless, the private 
sector continues to play a crucial role in driving financial sector development, 
given the lack of direct government intervention in markets. While 
independent experts and academics are involved in consultative processes, 
they do not possess significant influence over financial policymaking.  
                                                          
910 Topping, Interview; Chong, Interview. 
911 Harris, Hong Kong; Scott, “Administration in a Small Capitalist State”; Painter, 
“Transforming the Administrative State.” 
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Hence while the HKMA has full authority over financial policy, it 
limits its interventions in financial markets to instances of “absolute 
necessity”.912 This leaves industry actors with a significant amount of space 
and leeway to develop their business interests, in the process driving financial 
sector development through their participation in Hong Kong’s free and open 
markets. In other words, while the state dominates financial policymaking, this 
dominance is not always obvious, given the government’s commitment to 
laissez faire approaches to financial governance.  
Furthermore, the HKMA’s almost exclusive preference for stabilizing 
instruments suggests the presence of an instruments constituency that 
advocates the use of stabilizing financial policy instruments. Similarly, the 
Hong Kong government’s adherence to free market principles is likely to 
derive from an advocacy coalition formed around such principles. 
Specifically, free market principles make up the coalition’s policy core beliefs 
while the belief that stabilizing instruments will allow these free market policy 
core beliefs to be fulfilled make up the coalition’s secondary beliefs. Hong 
Kong’s dominant state actors are thus simultaneously members of a stabilizing 
instruments constituency and an advocacy coalition based on a belief in free 
market principles.  
In contrast to Hong Kong, Singapore’s financial subsystem features 
less actors but comprises a less homogenous mix of actors formed around an 
                                                          
912 Tsang, Interview. 
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enduring ‘governing elite’. Importantly, both state and non-state actors are 
influential in financial policymaking. While the MAS leads financial sector 
development with its full array of stabilizing, enabling and developmental 
financial policy instruments, private sector industry actors are also heavily 
involved in financial policymaking through the MAS’s extensive consultative 
processes.   
As interviews have shown, the MAS is concerned with developing 
financial policies that are both implementable and beneficial for industry 
development.913 This means a ‘co-creation’ of financial policy by the MAS 
and industry,914 with both state and industry maintaining significant influence 
over financial policymaking. Industry participants from the private sector have 
also noted the MAS’s willingness to accept industry feedback and policy 
suggestions, facilitating regulatory compliance on their part.915  
Furthermore, independent experts and academics are also involved in 
the MAS’s consultative processes, often providing constructive feedback that 
informs the MAS’s financial policies.916 As such, Singapore’s financial policy 
subsystem involves the state, industry, and other non-state actors, with all 
three sets of actors involved financial in policy ‘co-creation’, although the 
                                                          
913 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview; Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013; Menon, 
Interview. 
914 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 
915 Fund Manager with a US Asset Management Firm, Interview; Senior Banker, Interview. 
916 Koh, Interview, June 18, 2013. 
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state retains its leadership over financial policymaking under the aegis of the 
MAS. 
Given that the MAS employs a wide array of stabilizing, enabling and 
developmental financial policy instruments in its regulation and promotion of 
Singapore’s financial markets, there is no identifiable instruments 
constituency in Singapore. Rather, instruments are selected based on their 
efficacy in attaining the desired policy outputs. However, dominant subsystem 
actors in Singapore are focused on common goals of financial market 
development and stability, with the financial policy mix design based on a 
shared desire for financial sector growth by both the state and industry.  
This means that the dominant state and industry actors in Singapore’s 
financial policy subsystem are members of an advocacy coalition formed 
around development-oriented policy core beliefs, with secondary beliefs 
predicated upon the efficacy of stabilizing and development-oriented 
instruments in attaining developmental goals. As later sections will show, this 
has resulted in the design of a diverse and varied financial policy mix that 
includes a wide array of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental financial 
policy instruments, reflecting the interests and instruments preferences of both 
state and non-state actors in Singapore’s ‘governing elite’.  
  In contrast to the highly internationalized financial markets in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, Shanghai’s financial markets are dominated by state-
owned institutions and small domestic firms. This is largely due to Shanghai’s 
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focus on the rapidly expanding domestic markets and the Chinese 
government’s perceptions of Shanghai’s financial markets as a means for 
“propelling domestic economic growth”.917 More importantly, this suggests 
that Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem comprises fewer members and a 
higher degree of actor homogeneity when compared to Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
Aside from limited and homogenous subsystem membership, the 
limited role of the private sector in financial policymaking also makes 
Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem relatively simpler, as compared to both 
Hong Kong and Singapore. While financial policies are formulated and 
implemented by state actors including the various financial regulatory 
agencies, state-owned financial institutions dominate Shanghai’s financial 
markets by virtue of their political connections.918  However, the Shanghai 
government has on occasion consulted external and internal experts through 
various consultative and advisory committees.919  
Furthermore, Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem has recently 
become slightly more complex, with the implementation of the Shanghai free 
trade zone. Restrictions on foreign participation in Shanghai’s financial sector 
have been liberalized, bringing forth an influx of foreign financial institutions. 
However, these foreign financial institutions do not possess any influence over 
                                                          
917 Pauly, Hong Kong’s International Financial Centre:  Retrospect and Prospect, 39. 
918 Chong, Interview. 
919 Sheng, Interview; Independent Expert, Interview. 
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the state’s financial policymaking processes. Shanghai remains a state-
dominated IFC, with financial policymaking kept tightly within the purview of 
the central and municipal governments.  
Given the dominance of state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy 
subsystem and the state’s overarching focus on financial sector growth and 
national economic development, developmental and enabling instruments are 
often selected based on policymakers’ interest and desire to fulfil 
developmental goals. Yet as the recent establishment of the Shanghai FTZ has 
shown, the state is not averse to implementing stabilizing policy instruments, 
so long as these are shown to be beneficial for Shanghai’s development as an 
IFC. This focus on development and the consequent selection of instruments 
based on a need to fulfil developmental goals suggests the absence of a strong 
instruments constituency in Shanghai.  
Rather, the focus of Shanghai’s dominant state actors on financial 
sector growth and national economic development suggests the presence of an 
advocacy coalition, with developmental and state ideologies making up its 
policy core beliefs. Secondary beliefs are thus predicated upon the perceived 
efficacy of particular instruments in the pursuit of developmental and state 
objectives. Given the dominance of state actors in Shanghai’s financial policy 
subsystem, such a coalition comprises government agencies of all levels as 




Summary of Comparisons 
The financial policy subsystems of Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai can be respectively characterized by the terms ‘big market, small 
government’, ‘governing elite’, and ‘state-dominated’. While state 
intervention is limited in Hong Kong, the Singaporean state retains a 
leadership position even as financial policymaking involves heavy 
participation industry and other non-state actors. Although private sector 
industry actors are present in both Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s financial 
policy subsystems, Hong Kong’s industry actors possess little influence over 
financial policymaking.  
In contrast, the private sector plays a significant role in Singapore’s 
financial policymaking processes. This is institutionalized formally in the 
MAS’s and overall government’s various consultative and advisory 
committees as well as informally in terms of continuous state-industry 
interactions and the presence of a governing elite comprising both state and 
industry actors. Lastly, financial policymaking in Shanghai remains largely 
dominated by state actors from both the central and municipal levels. 
Shanghai’s private sector has little or no influence over financial policymaking 
in the municipality.  
In sum, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai differ across the areas of 
comparative advantages, financial governance model and regulatory agencies, 
financial policy mix, and financial policy subsystem. Furthermore, each IFC’s 
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unique policy subsystem configuration affects the policy mix developed and 
used by its government in attaining specified policy outputs. These linkages 
between policy subsystem configuration and policy mix design are further 
explored in the second part of this chapter below, which applies the nested 
instrumental approach introduced in Chapter 3 to the three cases.  
 
Application of the Nested Instrumental Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis develops the nested instrumental 
approach as its framework for analysis, providing an integrated approach to 
understanding IFC development that accounts for both political context and 
policy considerations in financial policy. This is achieved by the combination 
of the policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches, drawing on the 
insights of both approaches while at the time, avoiding their individual 
shortcomings. This section applies the nested instrumental approach to the 
three cases, in the process providing two key contributions to the existing 
literature.  
First, it contributes to the empirical understanding of IFC’s by 
structuring the case material around the nested instrumental approach, 
providing a more structured and nuanced understanding of IFC development 
and success. Second, empirically testing the nested instrumental approach 
through its application to the three cases improves its explanatory strength, 
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contributing to its potential as a theoretically-driven framework for analysis. 
An illustrated overview of the nested instrumental approach is reproduced in 
Table 8.1 below, followed by a brief recapitulation of the approach.  









To recapitulate from Chapter 3, policy subsystem configurations define 
policy mix design, with dominant actors shaping a policy mix around their 
preferences, interests, and beliefs. Policy mixes in turn determine the 
achievement of policy outputs through the application of policy instruments to 
a policy issue. This means that causal linkages exist between policy subsystem 
configuration and policy mix design, as well as between policy mix design and 



































Success vs Failure 
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affect policy mix design through the actions of dominant subsystem actors, 
exercised through instrumental and ideational channels that involve varying 
levels of participation in instruments constituencies and advocacy coalitions.  
Furthermore, policy mix design determines the successful attainment 
of desired policy outputs. Policy mixes are designed to comprise stabilizing, 
enabling, or developmental financial policy instruments in varying weightage, 
with instruments choice related to the type of policy output which dominant 
subsystem actors choose to pursue, in this case either financial stability or IFC 
development. Hence both causal linkages are driven by a logic of ‘nested 
instrumentality’, with the use of policy instruments centring the study of 
policy around a means-ends dichotomy and policy subsystem configurations 
serving to ‘nest’ policy instruments within the wider political economic 
context.  
According to the nested instrumental approach, an IFC’s policy 
subsystem configuration result in the design of a unique policy mix that 
reflects and caters to the political economic context of that subsystem, with the 
implementation of such nested policy mixes geared towards the attainment of 
a desired policy output. In the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai, 
the policy outputs are relatively clear and homogenous across the three cases: 
all three cities are focused on attaining IFC success.  
However, the three cases differ in terms of their political systems and 
economic conditions, as reflected in their different policy subsystem 
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configurations. Yet despite such differences, all three IFC’s have attained 
comparable levels of success. This re-centres the discussion around the two 
research questions that have driven the research for this thesis: First, how have 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai achieved their current levels of success 
as IFC’s?  Second, how have these three IFC’s managed to attain their 
comparable levels of success despite differences in political-economic 
conditions?  
As this section will show, IFC success in all three cases is dependent 
upon the successful design and implementation of financial policy mixes in 
accordance with existing subsystem configurations. In other words, different 
subsystem configurations across the three cases have resulted in the design of 
different policy mixes that are ‘customized’ to the prevailing political-
economic conditions of each IFC. This means that the balance of stabilizing, 
developmental, and enabling financial policy instruments within a policy mix 
varies across the three cases in accordance to subsystem configurations and 
the instrument preferences of dominant actors.  
This suggests that IFC success does not depend solely on existing 
political economic conditions or the type of financial policies implemented by 
policymakers. Rather, both are important in contributing to IFC success. The 
three IFC’s studied in this thesis have attained success through the adaptation 
of financial policy mix design to their individual financial policy subsystem 
configurations. The remainder of this chapter applies the nested instrumental 
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approach to the three cases. Conclusions and implications for public policy 
theoretical development will then be discussed.  
 
Hong Kong 
As Chapter 4 has shown, financial policy in Hong Kong is 
characterised by the government’s “big markets, small government” doctrine 
that involves limited government intervention and as a consequence, a 
financial policy mix that is largely comprised of stabilizing policy instruments. 
Enabling and developmental instruments that typically reflect significant 
government intervention do not factor heavily in Hong Kong’s financial policy 
mix. Given the government’s predisposition towards laissez faire approaches, 
financial policymaking in Hong Kong is geared towards achieving the policy 
outputs of financial sector stability and investor protection.  
Figure 8.2 below provides an overview of Hong Kong’s IFC 
















Financial policymaking in Hong Kong lies within the sole province of 
the government. While the HKMA carries out consultations and other 
interactions with industry actors, such consultations have been seen to 
represent a channel through which the government informs industry of 
impending policies rather than as a means of collecting industry feedback and 
policy inputs.920 As such, government agencies such as the HKMA remain the 
dominant subsystem actors in financial policymaking.  
While industry actors remain important driving financial sector 
development, they typically operate within the regulatory boundaries 
established by the HKMA and possess very limited influence over financial 
                                                          

































policymaking. Other non-state actors such as experts and academics are 
occasionally consulted by the government and the HKMA, although their 
influence over financial policy is also limited.921  
Given the government’s predisposition towards laissez faire 
approaches and its commitment to the “big market, small government” 
doctrine, Hong Kong’s financial policy mix largely comprises stabilizing 
instruments that aim to maintain financial system stability and investor 
protection, thereby providing the fundamental “software” necessary for 
financial sector development.922 This focus on providing the infrastructure or 
environmental conditions necessary for financial market stability stands in 
contrast to Singapore’s and Shanghai’s developmental and enabling policies 
that aim to channel resources or advantages to specific markets or sectors.  
While enabling instruments have on occasion been used to stimulate 
the development of new markets, such as the government’s more recent efforts 
to establish the necessary infrastructure and conditions for the establishment of 
offshore RMB business in Hong Kong, government intervention in financial 
markets remain limited to instances of necessity or market failure. 923 
Furthermore, past HKMA interventions in the market have also been justified 
as means to ensure systemic stability and do not contradict with the 
                                                          
921 Chong, Interview. 
922 Ibid. 
923 Tsang, Interview; Sheng, Interview. 
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government’s commitment to laissez faire.924 In short, Hong Kong’s financial 
policy mix is largely skewed towards stabilizing policy instruments.  
The government’s dominance over financial policymaking and the 
limited influence of industry and other non-state actors over policy also serve 
to reinforce the stabilizing character of Hong Kong’s financial policy mix. 
With industry actors possessing limited influence over financial policymaking, 
Hong Kong’s financial policy mix does not reflect or cater to specific industry 
interests. As shown in the case of Singapore, enabling and developmental 
instruments tend to reflect the demands of industry for financial policies that 
benefit their going concern925 or minimize costs of regulatory compliance926. 
The dominance of stabilizing instruments and relative under-representation of 
enabling and developmental instruments in Hong Kong’s financial policy mix 
thus reflects a lack of input or influence from the private sector.  
In sum, the dominance of the government and HKMA in Hong Kong’s 
financial policy subsystem and the focus of these dominant state actors on 
laissez faire approaches have resulted in a policy subsystem configured around 
the government’s chief role as regulator and the industry as drivers of financial 
sector development within the regulatory purview of the state. As a 
consequence of this stability-focused and regulation-based subsystem 
configuration, Hong Kong’s financial policy mix predominantly comprises 
                                                          
924 Sheng, Interview. 
925 Former Senior Policymaker, Interview. 
926 Menon, Interview. 
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stabilizing instruments and excludes more ‘industry-friendly’ enabling and 
developmental instruments.  
 
Singapore 
In contrast to Hong Kong, financial policymaking in Singapore 
involves a relatively larger extent of state intervention. However, state 
intervention is complemented by industry participation in financial 
policymaking. Industry and other non-state actors are highly involved in 
financial policymaking through various channels of formal and informal 
consultative processes. This ‘co-creation’ of policy by state and industry 
actors reflects the presence of a ‘governing elite’ comprising state and non-
state actors.  
As a consequence, Singapore’s financial policy mix comprises a full 
array of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental financial policy instruments 
that reflect the interests and preferences of Singapore’s diverse ‘governing 
elite’. Singapore’s desired policy outputs of financial sector stability and IFC 
development similarly reflect both state and industry interests, contributing to 
the state’s desire for stability and industry needs for growth. This ‘nesting’ of 
Singapore financial policy mix and its policy outputs within the context of its 












As Singapore’s lead agency for financial sector policy and 
development, 927  the MAS has consistently involved industry actors in its 
financial policies through various formal and informal consultative 
processes.928 These include consultative and advisory committees as well as 
informal interactions between regulators and financial sector professionals.929 
Other non-state actors such as academics have also been included in many of 
these consultative processes.930  
This means that Singapore’s financial policy subsystem is co-
dominated by state and industry actors who work together to ‘co-create’ 
                                                          
927 Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013. 
928 Menon, Interview. 
929 Senior Banker, Interview; Fund Manager with a US Asset Management Firm, Interview. 

































financial policies,931 with other non-state actors such as independent experts 
and academics serving to provide constructive feedback that is also often 
factored into the MAS’s policies.. Consequently, the MAS’s financial policy 
mix is reflective of the interests and needs of both state and industry. While 
the MAS’s overriding mandate or goal is that of financial sector stability, it is 
also tasked with developing or promoting Singapore as an IFC.932  
This latter goal of IFC development requires the MAS to be cognizant 
of industry needs and able to provide a suitable environment for the 
development and flourishing of financial institutions in Singapore without 
compromising financial sector stability. 933  As such, industry actors have 
played a significant role in contributing to and improving on MAS policies 
and regulations. 934   As a consequence, Singapore’s financial policy mix 
comprises stabilizing, enabling, and developmental financial policy 
instruments. While stabilizing instruments are typical of most IFC’s seeking to 
ensure financial sector stability and investor protection, enabling and 
developmental instruments are reflective of both state developmental goals 
and industry needs.  
 The MAS’s full spectrum of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental 
policy instruments thus reflects the co-dominance of state and industry actors 
in the financial policy subsystem, with the state focused on providing suitable 
                                                          
931 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 
932 Menon, Interview. 
933 Ibid.; Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 
934 Menon, Interview. 
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incentives and environmental factors for the maintenance of a thriving 
financial system and the industry in turn providing inputs on the form and 
substance of financial policies that are necessary for financial institutions to 
contribute to Singapore’s continued success as an IFC. In particular, industry 
actors tend to recommend and promote policies that enhance their business 
prospects935 or minimize costs of regulatory compliance.936 
However, the MAS’s desired policy outputs of financial sector stability 
and IFC development remain defined by the state.937 This means that the co-
dominance of state and industry in financial policymaking and its inherent ‘co-
creation’ of policy is deliberately designed by the state for the purpose of 
achieving state developmental goals. In other words, industry involvement in 
financial policymaking is specifically designed by the MAS such that 
regulations and policies may help financial institutions to thrive in Singapore 
and in the process contribute to the state’s goals of IFC development.  
In short, Singapore’s policy subsystem is configured around a 
‘governing elite’ made up of state and industry actors. Such a subsystem 
configuration has resulted in the design of a financial policy mix that 
comprises stabilizing, enabling, and developmental instruments, reflecting the 
goals and interests of both state and industry. However, industry participation 
or involvement is deliberately designed into the MAS’s consultative processes 
                                                          
935 Former Senior Policymaker, Interview; Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013. 
936 Menon, Interview; Senior Banker, Interview. 
937 Menon, Interview; Koh, Interview, August 7, 2013; Former Senior Policymaker, Interview. 
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and the state’s governing elite structure. Hence, the government retains overall 
influence over the formation of Singapore’s subsystem configuration through 
its inclusion of industry actors and its key role in defining the belief structure 
and norms underpinning this subsystem and hence remains the lead actor in 
Singapore’s financial policy subsystem.   
 
Shanghai  
Compared to Singapore, financial policymaking in Shanghai is even 
more state-driven, with the municipality’s financial policy subsystem largely 
dominated by state actors. However, conceptions of the state in Shanghai are 
necessarily more complex than both Singapore and Hong Kong, given the 
presence of both central and local level governmental actors.  
With the State Council aiming to turn Shanghai into a leading trade, 
finance and shipping hub by 2020, central government involvement in 
Shanghai’s financial sector development is predicated upon the municipality’s 
contribution to national economic development. Shanghai’s financial policy 
mix reflects these developmental concerns by including enabling and 
developmental instruments that aim to develop and promote Shanghai as an 
IFC.  
However, stabilizing instruments remain weakly represented in the 
mix, with Shanghai’s rule of law and regulatory infrastructure perceived to be 
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relatively weak. Nonetheless, the government has more recently shown a 
greater interest in improving Shanghai’s regulatory infrastructure and its 
compliance to international regulatory standards. 938  Despite such fledgling 
efforts at incorporating stabilizing instruments into Shanghai’s financial policy 
mix, enabling and developmental instruments remain dominant in Shanghai’s 
financial policy mix. Figure 8.4 below provides an illustration of a nested 
instrumental approach to understanding Shanghai’s development as an IFC.  








Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem is configured around the 
dominance of the state, with both central and local level government actors 
heavily involved in its development as an IFC. This is due to the significance 
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of Shanghai’s role in China’s economic development and reform process.939 
The recent establishment of a free trade zone in Shanghai, along with its 
pending liberalization of the RMB and interest rates, is also testament to 
Shanghai’s leading role in China’s economic reform and experimentations 
with new reform measures.940  
As such, both the central and municipal governments are highly 
involved in developing Shanghai as an IFC, given that issues of national 
economic development and reform are dependent on Shanghai’s continued 
success. The near-monopoly of politically-connected state-owned financial 
institutions in Shanghai 941  has also served to reinforce the state-dominated 
nature of Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem, with both government 
agencies and state-owned financial institutions exerting a strong influence on 
financial policymaking through their roles as dominant subsystem actors.  
However, the government has also put in place various consultative 
committees; these involve domestic and foreign experts providing advice to 
central government agencies such as an advisory committee in the CBRC as 
well as the Shanghai mayor’s advisory committee on Shanghai’s development 
as an IFC. 942  Nonetheless, the influence of these experts on financial 
                                                          
939 David Wall, “China’s Economic Reform and Opening-Up Process: The Role of the Special 
Economic Zones,” Development Policy Review 11, no. 3 (1993): 243–60; Gang Tian, 
Shanghai’s Role in the Economic Development of China: Reform of Foreign Trade and 
Investment (Westport: Praeger, 1996). 
940 “Shanghai Free-Trade Zone Launched.” 
941 Chong, Interview. 
942 Sheng, Interview; Independent Expert, Interview. 
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policymaking in Shanghai remains limited. Private sector actors, whether 
domestic or foreign, also exercise negligible influence over financial 
policymaking in Shanghai. Rather, industry actors tend to be dependent upon 
state policy for their ability to operate and even thrive in Shanghai’s financial 
markets.  
As a result of the state-dominated and development-oriented aspects of 
Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem, Shanghai’s financial policy mix used is 
necessarily highly development-oriented. This means that Shanghai’s financial 
policy mix largely comprises enabling and developmental policy instruments 
geared towards the development of Shanghai’s financial markets.  
Enabling and developmental instruments are favoured by the 
government, as these allow the state to directly determine or influence the 
growth and development of Shanghai’s financial sector. An instance of this is 
the recent establishment of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, with the associated 
promulgation of various enabling and developmental instruments such as the 
liberalization of interest rates and the lowering of entry requirements for 
foreign banks and financial institutions.  
However, Shanghai is perceived to be relatively weak in its rule of law 
and regulatory infrastructure. 943  This is reflected in the relative under-
representation of stabilizing policy instruments in Shanghai’s financial policy 
mix. Nonetheless, the Shanghai government has taken up a more recent 
                                                          
943 Chong, Interview. 
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interest in enhancing its regulatory framework and improving compliance to 
international regulatory standards.944  
This means that stabilizing policy instruments are beginning to be 
incorporated into Shanghai’s financial policy mix. Nonetheless, Shanghai’s 
financial policy mix remains largely dominated by enabling and 
developmental instruments, given the government’s current focus on building 
up Shanghai as a full-fledged IFC by 2020. This is further reflected in the 
government’s policy outputs of IFC development and promotion, albeit with 
an emerging interest in ensuring financial sector stability. Like Shanghai’s 
financial policy mix, these policy outputs are also state-determined. 
In sum, Shanghai’s state-dominated financial policy subsystem 
configuration has resulted in a highly development-oriented financial policy 
mix that comprises mostly enabling and developmental instruments. This is 
due to the central and municipal governments’ desires to develop Shanghai 
into a leading IFC by 2020 through active state interventions in the form of 
enabling and developmental financial policies. Given the dominance of state 
actors in Shanghai’s financial policy subsystem, the design of its financial 
policy mix is reflective of the state’s goals and ambitions for Shanghai as an 
IFC, with its policy output essentially focused on IFC development.  
 
                                                          




This chapter has provided a comparative analysis and an in-depth 
application of the nested instrumental approach to the three cases of Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai. This was based on the case material provided 
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 as well as primary data collected over the course of 
fieldwork. The comparative analysis has shown how the three IFC’s differ 
across the areas of comparative advantages, financial governance model, 
policy subsystem configuration, and financial policy mix.  
As shown in Table 7.1, these differences stem from differing extents of 
state and industry involvement in financial policymaking, which means 
different combinations of dominant subsystem actors across the three cases. 
This has necessitated an application of the nested instrumental approach to the 
three cases, in order to derive a clearer understanding of the impacts and 
influence of policy subsystem configuration, as defined by dominance-
dependence relations between subsystem actors, on policy mix design.  
This chapter’s application of the nested instrumental approach to the 
three cases has served two important purposes. First, it has provided empirical 
backing to nested instrumental approach, ensuring that this approach is 
practicable as a useful tool or framework for policy analysis. Second, applying 
the nested instrumental approach to the three cases has allowed for a deeper 
and more structured analysis of the three cases. Furthermore, the analysis 
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remains theoretically driven, given the approach’s foundations in the policy 
instruments and policy subsystems approaches.  
In other words, the nested instrumental approach provides a useful 
frame of analysis, around which case data can be structured and comparative 
analysis carried out. Importantly, it has combined the insights of the policy 
instruments and policy subsystems approaches within one analytical 
framework, in the process overcoming the individual shortcomings of these 
two approaches. This paves the way for a more nuanced and in-depth 
understanding of IFC development and success that goes against the existing 
conventional wisdom of IFC convergence.  
In the process, this thesis has provided a more accurate understanding 
of the policy and politics of IFC development in general. As such, the nested 
instrumental approach provides both empirical and theoretical contributions to 
the field. This is especially pertinent, given the limitations and gaps in the 
existing financial policy and IFC literatures identified in Chapter 2 and 
shortcomings of the policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
Understanding the policy process devoid of politics and vice versa 
presents a danger of omitted variable bias and more fundamentally, results in 
contextually-sterile analyses that may not be relevant to real world public 
policy practitioners. By melding policy and politics, the nested instrumental 
approach provides an analytical framework that ensures relevance in its 
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analysis and provides policy practitioners with a more structured way of 
understanding policymaking and policy design within the political economic 
context of the policy subsystem.  
In doing so, it encourages policymakers and policy designers to be 
cognizant of the political economic context within which they operate. This 
will encourage the development of a financial policy process that is attuned to 
political economic realities and nuances on the ground. The nested 
instrumental approach also provides policy scholars with a potentially useful 
tool for policy analysis. Given the identified limitations of the policy 
subsystems and policy instruments approaches identified in Chapter 3, there is 
an urgent need to ameliorate these shortcomings and at the same time 









Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This thesis had set out to understand how Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai have achieved their individual successes as IFC’s. In the first 
chapter, two research questions were posited, the first question being how 
have Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai achieved their current levels of 
success as IFC’s, and the second question relating to how these three IFC’s 
managed to attain their comparable levels of success despite differences in 
political-economic conditions. These two questions have driven the research 
behind this thesis and contributed to its findings.   
This thesis has largely answered both questions through the 
development and application of the ‘nested instrumental approach’ to the three 
IFC’s, based on case material collected over the course of fieldwork. In 
particular, this thesis has found that relations of dominance and dependence 
among actors within a policy subsystem configuration influence policy mix 
design, with policy mixes reflecting and catering to the interests and 
instrument preferences of dominance subsystem actors. A more extensive 
summary of the findings of this thesis is provided in the next section.  
In the process of answering these two research questions, several 
significant limitations in the existing literature were encountered. Specifically, 
the review of the literature on IFC’s and financial sector development in 
Chapter 2 has revealed that these literatures are overly focused on the 
structural economic factors contributing to IFC emergence, development and 
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success. This has further resulted in an over-statement of an assumed 
convergence in models or modes of IFC development and financial 
governance. Yet as Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have shown, IFC’s such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai have exhibited clear differences in their 
comparative advantages as IFC’s, financial governance models, financial 
policy mixes, and policy subsystem configurations.  
The neglect of differences in policy mix design and policy subsystem 
configurations across different IFC’s limits current understandings of IFC 
development, with the implication being an incomplete understanding of the 
policies and political factors that drive IFC success. Furthermore, existing 
policy analytical frameworks such as the policy subsystems and policy 
instruments approaches respectively lack the scope and depth of analysis 
necessary to overcome such limitations in existing IFC and financial policy 
literatures.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the policy subsystems approach remains at 
an overly-broad level of abstraction and neglects the precise mechanisms 
through which policy is formulated and implemented while the policy 
instruments approach is too narrowly focused on instruments and has not 
adequately accounted for the political economic factors that may influence or 
affect the policy design process. Both approaches on their own do not make 
strong contenders for the analysis of IFC success. However, there remains 
scope for combining their insights into a more integrated framework for 
336 
 
analysis that is able to provide a more complete analysis, which this thesis has 
achieved through the nested instrumental approach.  
In the context of these limitations and shortcomings in the existing 
literature, there is scope for both empirical and theoretical advances in the 
study of IFC’s and public policy in general. This thesis has attempted to 
contribute both empirically and theoretically to the study of IFC’s and 
financial policy through the establishment and application of the ‘nested 
instrumental approach’ to the three cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai. In introducing the nested instrumental approach, this thesis has 
contributed to public policy theory by improving upon the existing policy 
subsystems and policy instruments approaches and combining them into an 
integrated framework for analysis.  
Furthermore, the application of the nested instrumental approach to the 
study and analysis of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai has contributed to 
the empirical study of IFC success. In particular, the nested instrumental 
approach’s incorporation of political economic context and policy design 
processes has allowed for a more in-depth and nuanced account of IFC 
development and success. The remainder of this chapter provides a summary 
of the findings of this thesis, its implications for policymakers, contributions 
to the existing financial policy literature and public policy theory, as well as 




Summary of Findings  
Based on data collected from field research and an extensive review of 
the literature on the three cases, I argue that differences in policy subsystem 
configurations across the three cases have resulted in the formulation and 
design of policy mixes comprising stabilizing, developmental, and enabling 
policies in varying weightages. Each policy mix reflects the interests and 
instrument preferences of its dominant subsystem actors, given their influence 
on policy mix design. Policy mixes are in turn applied to the attainment of 
policy outputs, which are also defined by the dominant subsystem actors.     
Furthermore, the formulation and implementation of all three types of 
financial policy instruments is typically carried out by regulatory agencies 
which are tasked with both regulating and developing their respective financial 
sectors. This means that regulators in the three IFC’s are essentially financial 
policymakers in their own rights. Given their dual roles as regulators and 
policymakers, this thesis has focused on the financial regulatory agencies of 
each IFC, drawing on interviews with senior regulatory officials as well as 
official publications by these agencies. 
As my research findings have shown, the ways in which dominant 
actors are arrayed within a subsystem configuration results in the design of 
policy mixes that reflect the interests and instrument preferences of these 
dominant actors. The interaction of interests and instrument preferences also 
factors into policy mix design. For instance, both Hong Kong and Shanghai 
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exhibit state dominance over financial policymaking. However, state 
dominance is filtered through the Hong Kong government’s laissez faire 
approach and the Shanghai government’s development-orientation to result in 
Hong Kong’s stabilizing policy mix and Shanghai’s development-oriented 
policy mix respectively.  
Such nuances were discussed in Chapter 7, through an application of 
the nested instrumental approach to primary and secondary data collected over 
the course of fieldwork. The analysis in Chapter 7 has shown that three 
different processes of financial policymaking are at work across the three 
IFC’s. This stems from differences in their policy subsystem configurations, 
manifesting in different policy mixes that reflect and are tailored to the 
political economic context of each IFC’s policy subsystem.  
Differences in subsystem configuration are also reflected in a focus on 
different policy outputs across the three IFC’s. While all three IFC’s have 
been deemed successful by IFC rankings and hierarchies,945 it is important to 
note that models of IFC development and desired policy outputs vary across 
the three cases. While Chapters 7 and 8 have comparatively analysed the three 
cases, the remainder of this section will provide a brief summary of the 
findings discussed in those chapters.  
                                                          
945 Poon, “Hierarchical Tendencies of Capital Markets Among International Financial 
Centers”; Poon, Eldredge, and Yeung, “Rank Size Distribution of International Financial 
Centers”; Yeandle and Dranev, The Global Financial Centres Index 14. 
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First, this thesis has found that Hong Kong operates on a financial 
governance system of “big markets, small government” that involves a laissez 
faire approach to financial governance, with government interventions limited 
to instances of necessity or market failure. Paradoxically, the government’s 
commitment to laissez faire also instates its dominance over financial 
policymaking, given that such a laissez faire approach connotes policy 
stability with policymakers facing a lower need to take industry interests into 
account. 
As such, Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem is dominated by 
government agencies such as the HKMA. However, industry actors continue 
to play an important role in driving Hong Kong’s financial sector 
development, although their activities are necessarily subsumed within the 
regulatory overview of the state. While other non-state actors are involved in 
consultative or advisory committees to the government, their influence over 
policy has also been shown to be limited. 
In other words, Hong Kong’s financial policy subsystem is configured 
around a dominant state that is committed to free market principles and a 
laissez faire model of financial governance. This has resulted in the design of a 
financial policy mix that largely comprises stabilizing policy instruments, with 
little or no inclusion of enabling and developmental instruments that would 
usually involve more extensive government intervention in markets and reflect 
specific industry interests.  
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Given this focus on stabilizing instruments and laissez faire principles, 
the Hong Kong government is mostly focused on attaining the policy outputs 
of financial market stability and investor protection. This focus on financial 
market stability and the consequent use of stabilizing instruments have been 
the basis of Hong Kong’s key comparative advantages as an IFC, namely its 
robust legal and regulatory infrastructure as well as political and economic 
stability, both of which are underpinned by a strong rule of law.  
In contrast, IFC development in Singapore involves a larger extent of 
state intervention; Singapore’s initial formation as an IFC was essentially a 
state-driven initiative.  However, industry and other non-state actors have 
since achieved strong involvement in financial policymaking through the 
MAS’s various consultative channels as well as the participation of select 
industry and non-state actors in Singapore’s ‘governing elite’.  
By the MAS’s own reckoning, financial policymaking involves a “co-
creation”946 of policy by state and industry actors. This means that Singapore’s 
financial policy subsystem is configured around the co-dominance of state and 
industry actors, with other non-state actors such as experts and academics 
providing significant inputs to financial policies. However, it is important to 
note that this state-industry co-dominance of financial policymaking does not 
necessarily mean equal levels of authority or status among actors. Financial 
                                                          
946 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview. 
341 
 
policymaking in Singapore remains state-led, with the MAS continuing to 
occupy a peak position in Singapore’s financial policy subsystem.  
As a consequence of this co-dominance of state and industry actors in 
financial policymaking, Singapore’s financial policy mix comprises a wide 
array of stabilizing, enabling, and developmental policy instruments. This 
reflects the MAS’s dual goals of financial market stabilization and IFC 
development. Furthermore, the inclusion of enabling and developmental 
policy instruments can also be seen as a consequence of industry involvement 
in policymaking, given that these policies are particularly beneficial to the 
interests of industry.  
As interviews have shown, it is in fact the deliberate design of the 
MAS that its policies should include the inputs of industry and hence provide 
the conditions deemed necessary by industry actors for their success, which in 
turn contributes to Singapore’s overall success as an IFC.947 As a result of 
industry input in financial policymaking and the MAS’s dual goals of 
stabilization and development, financial policymakers in Singapore are 
focused on achieving the two policy outputs of financial market stability and 
IFC development.  
Relative to Singapore, financial governance in Shanghai involves an 
even larger degree of state involvement. Given the Chinese government’s 
                                                          




ambitions of developing Shanghai into a full-fledged IFC by 2020, both 
central and municipal governments are involved in developing Shanghai as an 
IFC. Furthermore, Shanghai’s financial markets are largely dominated by 
state-owned enterprises with strong political connections that act as a barrier 
of entry to domestic private firms, 948  while foreign participation remains 
limited.  
However, the recent establishment of a free trade zone in Shanghai 
portends a loosening of these restrictions and the entry of more foreign 
financial institutions. Nonetheless, both the Chinese central government and 
Shanghai municipal government have continued to maintain their control over 
financial policymaking. As a consequence, Shanghai’s financial policy 
subsystem is configured around this state dominance, with dominant state 
actors including both central and municipal governments, their related 
regulatory agencies, as well as state-owned enterprises that include the “big 
four” state-owned commercial banks and three main policy banks.  
Given this dominance of the state over financial policymaking and that 
of state-owned enterprises in the financial markets, private sector industry 
players possess little influence over policy. Rather, they are dependent upon 
the state’s financial policies for their survival and business going concern. 
While other non-state actors such as experts and academics have been 
involved in the government’s various advisory committees both at the central 
                                                          
948 Chong, Interview. 
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and municipal level, their actual influence over policy has also been found to 
be limited. 
Shanghai’s state-driven financial policy subsystem as well as the 
Chinese central government’s focus on developing Shanghai as an IFC and 
maintaining its contribution to China’s overall economic development means 
that Shanghai’s financial policy mix is necessarily development-oriented, 
comprising mostly enabling and developmental policies. Stabilizing policies 
remain under-represented, as reflected in Shanghai’s relatively weak rule of 
law and under-developed regulatory infrastructure, although policymakers 
have more recently begun focusing on improving Shanghai’s regulatory 
system and ensuring compliance to international regulatory rules949. Despite 
these efforts, Shanghai’s financial policy mix remains largely dominated by 
enabling and developmental instruments, geared towards the central and 
municipal governments’ desired policy output of IFC development.  
Having provided a brief summary of the findings of this thesis in terms 
of the nested instrumental development of the three IFC’s, this section has 
shown that IFC development across the three cases is characterized by a high 
degree of diversity and variegation. Yet such diversity has not prevented the 
three IFC’s from attaining comparable levels of success. Rather, the three 
IFC’s have attained success through a policy design process that is cognizant 
and reflective of the extant political economic context, and based on the 
                                                          
949 Sheng, Interview. 
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actions and influence of dominant subsystem actors who are focused on 
attaining IFC success.   
By ‘nesting’ policy mix design within policy subsystem configuration 
through the actions and influence of dominant subsystem actors, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Shanghai have each been able to achieve their individual 
successes as IFC’s. The findings of this thesis go against the grain of 
conventional thinking which predicts and espouses IFC convergence, 
presupposing and predicting an increasing homogeneity of financial policy 
mixes across different IFC’s. Furthermore, this thesis has made valuable 
contributions both to the empirical study of IFC’s and to public policy theory 
in general. The next section discusses these contributions. 
 
Contributions to Literature and Theory 
As Chapter 2 has shown, the existing literature on IFC’s and financial 
policy tends to overstate the impacts of structural economic variables on IFC 
success, with the consequence being an assumed convergence of IFC 
development models around the development of these variables. In reality, 
IFC’s exhibit a vast diversity in terms of the financial activities which take 
place within them, the financial policies formulated and implemented by 
policymakers in their development, and the political economic contexts within 
which they exist. More importantly, this thesis has found that IFC success 
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across the three cases is dependent on the adaptation of policy mix design to 
the unique political economic context of its policy subsystem,   
However, existing public policy theoretical approaches do not allow 
for a deeper understanding of this interplay between policy mix design and 
subsystem configuration. As shown in Chapter 3, extant shortcomings in the 
policy subsystems and policy instruments approaches present an incomplete 
picture of IFC development when these two approaches are individually 
applied to the study of IFC’s. This has necessitated the establishment of the 
nested instrumental approach, which draws upon and combines the policy 
subsystems and instruments approaches into an integrated analytical 
framework.  
The development of the nested instrumental approach and its 
application to the case data collected over the course of fieldwork have 
allowed this thesis to make significant contributions to both the empirical 
study of IFC’s and  theoretical developments in the study of public policy in 
general. This thesis’s empirical and theoretical contributions are discussed in 
turn below.  
First, the application of the nested instrumental approach to the three 
cases has served to provide a deeper and more nuanced understanding of IFC 
development, by accounting for policy subsystem configurations and their 
impacts on financial policy mix design. This inclusion of contextual 
subsystem data is a significant empirical contribution, given the existing 
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literature’s bias towards a quantitative understanding of IFC success that 
neglects less measureable but nonetheless significant contextual variables. The 
use of case study and qualitative methods in this thesis has particularly proven 
useful in providing such an in-depth understanding of how the political 
economic context affects IFC development and financial policy instrument 
choices.  
Furthermore, the nested instrumental approach presents a useful 
structure around which case data can be organized, allowing for a more 
integrated understanding of how financial policy mix design is determined by 
its subsystem configuration, leading to the attainment of desired policy 
outputs. Given the abovementioned neglect of political context in the existing 
IFC literature, this melding of policy and politics in the nested instrumental 
approach contributes significantly to the existing literature and provides a 
useful new analytical framework for studying the politics of finance.  
Secondly, the development and introduction of the nested instrumental 
approach in this thesis contributes directly to public policy theory. As Chapter 
3 has shown, shortcomings in the policy subsystems and policy instruments 
approaches suggest that the subsystems approach tends to be overly broad and 
does not sufficiently explicate the policy instruments through which  policies 
are made while the instruments approach downplays the influence of context 
in its focus on instruments design and implementation processes.  
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In combining the two approaches, the nested instrumental approach 
allows for a melding of key insights from both the subsystems and instruments 
approaches and a simultaneous negation of their individual shortcomings. As 
such, the nested instrumental approach represents a unique and theoretically-
driven analytical framework that both addresses the political economic context 
and examines policies as instruments or means applied in the attainment of 
defined ends, in the process accounting for the interplay between instruments 
and subsystems in policymaking.    
Through the facilitation of a more integrative approach to 
understanding policy processes, the nested instrumental approach presents a 
potentially useful tool for policy analysis. In particular, a greater 
understanding of policy mix design, coupled with a deeper appreciation of the 
political economic context and its influence on policymaking, will allow for a 
policy design process that is more attuned to political economic context and 
realities. The next section discusses the implications of the nested instrumental 
approach and this thesis’s findings to policymakers. 
 
Implications for Policymakers  
Aside from the empirical and theoretical contributions discussed 
above, this thesis also has significant implications for policymakers, whether 
in the context of financial policy and IFC development or with regards to the 
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policy process more generally. This section first discusses implications for 
financial policymaking, followed by the policy process in general. 
As the findings of this thesis have shown, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai have attained comparative success as IFC’s despite differences in 
their political systems and the types of financial activities they specialize in. 
This has been achieved in the three IFC’s through the application of financial 
policy mixes which were designed in accordance to their respective policy 
subsystem configurations. Extrapolating from these findings, a case can be 
made that there are different paths to success for different IFC’s. This means 
that policymakers need to re-evaluate preconceived notions or expectations of 
IFC convergence...   
Rather, policymakers need to be cognizant of the political economic 
context within which successful IFC’s have been developed as well as the 
ways in which context has shaped policy in order to bring about financial 
sector development and success. This requires policymakers to take on what 
Wu et al have termed a “political perspective” and develop related 
competencies in “policy acumen”950. This means that policymakers and policy 
designers need to build up deep extensive knowledge of inter-actor relations 
and dynamics within their respective IFC’s, with the policy design process 
factoring in such relations and dynamics.  
                                                          
950 Xun Wu et al., The Public Policy Primer (London: Routledge, 2010), 7–11. 
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Singapore presents a positive instance of such contextual 
understanding on the part of its policy makers, with financial policymaking 
processes driven by a strong appreciation of nested instrumentality. 
Specifically, Singapore’s financial policymakers have exhibited a strong 
understanding of the city-state’s policy subsystem configuration as an IFC and 
correspondingly designed their policies in accordance with this configuration, 
allowing for the attainment of both prudential regulatory goals and industry 
ambitions. This has been largely achieved through the MAS’s extensive 
consultative processes, which have imbued regulatory officials with a keen 
understanding of industry interests and allowed for the inclusion of industry 
actors in the drafting of rules and regulations.951  
In general, developing a keen understanding of policy subsystem 
configurations and dynamics requires policymakers to take on a political 
perspective which, according to Wu et al, allows the policymaker to 
understand the interests of key actors and the relationships between them952. In 
the context of the nested instrumental approach, taking on this political 
perspective essentially means achieving a deeper understanding of the 
relations of dominance and dependence among major subsystem actors which 
define and shape policy subsystem configurations.  
                                                          
951 Former Senior Regulatory Official, Interview; Senior Banker, Interview; Menon, 
Interview. 
952 Wu et al., The Public Policy Primer, 10. 
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This will allow for the design of policy instruments and mixes that are 
not only more effective in attaining the desired policy outputs, but also more 
relevant to the interests and preferences of subsystem actors. Policies that are 
reflective or representative of the political context are likely to benefit from 
increased compliance and greater public support, since such policies are able 
to cater to the interests and benefits of both policymakers and targets of these 
policies.  
Aside from accounting for its policy subsystem configuration, policy 
mix design should also be attuned to desired policy outputs. In other words, 
policy mixes should comprise instruments that are more efficiently targeted 
towards the attainment of policy outputs through processes or pathways which 
are clear and well-understood by policymakers. While the policy instruments 
literature has made significant advances in this respect, there remains a need to 
understand how policy outputs themselves are defined by policy subsystem 
configurations, with a set of desired policy outputs typically defined or set in 
place by dominant subsystem actors.  
In the context of IFC’s, these policy outputs are also related to the type 
of financial centre that policymakers wish to establish (such as an investment 
safe haven with a strong wealth management industry, loan syndication centre 
with deep capital markets, or an international banking centre with strong 
international linkages and compliance with international regulations), as well 
as the comparative strengths and advantages enjoyed by each IFC.  
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As this thesis has shown, Hong Kong’s policymakers have chosen to 
focus on policy outputs of financial market stability and investor protection 
based on their commitment to free market principles. In contrast, policymakers 
in Singapore and Shanghai view financial markets as a significant contributor 
to national economic development, with the result being a focus on IFC 
promotion and development, although Singapore has retained its desired 
policy output of financial market stability as well.  
As previous chapters have shown, these have resulted in the design of 
financial policy mixes that are geared towards the attainment of policy outputs 
which the respective dominant subsystem actors of the three IFC’s have 
chosen to pursue. In tying policy mix design to the interests and aspirations of 
senior policymakers and the IFC’s existing advantages, financial policy 
instruments can be designed to be more efficient and effective in achieving 
targeted or desired policy outputs, whether in terms of financial market 
stabilization or IFC development and promotion.  
  In short, policy mix design needs to take into account policy subsystem 
configurations and as a corollary, the policy outputs deemed desirable by 
dominant policy actors, which also flow from the subsystem configuration. 
This means that there is a need to align the three components of policymaking 
which the nested instrumental approach has laid out, namely policy subsystem 
configurations, policy mix design, and policy outputs.  
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Limitations and Issues for Future Research 
This last section discusses issues which were or could not be addressed 
in this thesis. Given limits on its length and size, this thesis has necessarily 
been more targeted and focused in its research approach. There are invariably 
issues which may lie beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, these issues 
provide potential avenues for future research, with this thesis acting as a 
foundational start to an emerging line of research on IFC’s and nested 
instrumental policymaking. 
First, in choosing to study the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Shanghai, this thesis has limited its research focus to the study of successful 
Asian IFC’s. The Asia-centric nature of this thesis does not present any 
immediate problems; given that IFC’s in Western developed nations have 
received more than sufficient attention in the existing IFC literature. In fact, 
this thesis is itself a contribution towards more systematic analyses of IFC 
development in Asia.  
However, IFC’s which have failed to attain success remain under-
studied. As such, one key issue which this thesis has not addressed is how and 
why IFC’s have failed. While the study of IFC failures presents a promising 
avenue of future research, the findings of this thesis may nonetheless provide a 
useful starting point for such research on IFC failure. After all, failure is the 
flipside of success. However, it should also be noted that definitions of failure 
are subjective and contentious. Policymakers of less successful IFC’s may 
353 
 
well argue that they have not failed, but more time is needed before their cities 
can take off as IFC’s. Regardless, there is still a need to understand why or 
how less successful IFC’s have not been able to attain the levels of financial 
sector development and success which the three IFC’s studied in this thesis 
have achieved.  
This thesis has enumerated and discussed the various factors which 
have contributed to the success of the three IFC’s. It then goes without saying 
that the lack of these factors is likely to contribute to failure or at the very 
least, raise the barriers of entry to success. Furthermore, the nested 
instrumental approach introduced and applied in this thesis suggests that IFC 
success is very much dependent on ensuring that financial policy mixes and 
policymakers are attuned to the political economic realities of the subsystem. 
Correspondingly, failure to address subsystem configurations is also likely to 
lead to IFC failure.  
However, it is noted that such conjectures on failure based on success 
factors is insufficient in terms of providing a deeper understanding of IFC 
failure and its causes. As such, there remains a need for further research on 
failed IFC’s, which will allow for a clearer understanding of why these IFC’s 
have failed. In a similar vein to this thesis, research into failed IFC’s will 
necessarily have to take into account the political economic context within 
which IFC’s have failed. This requires taking a nested instrumental approach 
to studying failed IFC’s.  
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Another potential avenue for future research is the study of second-
tiered developing Asian IFC’s such as Shenzhen, Kuala Lumpur, Qatar, and 
Dubai, just to name a few. While these IFC’s have enjoyed varying degrees of 
success, they are still relatively new as IFC’s and their development, size and 
scale continue to lag behind Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai. This 
makes it problematic to compare these less developed but nonetheless 
successful IFC’s with Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, given that these 
three IFC’s possess much larger financial sectors and are essentially much 
more developed as IFC’s.  
Future research may focus on these other emerging Asian IFC’s by 
studying their success factors, the policies enacted in their development, as 
well as the political economic context within which their development as 
taken place. The nested instrumental approach provides a useful analytical 
framework for the future study of these other emerging Asian IFC’s. With the 
development of the nested instrumental approach in this thesis, there is also 
potential for future applications of this new analytical framework to other 
policy areas, given that politics generally permeates policymaking across issue 
areas.  
Lastly, this thesis was hampered by empirical limitations arising from 
challenges or difficulties encountered in the field. In particular, there was a 
reluctance on the part of respondents to provide sensitive information. In 
instances where respondents did provide sensitive information, many of them 
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chose to remain anonymous. As Chapter 3 has shown, this reflects existing 
power relations within the three IFC’s and in Asian IFC’s in general. In other 
words, there is a general aversion or fear of being ‘punished’ by the prevailing 
powers or authorities for revealing information that was not mean for the 
public domain.  
While this thesis has addressed this problem by triangulating interview 
data with archival and secondary data, there remains a need to improve the 
information gathering process, particularly when working within the East 
Asian context. More needs to be done to assure potential interviewees of the 
anonymity of their responses and the protection of their identities. More 
fundamentally, there is an overall reluctance on the part of both public and 
private sector individuals to participate in interviews in the first place, as 
reflected the high levels of rejection encountered in the process of this 
research.  
This too reflects the prevailing power relations of East Asian IFC’s. 
Unfortunately, little can be done about this. As researchers and scholars, we 
can only hope that the authorities operating in these jurisdictions will 
eventually become more open and liberal in terms of informational disclosure 
and sharing of data with researchers. Nonetheless, researchers can work at 
assuring the authorities that collection and analysis of data is carried out 
purely for scholarly and research purposes, and that research projects are not 
politically motivated. This in turn requires researchers themselves to take an 
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objective and empirically-driven approach to studying politics, even as they 
remain cognizant of the place which their research and the subjects occupy 
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
Introduction 
This interview is part of a larger comparative research study on financial 
regulation across various jurisdictions in East Asia. This is an open-ended, 
semi-structured expert interview that will allow the respondent to share his/her 
experiences in financial regulation and reflect on these experiences. Guiding 
questions will be used to direct the interview, with respondents granted 
flexibility and candour in their responses.   
Respondents are encouraged to be frank and forthcoming with their responses. 
General Questions 
(1) How long have you been working for your organization? 
a. What are your main duties? 
(2) In working for your organization, have you ever interacted with or 
consulted other organizations on a formal basis? 
a. If yes, please list these organizations. 
b. What is the frequency of such interaction?  
c. How would you describe your experiences and interactions 
with these other organizations? 
(3) In working for your organization, have you ever interacted with or 
consulted other organizations on an informal basis? 
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a. If yes, please list these organizations. 
b. What is the frequency of such interaction?  
c. How would you describe your experiences and interactions 
with these other organizations? 
Specific Questions 
Financial Regulators 
As a financial regulatory, what are the main goals of your regulatory 
policy/activity? 
 Are these goals formally defined by your organization?   
o If not, who defines these goals? 
 What difficulties do you face in achieving your goals? 
 Do these goals include financial sector development? 
 Is financial system stability more important, less important, or equally 
important as financial market development? 
 Do you think financial regulation has any role to play in financial 
sector development/expansion? 
Please describe some of the means or methods used in pursuing these goals.  
 How are such means or methods chosen?  
 Do you think these means or methods are effective or appropriate for 
achieving their stated goals? 
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There have been various instances whereby regulatory reform has been 
beneficial to your city’s development as a financial centre. 
 How often is regulatory reform conducted with a view to growing or 
developing the financial sector? 
 Can you recall any specific regulations contributing to growth in a 
particular financial market, which you or your department has enacted? 
 Were the goals of this specific regulation geared towards financial 
system stability, financial market development, or both? 
 How do you view your agency/organization’s role in: 
o Maintaining financial system stability (very 
important/important/neural/not important) 
o Stimulating financial market development (very 
important/important/neural/not important) 
o Do you think these two goals are complementary? 
According to your organization’s website, your organization places significant 
focus on the promotion of your city as an international financial centre 
 Can you tell me a little more about the policies/ordinances that have 
contributed to the promotion of your city as an international financial 
centre? 
 As a regulator, how do you perceive your role in the success of your 
city’s financial sector?  
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How often do you consult and engage with external actors? 
 Who selects these actors? 
 What are the criteria used in identifying external actors to consult? 
Have any external actors, on their own volition, ever put forward policy ideas 
or requested consultation with your organization pertaining to policy issues? 
 Are there any channels through which such feedback is received? 
Do you or your department/organization interact with financial 
institutions/professionals regularly? 
 How often do you do so formally? 
 How often do you do so informally? 
Do you or your department/organization interact with non-governmental and 
non-financial sector organizations or individuals? 
 How often do you do so formally? 
 How often do you do so informally? 
In your opinion, what is the role of the private sector in financial regulation? 
 Does this role complement your organization? 
 Does this role benefit the financial sector (in terms of financial system 
stability and financial market development)? 
Finance-Sector Professionals (Bankers/Insurers/Wealth Managers, etc)  
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Please describe your relationship or your organization’s relationship with your 
city’s financial regulators  
 Good/warm/average/cordial/bad 
 How often do you or your organization/department interact with 
financial regulators on a formal basis? 
 How often do you or your organization/department interact with 
financial regulators on an informal basis? 
Are you or your organization consulted prior to the enactment of any new 
rules or regulations by financial regulators? 
 How often does this occur? 
 Can you describe in greater detail an instance of this? 
 Can you describe in greater detail the sort of feedback that you have 
contributed to such consultations? 
What is your view on the impact of financial regulatory policy on your 
organization’s operations and business going concern? 
 Have financial regulations been beneficial to your organization’s 
business model and going concern? 
 Can you think of a regulation that has proven beneficial (in terms of 
improving profits) to your organization or department? 
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 Can you think of a regulation that has proven disadvantageous (in 
terms of inducing losses or unnecessary costs) to your organization or 
department? 
In your opinion, what is the role of the private sector in financial regulation? 
 Does this role benefit your organization’s operations and prospects? 
 Does this role benefit the financial sector (in terms of financial system 
stability and financial market development)? 
Interested Public (Academics/NGO’s, etc) 
Please describe your relationship or your organization’s relationship with your 
city’s financial regulators  
 Good/warm/average/cordial/bad 
 How often do you interact with financial regulators on a formal basis? 
 How often do you interact with financial regulators on an informal 
basis? 
How often have you served on a consultative or advisory committee involving 
financial or regulatory policy? 
 Can you describe in greater detail any of the policy recommendations 
or advice that you have provided in your capacity as a 
consultative/advisory committee member? 
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 Were all your recommendations taken into serious consideration or 
enacted as policy? 
 Do you feel that you have contributed to financial policy-making in 
your city? 
Please tell me more about how these consultative/advisory committees 
operate. 
 How often does the committee meet? 
 Who sets the agenda for these meetings?  
 Who leads the discussion at these meetings? 
In your opinion, what is the role of the civil/non-state sector in financial 
regulation? 
 Does this role benefit the financial sector (in terms of financial system 
stability and financial market development)? 
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